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Abstract
For the past forty years, the global economy has faced many challenges,
including the increasing complexity and sophistication of financial markets,
which created a new type of frictions that were in the origin of several recessive
episodes such as the 2008 financial crisis. Such events were largely unexpected
and much deeper than most theoretical macroeconomic models have predicted
until that point, and the subsequent recovery was much slower. As a result,
many macroeconomic models were heavily criticized for omitting key financial
mechanisms and shocks stemming from the financial sector.
To overcome this gap, a large number of studies that started characterizing
the cyclical properties of financial variables such as the risk premium, firms’
equity and debt flows at an aggregate level has proliferated exponentially
during the last decades, as well as the diversity of different aspects of the
financial sector that were conveniently modelized, such as the impact of credit
supply conditions and borrowing constraints. Among that extensive plethora
of macrofinancial models, emerged a cluster of authors devoted to analyze the
role of financial frictions as a source of business cycle fluctuations. This thesis
contributes to that branch of the literature in three different ways.
Chapter 1 proposes a measure the welfare effects of financial shocks as
a percentage of consumption in a real business cycle model and compare it
with the welfare costs of a productivity shock. In this model firms use both
equity and debt financing, and financial shocks are modelled as stochastic
innovations in the probability to recover from the debt’ liquidation value in
case of default, as a result of a tightening of firms’ financing conditions. The
main results show that financial shocks explain a significant extent of the
macroeconomic dynamics of real and financial variables observed during fi-
nancial crises, including the events occurred during the recent 2008 financial
recession. The findings also suggest that although the welfare costs imposed
by financial shocks computed in this framework are small, their relevance as
a source of disturbances in business cycles cannot be underestimated, since
it is estimated that the welfare cost of a financial shock is approximately 4
times larger than the welfare cost of a standard productivity shock in the
economy, assuming that there is a tax benefit over the gross interest rate and
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that there is an equity payout cost that represents the rigidities affecting the
substitution between debt and equity.
Chapter 2 establishes a comparison between the empirical time series of
major macroeconomic aggregates during the period 1984Q1-2014Q2 with the
simulated series computed from the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model in
terms of variability, persistence and amplitude of a productivity and a financial
shocks, and between the respective impulse responses to each shock. The main
goal is to infer if this model provides a solid theoretical framework capable of
replicate and anticipate large and deep recessions caused by financial shocks,
such as the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent Great Recession. I conclude
that, despite being able to capture reasonably well the timing of the shocks
and the consequent downfall of the real side of the economy that follows after
the shock hits, the model is unable to replicate the magnitude, persistence
and volatility found in the data. This paper also includes a brief survey which
describes the sequence of events that led to the crash of the financial system
in the U.S. in 2008 and characterizes the empirical behavior of financial and
real variables during and after that period.
Chapter 3 applies a New Keynesian DSGE model in which the nominal
interest rate is determined according to a truncated Taylor rule and includes
eight different shocks based on Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Smets and
Wouters (2007) to study the role of an interest rate subsidy as a fiscal in-
strument able to circumvent completely (or at least partially) the effects of a
binding zero lower bound in the economy. This paper shows that, generally,
the standard structural shocks such as preference and technological shocks are
large enough to activate the zero lower bound constraint, as well as financial
innovations. However, these findings also suggest that, during and after re-
cession periods, when the zero lower bound binds, those shocks produce wider
responses of output and the major macroeconomic aggregates than they would
produce in an unconstrained economy, in terms of persistence and volatility.
This paper also shows that by manipulating an interest rate tax subsidy to
overcome the zero bound problem, it is possible to circumvent the zero lower
bound completely, but at the cost of not achieving the first best allocation.
I also quantify the tax benefit that would be sufficient to partially neutralize
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the effects of the zero lower bound constraint when different types of shocks
affect the economy.
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Introduction
For the past forty years, the global economy has faced many challenges, including
the increasing complexity and sophistication of financial markets, that changed the
pre-existent dynamics between the real economy and financial institutions and trig-
gered the emergence of a new type of frictions that were in the origin of several reces-
sive episodes such as the 2008 financial crisis. Such events were largely unexpected
and much deeper than most theoretical macroeconomic models have predicted until
that point, and the subsequent recovery was much slower. This failure in predicting
the extension and depth of those recessions and neglecting the importance of the
financial sector of a potential source of negative shocks had widespread implications
for economic policy and economic performance, and many macroeconomic models
were heavily criticized for omitting key financial mechanisms and shocks stemming
from the financial sector.
To account for this gap in the literature, a lot of effort have been devoted to
incorporate the financial sector into well established theoretical frameworks, such as
Real Business Cycle (RBC) models or in New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic Gen-
eral Equilibrium (DSGE) models. In these last decades, the number of studies that
started documenting and characterizing the cyclical properties of financial variables
such as the risk premium, firms’ equity and debt flows at an aggregate level has
proliferated exponentially, as well as the diversity of different aspects of the finan-
cial sector that were heavily scrutinized and discussed, such as the impact of credit
supply conditions, risk aversion quantification, economic agents’ expectations about
future policy actions and the effect of unconventional interventionist policies from
the central banks such as quantitative easing (QE) policies targeting yield curve or
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risk spreads. Among that extensive plethora of macrofinancial models, emerged a
cluster of authors devoted to analyze the role of financial frictions as a source of
business cycle fluctuations. This thesis contributes to that branch of the literature
in three different ways.
Chapter 1 was mainly motivated by the necessity to quantify the welfare losses
that households must face when are confronted with financial frictions and rigidities
that affect firms’ ability to borrow from financial intermediaries. Despite the fact
that it is originated in the financial sector, that enforcement constraint imposed
to firms and subject to random disturbances compromises the firms’ flexibility to
change their financial structure, i.e. decide the composition of debt and equity.
Since those disturbances that limit the firms’ capacity to borrow, they are referred
to as ”financial shocks”. The major goal in this Chapter is to measure the welfare
effects of financial shocks in a model with pecking order at the firm level, based
on the model of Jermann and Quadrini (2012), and present these results in relative
consumption units.
Although the results obtained are significantly small, they are consistent with
other important references related to the welfare analysis, such as Lucas (1987),
for example. According to my results, an agent in an economy affected only by the
financial shock would have to increase his consumption in 0.0245 per cent in order to
be as well off as in a frictionless economy without any type of shock, assuming that
the interest rate benefit and the equity payout cost are active in this economy. In
comparison, the welfare cost imposed by the isolated productivity shock is estimated
to represent a sacrifice of approximately 0.0013 per cent of the consumption of an
agent of that economy in comparison to the frictionless economy, which is almost
19 times smaller than the welfare cost imposed by the financial cost alone.
The importance of financial shocks as a source of serious economic downturns
is nowadays widely accepted by several authors, that generally agree that the vast
bulk of movements in aggregate real economic activity during the recent depressive
episodes such as the Great Recession were due to financial frictions.
Although the literature related with financial and banking shocks has expanded
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significantly and the number of theoretical models that aim to explain how those
financial frictions affect the real side of the economy has proliferated at a steady
pace since the 2008 financial crisis, not all of those frameworks are equally efficient
at replicating the behavior of financial and real variables during those episodes,
especially in terms of volatility and magnitude of the shocks.
Therefore, the main goal of Chapter 2 is to use the RBC model proposed by
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) to compare the empirical time series of major macroe-
conomic (financial and real) aggregates against the simulated series obtained using
that model, in terms of persistence, propagation and amplitude effects caused by a
financial and a productivity shock. The impulse response functions are also com-
puted in relation to both shocks. The ultimate goal is to infer if this framework is
able to replicate the behavior of those financial and real variables during and after
events as the 2008 financial crisis as it is described in the data.
Since the Great Recession originally started in the U.S. with the subprime finan-
cial crisis, I focus essentially on U.S. data. Although the full sample ranges between
1952.I-2014.II, I focus my analysis essentially on the period between 1984.I - 2014.II,
because it includes the time range originally chosen by Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
(1984.I - 2010.II) to calibrate their model and perform simulations. One of the major
exercises of this paper is precisely to quantify and evaluate the main changes in the
calibration of the model caused by the inclusion of this new set of observations in
the original sample, and also study the performance of the model while replicating
the data, specially in terms of the response of the major aggregates to exogenous
shocks.
In order to characterize the general environment that surrounded the 2007-2009
financial crisis, a short survey is also included in this paper, in which I describe the
main causes, triggers and consequences of that recession, since its early beginnings
with the burst of the housing bubble at the end of 2006, including the start of the
collapse of the financial system at the end of 2007 with the subprime crisis, and
until the later period of worldwide economic depression which is now denominated
the Great Recession.
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I conclude that overall, the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model is able to explain
the empirical evidence associated with the time sample considered (1984.I-2010.II).
The model seems to replicate relatively well the empirical evidence on volatility and
on correlation between the simulated variables and data. However, after updating
the data until 2014.II and after recalibrating the model the model seems unable to
reproduce more deep, prolonged and deep recessions triggered by productivity or
financial shocks such as the 2008 financial crisis.
The motivation for Chapter 3 stems from the fact that, since the Great Recession,
the major economies such as the U.S. have experienced an unusual combination of
features that include the weak growth of the GDP, low core inflation, and a real
interest rate close to zero. The process of recovery has been much slower than
usual in most high-income countries and has lasted longer than in previous financial
crises, leading to central banks’ efforts to stabilize the financial system through less
conventional quantitative easing measures, such as forcing the reference interest rates
near zero by the end of 2008, and held them there for an undefined amount of time,
allowing commercial banks to accumulate substantial cash reserves in their accounts.
This pattern of excess liquidity in the market accompanied by a real interest rate
close to zero implies the presence of a liquidity trap, under which conventional central
bank open-market operations are ineffective as an expansionary policy instrument.
Monetary authorities, therefore, began to consider alternative policy approaches for
escaping the trap, including raising the inflation target, depreciating the currency
and targeting long-term interest rates directly. Less conventional policies were also
considered, such as an excess reserve tax for commercial banks.
Chapter 3 studies the role of a tax benefit on the interest rate as an instrument
to overcome a liquidity trap. It also considers whether the imposition of a zero lower
bound constraint amplifies or not the negative impact of a financial shock in the
economy, particularly during and after the 2008 financial crisis. To accomplish this
goal, the structural DSGE model developed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) is used,
originally estimated with Bayesian maximum likelihood techniques. This structural
approach follows closely the model estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007), but
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with the addition of financial frictions and financial shocks. Then, I compare the
main findings against the results obtained in the most recent related literature,
particularly the model estimated by Lindé et al. (2016). These authors update
the Smets and Wouters (2007) by adding a financial accelerator mechanism, shocks
originated in the financial sector and by introducing explicitly the zero lower bound
into the model. They extend the model with a financial accelerator and allow for
time-variation in the endogenous propagation of financial shocks. However, their
approach to the financial shock and to the financial friction differ significantly from
the approach presented by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), and they do not focus on
the role of the interest rate subsidy as an attainable instrument to circumvent the
effects of the zero lower bound, which is the fundamental premise of this paper.
In general, the findings in this Chapter suggest that, in an economy constrained
by the binding presence of a zero lower bound imposed in a truncated Taylor rule by
the monetary authority, the presence of an interest rate subsidy and other frictions
(such as the equity payout cost, price and wages rigidities and investment adjustment
costs) helps to amplify and propagate the effects of shocks of very different sources
that can affect the economy.
Chapter 3 also shows that, generally, the standard structural shocks such as
preference and technological shocks are large enough to activate the zero lower bound
constraint, as well as financial innovations. However, these findings also suggest
that, during and after recession periods, when the zero lower bound binds, those
shocks produce wider responses of output and the major macroeconomic aggregates
than they would produce in an unconstrained economy, in terms of persistence
and volatility. These findings also show that by manipulating an interest rate tax
subsidy to overcome the zero bound problem, it is possible to circumvent the zero
lower bound completely, but at the cost of not achieving the first best allocation.
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Chapter 1
The Welfare Effects of Financial
Crises
1.1 Introduction
It is well documented and widely discussed that financial shocks played a cru-
cial role in the recent 2007-2009 financial crisis. In fact, several authors such as
Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Bernanke et al. (1999), Mendoza and Smith (2006) and Mendoza (2010)
have shown that the financial sector was one of the major sources of propagation
and persistence of business cycle fluctuations during the last 20 years, especially
during recent events starting with the subprime crisis in the summer of 2007. This
financial crisis inevitably led to an economic depression in which unemployment has
risen sharply, and consumption and investment dropped substantially, at least for
the most developed economies. But ultimately to what extent, in percentage terms,
did the average consumer lost in welfare due to these financial frictions?
The main objective of this paper is to measure the welfare effects of financial
shocks in a model with pecking order at the firm level, based on the model of Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) 1, and present these results in relative consumption units. At
1Which was based on Jermann and Quadrini (2009).
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a first stage, I build on their basic framework, which replicates simultaneously real
aggregate variables and aggregate flows of financing such as debt and equity. I follow
their method of construction of time series for the financial shocks from the model’s
enforcement constraint, using empirical data for debt, capital and output.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on welfare analysis, whose main
reference in the last decades is given by the work of Lucas (1987), later updated by
Lucas (2003). Lucas computed an estimate of the welfare gain associated with the
elimination of business cycles, and translated the comparison between an economy
with and without cycles into a comparison between an estimated time series repre-
sentation of the actual postwar U.S. consumption path and the trend part of the
representation. In order to establish a welfare comparison, Lucas assumed an in-
finitely lived risk-averse consumer, endowed with a stochastic consumption stream,
who maximizes expected utility. Lucas’ calculation assumed also that aggregate risk
is shared equally among all individuals.
Contrary to Lucas (1987), one of the main goals of this analysis is to measure the
isolated welfare effects of the financial shocks, not just the welfare effects of business
cycle fluctuations over the stream of consumption. That is a reason why I perform
my welfare cost calculations using a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model that considers
two exogenous shocks: a productivity and a financial shock. The productivity cost
is included in order to set the standard RBC model as a benchmark, and in order
to compare the direction and the magnitude of the financial shock against those of
a shock more studied and established in the literature. Therefore, I estimate four
different calibrated models to compute the welfare effects: a model with both the
productivity and the financial shocks, a model with only the financial shock, a model
with only the productivity shock (the real RBC benchmark economy, in this case),
and a model without any shock. Through all the simulations of all types of models I
compute the expected utility in the steady state, and then use those calculations to
perform the welfare cost analysis, following a similar method as the one described
by Lucas (1987).
In the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) framework the introduction of an interest
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rate tax benefit (in order to accommodate the existence of the U.S. debt tax shield
that makes all the interest paid on corporate debt tax deductible to the firms)
and the introduction of a quadratic adjustment cost function on equity payout are
crucial to the amplification and propagation effects of the financial shock in the
simulated economy, largely because they affect the way firms react to both shocks.
The link between the financial shock and the behavior of real variables, especially
labor, depends largely in the parameters associated with these frictions. Also, these
frictions determine the firm’s optimal level of debt even in the absence of stochastic
shocks. Therefore, I perform the different simulations of the model assuming the
presence or absence of those frictions. In total, assuming that both the financial and
the productivity shocks are exogenous, I run sixteen simulations to cover all possible
combinations of frictions and shocks that can change the households’ steady state
and lifetime welfare situation.
Since the introduction of the two financial frictions (the interest rate subsidy
and the equity payout cost) imply a significant change in the steady state levels of
the majority of the variables of the model, I applied a correction procedure in the
calculation of the expected utilities of those sixteen simulations, in order to avoid
the production of biased welfare effects estimates. I also include a more detailed
characterization of the equilibrium in this framework in order to obtain a better
understanding of the behavior of the model in the steady state when we consider
different scenarios for the two financial frictions.
The results obtained are significantly small, and this fact is consistent with a large
branch of the literature related to the welfare analysis, like the results obtained by
Lucas (1987), for example. According to my results, an agent in an economy affected
only by the financial shock would have to increase his consumption in 0.0245 per
cent in order to be as well off as in a frictionless economy without any type of shock,
assuming that the interest rate benefit and the equity payout cost are active in
this economy. In comparison, the welfare cost imposed by the isolated productivity
shock is estimated to represent a sacrifice of approximately 0.0013 per cent of the
consumption of an agent of that economy in comparison to the frictionless economy,
9
which is almost 19 times smaller than the welfare cost imposed by the financial cost
alone.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief liter-
ature review about the welfare analysis and the role of financial shocks over the
economy. Section 3 describes the standard RBC model presented by Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) with financial frictions and financial shocks. Section 4 defines and
characterizes the equilibrium of the benchmark economy and studies different cases
depending on the inclusion or exclusion of the two financial frictions. Section 5
describes the parameterization and estimation methods. Section 6 describes the
welfare effects analysis, presenting the methodology used and the main findings.
Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Literature
In the welfare effects’ literature, one of the main references is given by Lucas
(1987), who calculated an estimate of the welfare gain associated with the elimina-
tion of business cycles. He translated the comparison between an economy with and
without cycles into a comparison between an estimated time series representation
of the actual postwar U.S. consumption path and the trend part of the representa-
tion. In order to establish a welfare comparison, Lucas assumed an infinitely lived
risk-averse consumer, endowed with a stochastic consumption stream, who maxi-
mizes expected utility. Lucas’ calculation assumed also that aggregate risk is shared
equally among all individuals. His estimates implied welfare gains of no more than
a very small fraction of about one-twentieth of 1 per cent of consumption. With
different specifications this value changes slightly, but not significantly, e.g, for log-
arithmic utility the welfare gains are approximately 0.008 per cent of consumption.
However, one of the main criticisms pointed to the Lucas method is the assump-
tion regarding consumer homogeneity, both in terms of preferences, employment
status and wages. Several authors tried to overcome that handicap, such as Krusell
and Smith (1999), that also computed the welfare effects of eliminating business
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cycles, but assuming consumer heterogeneity which arises from uninsurable and id-
iosyncratic uncertainty in preferences and employment. Their calculations lead them
to conclude that the steady state average gains from eliminating business cycles are
higher than the Lucas (1987) representative-agent model estimates. Using a model
with a two-state process both for employment and for the productivity shock, they
obtained a long-run welfare gain from eliminating cycles of approximately 0.138 per
cent, which is much higher than the welfare gain of 0.008 per cent of consumption
estimated by Lucas (1987). However, in order to infer about the welfare effects of
eliminating business cycles for different groups of agents, Krusell and Smith (1999)
extended their calculations to include transition paths experiments, and they con-
cluded that those welfare gains are very small and even negative for almost all groups
covered in their estimations. In other words, on average, there is a welfare loss from
eliminating cycles, according to their model.
One needs to consider that their framework has several weaknesses: the precise
amount of those welfare effects depends largely on the calibration of the model, but
also on the initial aggregate capital stock and aggregate exogenous state. Further-
more, their model treats both the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shocks as exoge-
nous, which forces the construction of two different models to establish a comparison
between an economy with cycles and one without, using different assumptions re-
garding production possibilities and idiosyncratic shocks that are quite controversial.
They also do not consider idiosyncratic wage heterogeneity among agents, which can
constitute a much larger force to stimulate business cycle fluctuations than aggregate
wage risk, leading to larger estimates of the welfare costs of business cycles.
Other authors, such as Cooley and Hansen (1991), used a similar comparison
approach to estimate the revenue consequences and the welfare costs caused by
the inflation tax, introducing an equilibrium growth model with a cash-in-advance
constraint. Through this model, they examined how the presence of other distorting
taxes affects the welfare costs of inflation and the revenue that can be raised by the
inflation tax. Their welfare methodology consisted in computing the percentage
increase in consumption that an individual would require to be as well off as under
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the First Best allocation, which is one of the main principles also adopted in this
paper. Although the results confirm the widely held view that a permanent reduction
of the inflation rate to zero has positive welfare consequences, they also found that
the presence of other distorting taxes approximately doubles the estimated welfare
cost of the inflation tax and decreases the revenue potential of the tax, and that
policies which aim to eliminate the inflation only temporarily actually make the
economy worse off because of the substitution effect that occurs. However, their
model differs substantially from mine due to the presence of money and due to
the absence of uncertainty. They only compute welfare costs considering different
situations for the economy in the steady state, and do not include a dynamic analysis
of the transition between those different steady states.
There are authors such as Alvarez and Jermann (2000) that propose an alter-
native method to measure the cost of business cycles, by using an approach that
does not require the specification of preferences and instead uses asset prices. The
method is based on the marginal cost of consumption fluctuations, the per unit ben-
efit of a marginal reduction in consumption fluctuations expressed as a percentage
of consumption. They show that this measure is an upper bound for the benefit
of reducing all consumption fluctuations. We also clarify the link between the cost
of consumption uncertainty, the equity premium, and the slope of the real term
structure. They find that consumers ”would be willing to pay a very high price for
a reduction in overall consumption uncertainty.” However, for consumption fluctua-
tions corresponding to business cycle frequencies, we estimate the marginal cost to
be about 0.55% of lifetime consumption based on the period 1889-1997 and about
0.30% based on 1954-97.
In relation to the financial shocks’ literature, i.e. the field of the literature that
suggest that shocks originated in the financial sector can play an important role as a
source of macroeconomic fluctuations, it is always important to mention the major
contribution of the model of bank runs developed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
since this is a model which helped to clarify to a great extent the behavior of banks,
showing how these are able to create liquidity by investing in long-run projects and
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offering more liquid contracts.
However, since my model is most closely related to Jermann and Quadrini (2012),
this model embodies characteristics and influences from the branch of the literature
that defend that these shocks could constitute one of the major sources of macroe-
conomic fluctuations, such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke et al. (1999),
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), Mendoza and Smith (2006),
Mendoza (2010) and Christiano et al. (2010). In common, all these models assume
that shocks that directly or indirectly affect the financial sector lead to the genera-
tion of business cycles, either due to the existence of credit and collateral constraints
or other types of frictions that prevent several economic agents to access capital and
credit markets, leading to heterogeneity in the access to those markets, both for
firms and for households. These authors show that this type of shocks, based on the
interaction between credit limits and asset prices is a powerful transmission mech-
anism by which the effects of those shocks persists, amplify, and spill over to other
sectors of the economy. Although some of these models directly specify an interme-
diary sector, they do not consider shocks that directly affect the financial sector, as
in Jermann and Quadrini (2012), but they rather consider productivity or technol-
ogy shocks that triggers collateral constraints on domestic agents. Furthermore, the
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) framework also differ from those models by assuming
that firms are allowed to have negative equity payouts, which can be interpreted as
new equity issues.
One of the assumptions that constitute a key determinant of the impact of finan-
cial frictions in this environment is the trade-off between debt and equity, formalized
as a quadratic equity payout cost function. Modigliani and Miller (1958) in their
classical model showed that, if capital markets are frictionless, the total value (eq-
uity plus debt) of a firm is independent of the firm’s capital structure. However, in
this environment, financial frictions are introduced in the economy, and therefore,
rigidities between debt and equity must be taken into account, and are modelled as
a cost to the firm. The acknowledgement of this trade-off in the capital structure
of firms is well established in the corporate finance literature, as can be verified
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through the research of several authors, for example, Leary and Roberts (2005),
Scott Jr. (1976) and Miller (1977).
It is also important to consider whether the omission or presence of other dis-
torting taxes besides the interest rate subsidy considered in this framework is deter-
minant for the impact of the financial shocks over the behavior of the real variables.
Other authors such as Cooley and Hansen (1991), when studying the welfare costs of
the inflation tax, examined how the presence of distorting taxes on labor and capital
income affects those welfare costs and the revenue that can be raised by the inflation
tax, using an equilibrium growth model with a cash-in-advance constraint. Their
results show that the introduction of those taxes into their model approximately
doubles the estimated welfare cost of the inflation tax and decreases the revenue po-
tential of the tax. Cooley and Hansen (1991) also consider if the timing and duration
of the shocks produce significant changes in the welfare costs estimates of inflation,
and concluded that policies that reduce the inflation rate to zero only temporarily
actually make the economy worse off because of the intertemporal substitution that
takes place.
1.3 Benchmark Model
I use the framework presented by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), a standard RBC
model with financial frictions and financial shocks. The benchmark model consists
of a continuum of identical consumers and a continuum of identical firms. This
section starts to specify the firm’s problem and then the consumer’s firm.
1.3.1 Firms
There is a continuum of firms, in the [0, 1] interval. The production function is




t , where zt is the stochastic level of productivity, kt
is the input of capital and nt is the input of labor. It is assumed that zt follows the
stochastic process: zt = ρzzt−1 + εz, where εz is assumed to be i.i.d., have a zero
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mean and variance equal to σz. Innovations to zt are defined as the productivity
shocks in this framework, and they affect all firms. The capital stock kt is chosen at
time t− 1 and therefore predetermined at time t. Firms have more flexibility when
choosing the input of labor nt at time t.
The law of motion of capital is given by kt+1 = (1−δ)kt+it, where it is investment
and δ is the depreciation rate.
It is assumed that firms use both equity dt and debt bt in order to finance them-
selves. In this model, one of the main features is the pecking order in the financial
decision of firms between equity and debt. Debt is preferred to equity because of its
tax advantage, but the firms’ ability to borrow of limited by an enforcement con-
straint which is subject to random disturbances, designated as ”financial shocks”.
Given that rt is the net interest rate, the effective gross interest rate for the firm is
Rt = 1 + rt(1− τ), where τ denotes the tax benefit. This tax deduction enjoyed by
firms is paid for by a lump-sum tax on households. The tax advantage also implies
that the aggregate amount of debt Bt will always be strictly positive. According to
Amdur (2008) this creates a wedge between the gains a firm receives from issuing
a bond and the price that consumers pay for a bond. Since the firm perceives that
it can issue bonds at a favourable price due to the tax benefit, it has an incentive
to issue a positive amount of debt. However, the price of corporate debt increases
to consumers with the amount issued because of the monitoring costs to ensure
repayment supported by the investors/consumers, according to their assumptions.
Therefore, as the price of debt increases, consumer demand for corporate bonds
decline. The tradeoff between the tax advantage and monitoring costs is crucial to
define the equilibrium level of debt and the interest rate rt in equilibrium.
In order to finance working capital, in addition to the debt, bt, firms can raise
funds with an intra-period loan lt. According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012),
”working capital is required to cover the cash flow mismatch between the payments
made at the beginning of the period and the realization of revenues” (after produc-
tion). Therefore, according to Lucas timing, the intra-period loan is repaid at the
end of the period and there is no interest, by assumption. The assumption of the
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existence of this intra-period loan is a short cut to the fact that firms carry ”cash”
or ”liquidity” to the next period. The loan is then used to pay the equity holders
(including dividends) and to finance working capital (wages and investment), im-
plying that the payments of dividends comes from previous periods earnings. Firms
also issue equity shares st to its shareholders at the market price pt.
Firms start the period with intertemporal debt bt. Before producing they choose
labor, nt, investment, it = kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt and equity payout, dt, and they issue
new intertemporal debt, bt+1. Firms also contract an intra-period loan lt, since the
payments to workers, suppliers of investments, shareholders and bondholders are
made before the realization of revenues:
lt = wtnt + it + dt + bt − bt+1/Rt (1.1)
Therefore, the condition above can be interpreted as the equivalent to a cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraint in the standard literature.
The firm’s budget constraint is the following:
bt + wtnt + kt+1 + dt = (1− δ)kt + F (zt, kt, nt) + bt+1/Rt (1.2)
Using the previous two conditions follows that the intra-period loan is equal to
the firm’s production function/revenues, i.e. lt = F (zt, kt, nt). However, this is only
true as long as there is the tax benefit 2 (τ > 0).
Since firms can default on their obligations and divert some of its own resources
(specifically, the amount of liquidity available at period t, which corresponds to the
intra-period loan lt = F (zt, kt, nt)), the ability to borrow in both time horizons is
constrained by the limited enforceability of debt contracts. According to Jermann
and Quadrini (2012), ”the decision to default arises after the realization of revenues
2I will show this later in the characterization of the equilibrium, in Proposition 5 of Section
1.4.1.2.
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but before repaying the intra-period loan”. At this stage the firm holds a total
amount of liabilities given by the intra-period loan plus the new intertemporal debt,
i.e. lt + bt+1/Rt. In case of default, the only asset available for liquidation is the
physical capital kt+1, since firms can easily divert the total amount of liquidity
available at that period.
The renegotiation process between the firm and the lender in the event of default,
in this economy, takes place without the introduction of a well defined system of
financial intermediation. If the firm defaults, the lender acquires the right to liqui-
date the firm’s capital. It is assumed that at the moment of contracting the loan the
liquidation value of physical capital kt+1 is uncertain. With probability ξt the lender
will be able to recover the whole value kt+1 but with probability 1− ξt the recovery
value is zero. Neither the lender nor the firm are able to observe the liquidation
value before the actual default. Therefore, these two cases are considered separately
to determine the renegotiation outcome. In order to do so, it is assumed that the
firm has all the bargaining power in the renegotiation and the lender gets only the
threat value. The complete description of the renegotiation process is included in









When this constraint is binding, higher debt, either intertemporal or intra-
temporal, tightens the enforcement constraint, and a higher stock of capital has
the opposite effect. When this enforcement constraint does not bind 3, that is, when
lt < kt+1 − bt+1/(1 + rt), it imposes a liquidity cost that acts in the economy as
an inflation tax: if the disposable amount of liquidity lt = F (zt, kt, nt) given by the
production is not sufficient to make the payment that leaves the lender indifferent
between liquidation and keeping the firm in operation, then that implies that the
firm will not be able to finance working capital imposing an implicit tax on its
workers, investors, shareholders and bondholders.
3This happens when τ = 0, as I show in Proposition 6 of Section 1.4.1.2, in the characterization
of the equilibrium.
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The probability ξt is stochastic and follows the process ξt = ρξξt−1 + εξ. It is
common for all firms and depends on market conditions. We can interpret ξt as
the probability of non-default by the firms. Stochastic innovations to this variable
will be considered the ”financial shocks” of this model, since it affects the tight-
ness of the enforcement constraint, therefore affecting the borrowing capacity of the
firm. Hence, so far, we have two sources of aggregate uncertainty in this model:
productivity shocks, zt, and financial shocks, represented by ξt. Since there are no
idiosyncratic shocks, I will focus on the symmetric equilibrium solved for a repre-
sentative firm.
In order to better understand how ξt affects the financing and production decision
of firms, the enforcement constraint can be rewritten. In order to do so, and to
eliminate kt+1− bt+1/(1+rt) from the enforcement constraint, the budget constraint









+ F (zt, kt, nt) (1.3)













≥ F (zt, kt, nt) (1.4)
It is assumed that at the beginning of the period kt and bt are given, thus the
only variables that are under the control of the firm are the input of labor, nt, the
equity payout, dt and the new intertemporal debt, bt+1.
Assuming as a starting point for the analysis a stationary state in which the
enforcement constraint is binding and the firm plans to keep the production structure
unchanged (especially labor), then from the condition above it is possible to conclude
that a negative financial shock (lower ξt) implies either a reduction in equity payout
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dt or a decrease in the employment level nt. The effect over the intertemporal debt








adding that to the left hand term of the budget constraint,
bt+1
1 + rt
, gives a negative
response to a negative financial shock. In other words, in order to accommodate the
effects of the negative financial shock in the level of production, the firm is forced
to choose between increasing its equity or decreasing the new intertemporal debt.
However, if for some reason the firm is not able to reduce dt or bt+1, due to the
degree of rigidity with which the firm can change its financial structure, the only
option left is to reduce the employment level nt.
This analysis become more clear if we consider the case where τ = 0. In that





(1− δ)kt − bt − wtnt − dt
]
≥ F (zt, kt, nt). (1.5)
However, it is necessary to take into account that when the tax advantage is
absent, the enforcement constraint may not bind in equilibrium. In that case, a
negative financial shock may not necessarily imply a reduction in the equity payout
or employment in order to keep the level of production of the economy unchanged.
On the other hand, in the case of a positive and persistent productivity shock
the firm would like to both increase investment and rise its capital stock in the
next period (to take advantage of higher expected productivity) and also would
like to pay more to shareholders, to pass on the unexpected increase in lifetime
profitability, i.e., to increase the equity payout. In order to fulfil these goals, and if
debt is available and the cost of changing the equity payout cost is low or absent,
the firm will borrow heavily instead of increase its equity to boost its capital stock
and increase future payments to shareholders. If, however, the cost of adjusting
equity is high, the firm will refrain from borrowing to avoid large volatilities in its
payout. As a consequence, the firm’s adjustment in equity payouts is slower, and
the issuance of new debt will decrease both in magnitude and in frequency in time.
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Therefore, whether the financial shock affects employment depends crucially on
the trade-off between debt and equity when the firm has to decide the composition of
its financial structure. In other words, the Modigliani-Miller theorem (see Modigliani
and Miller (1958)) asserting the irrelevance of firms asset structures does not apply
in this economy when the enforcement constraint binds.
To formalize the rigidities affecting the substitution between debt and equity,
and in order to capture the frictions associated with paying dividends, I assume
that the firm’s payout is subject to a quadratic adjustment cost, following Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) framework. Given that dt is equity payout, the actual cost for
the firm is given by:
ϕ(dt) = dt + κ(dt − d)2,
Where κ ≥ 0, and d is a parameter equal to the long-run payout at the steady
state.
According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012), the equity payout can be interpreted
as a way of modelling the flexibility and ”the speed with which firms can change the
source of funds when financial conditions change, i.e. it can be interpreted as the
financial cost in which firms have to incur due to the trade-off between equity and
debt”. In order to change the composition of its portfolio, the firm must incur in
legal and accounting costs associated with issuing and repurchasing equity shares,
as well as costs associated with adjusting their equity payouts to shareholders. The
parameter κ is a measure of the scale of the adjustment cost of the firm’s payouts
to shareholders. The quadratic cost function implies that the adjustment cost is
increasing in the deviation of today’s equity payout from its long term steady-state
payout target. The convex functional form of the adjustment cost given here is
meant to mimic the empirical evidence that the preferences of managers turn to
dividend smoothing over time.
The parameter κ is determinant to evaluate the impact of financial shocks over
the rest of the economy. When κ = 0, the economy is almost equivalent to a fric-
tionless economy, and in this case, ”debt adjustments triggered by the enforcement
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constraint can be costlessly accommodated through changes in firm equity”, ac-
cording to Jermann and Quadrini (2012). When κ > 0, the substitution between
debt and equity becomes costly and the adjustment to a different financial structure
becomes slower, affecting the firm’s production decisions. This is the main reason
why financial shocks will produce non-negligible short-term effects on the production
decision of firms.
Besides issuing non-contingent bonds bt, firms also issue equity shares st, at the
market price pt. Let us denote the total amount of equity payout received from
owning shares as d′t (and the net equity payout simply as dt), in order to solve the
firm’s optimization problem. Then, d′t can be defined as d
′
t = stdt + pt(st− st+1), as
the sum of the total amount of dividends distributed by the shareholders in period
t and the total net amount of share repurchases available in the same period.
The individual state variables are the capital stock, k, the debt, b, and the equity
shares, s. The aggregate states are the equity payout d and the input of labor, n.












(1− δ)kt + F (zt, kt, nt)− wtnt +
bt+1
Rt
+ ptst = bt + ϕ(d
′







≥ F (zt, kt, nt)
Where mt+j is the stochastic discount factor, which will be defined later in the
hoseholds’ optimization problem. This variable, along with the wage and the interest
rate are all determined in the general equilibrium and are all taken as given by the
representative firm.
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Denoting by λ and µ the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget and en-







(st+jdt+j + pt+j(st+j − st+1+j))
+λt+j
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− F (zt+j , kt+j , nt+j)
)]




t− d)2 = stdt + pt(st− st+1) + κ(stdt + pt(st− st+1)− d)2
is the equity payout cost function depending on the sum of the total amount of
equity payout received from owning shares d′t and ϕd(d
′
t) = st + 2κst(d
′
t − d̄) =
st + 2κst(stdt + pt(st − st+1) − d̄) denotes the first derivative of that function in
relation to dt, the net equity payout.
The first-order conditions of this optimization problem for dt, nt, kt+1 and bt+1
and st+1 are:












































[pt+1 − ϕs(d′t)] = pt (1.11)
TV C : lim
t→∞
Etβ
tλtkt = 0 (1.12)
TV C : lim
t→∞
Etβ
tλtbt = 0 (1.13)
TV C : lim
t→∞
Etβ




t) = st + 2κst(d
′
t − d̄) = st + 2κst(stdt + pt(st − st+1)− d̄) back
into each one of these conditions we obtain:
Fn(zt, kt, nt) = wt
(
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1 + 2κ(d′t − d̄)
1 + 2κ(d′t+1 − d̄)
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1 + 2κ(d′t − d̄)
1 + 2κ(d′t+1 − d̄)
)
pt+1 = pt (1.18)
First of all, it must be noted that none of these conditions depend directly on




t+1. This fact will be used later when I show the
irrelevance of the equity shares determination in the equilibrium.
According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012), each one of these conditions have
an intuitive interpretation that provides further insights into the model. The first
condition (1.15) determines optimality for labor, where the left hand side of the equa-
tion is the marginal productivity of labor and the right hand sight is the marginal
cost of labor, as usual. However, in this case the marginal cost differs from the
standard expression because the wage rate is augmented by a wedge that depends
on the ”effective” tightness of the enforcement constraint, given by µϕd(d). Due to
this wedge, a tighter constraint increases the effective cost of labor and reduces its
demand, decreasing employment. Therefore, this friction in labor demand consti-
tutes the main channel of transmission of financial shocks to the real sector of the
economy.
From the second condition (1.16) it is not immediately clear whether the deter-
mination of the optimal level for capital in this economy depends or not directly
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in the interest rate rt. In this case, the marginal productivity of capital is also
negatively influenced by the wedge µtϕd(dt), which implies that the tighter the en-
forcement constraint and the higher the cost of equity payout, the lower will be
the stock of capital demanded in equilibrium. Solving the third condition (1.17)
in order of ξtµtϕd(dt) and substituting the result into the second condition, we get










Rt − (1 + rt)
Rt
(1.19)
From this condition shows that the determination of capital in equilibrium does
not depend directly on ξt, and therefore its innovations (the financial shocks) do not
have a direct impact over the stock of capital. However, the financial shocks have
an indirect effect over the demand for capital through two channels: the multiplier
µt and the interest rate Rt. The higher the µt, i.e., the tighter is the enforcement
constraint, the higher the wedge over the marginal productivity of capital, and
consequentially the smaller the demand for capital. If we consider the special case in
which the cost of payout is zero, i.e., κ = 0, this implies that ϕd(dt) = ϕd(dt+1) = 1.
Applying this condition, (1.9) and (1.19) become, respectively:
Emt+1
[
(1− µt+1)Fk(zt+1, kt+1, nt+1)
]
+ ξtµt = 1
Emt+1
[
(1− µt+1)Fk(zt+1, kt+1, nt+1)− (rt + δ)
]
=
Rt − (1 + rt)
Rt
As we can see from the second expression, even in the absence of the cost of
equity payout, the demand for capital is always pinned down by the tightness of the
enforcement constraint.
Condition (1.10) is the first order condition for debt, and it clarifies the rela-
tionship between the probability of repayment ξt and the enforcement constraint
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multiplier µt. Again, in order to better understand the intuition behind this con-
dition, it is convenient to consider the special case in which the cost of payout is
zero, i.e. κ = 0. In this case ϕd(dt) = ϕd(dt+1) = 1 and condition (1.10) becomes
RtEmt+1 +ξtµtRt/(1+rt) = 1, which implies that the Lagrange multiplier µt is fully
determined by the aggregate prices Rt, rt and Emt+1. It is also clear from condi-
tions (1.8) and (1.9) that the production and investment choices of the firm (labor
and capital choices, respectively) only depend on these prices. Taking as aggregate
prices Rt, rt and Emt+1 as given, condition (1.10) with κ = 0 implies that ”there
is a negative relationship between ξt and µt”. This means that ”lower liquidation
values of the firm’s capital make the enforcement constraint tighter”. Then from
condition (1.8) this negative relationship imposes that a higher µt implies a lower
demand for labor. Changes in ξt only affect the investment policy of the firm given
by condition (1.9) if they change the aggregate prices Rt and Emt+1. But as long
as the aggregate prices are not affected, the policy of the firm remains unchanged in
these circumstances. It is also possible to observe that, in the absence of the equity
payout cost, if the enforcement constraint is not binding in neither the current nor
the next period, the Lagrange multiplier is µt = µt+1 = 0. Then conditions (1.8)
and (1.9) that determine the choice of labor and capital become Fn(zt, kt, nt) = wt
and Emt+1[1− δ + Fk(zt+1, kt+1, nt)] = 1, that is, the marginal productivities equal
their marginal costs, just like in a standard real business cycle framework.
According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012) ”this mechanism is reinforced when
k > 0, since in that case it is costly to re-adjust the financial structure, and the
change in ξt induces a larger movement in µt”. In other words, a fall in the liquidation
value of the firm’s capital (a negative financial shock) will make the enforcement
constraint tighter. In the first period t after the shock, this will lead to a reduction
in the demand of labor. Then, starting from the next period t + 1, the input of
capital will also decrease.
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1.3.2 Households
The households sector is composed by a continuum of homogeneous households.
According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012) assumptions, ”households are the owners
(shareholders) of firms. In addition to equity shares, they also hold non-contingent
bonds issued by firms”.
Households maximize their lifetime expected utility subject to their budget con-












wtnt + bt + st(dt + pt) =
bt+1
1 + rt
+ st+1pt + ct + Tt
where where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the information set
at time t = 0, Ω0, ct is consumption, β is the discount factor, and Tt = Bt+1/[1 +
rt(1− τ)]−Bt+1/(1 + rt) are lump-sum taxes financing the tax benefit of debt and
firms.
After defining the Lagrangian of the problem, the first order conditions with
respect to nt, bt+1 and st+1 are:
wtUc(ct, nt) + Un(ct, nt) = 0 (1.21)
Uc(ct, nt)− β(1 + rt)EUc(ct+1, nt+1) = 0 (1.22)
Uc(ct, nt)pt − βE(dt+1 + pt+1)Uc(ct+1, nt+1) = 0 (1.23)
TV C : lim
t→∞
Etβ
tλtbt = 0 (1.24)
The first condition determines the supply of labor and the second condition is the
Euler equation that determines the interest rate. The third condition determines the
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price of shares, which states that, adjusted for dividends and discounting, the share
price follows a first-order univariate Markov process and that no other variables can
Granger cause the share price. Using forward substitution in this last condition I









According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012), this last equation confirms that
firms’ optimization is consistent with households’ optimization. Therefore, ”the
stochastic discount factor is mt+j = β
jUc(ct+j, nt+j)/Uc(ct, nt)”.
1.4 Equilibrium
Now, a general equilibrium is specified in Definition 1.
DEFINITION 1 (Equilibrium): Given that the aggregate states s˙t are the pro-
ductivity zt, the variable ξt, the aggregate capital Kt, and the aggregate bonds Bt,
a competitive equilibrium is defined as an allocation {ct(st), nt(st), kt(st)}∞t=0 all st;
debt and equity levels {bt(st), dt(st)}∞t=0 all st; and prices and policies {wt(st), rt,mt(st, st+1)(st)}∞t=0
all st, characterized by a set of functions for (i) households’ policies c
h(st), n
h(st)
and bh(st); (ii) firms’ policies d(st; kt, bt), nt(st; kt, bt) and bt(st; kt, bt); (iii) aggre-
gate prices wt(st), rt(s)t and wt(st, st+1); (iv) law of motion for the aggregate states
st+1 = Ψ(st), that solve the problems of the firms and the households, such that all
markets clear: (i) households’ policies satisfy conditions (21), (22) and (23) subject
to the budget constraint given in (20); (ii) firms’ policies are optimal and satisfy con-
ditions (8), (9), (10) and (11) maximizing the utility function subject to the firm’s
budget constraint and the enforcement constraint; (iii) the wage and the interest
rates clear the labor and bond markets through firms’ conditions (8) and (10) and
m(st, st+1) = βUc(ct+1, nt+1)/Uc(ct, nt); (iv) the law of motion Ψ(st) is consistent
with individual decisions and the stochastic processes for zt and ξt.
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1.4.1 Characterization of the Equilibrium
1.4.1.1 Equivalence Results on Allocations, Prices and Policies in Equi-
librium
I now show that the set of implementable allocations when firms issue both eq-
uity shares and redistribute equity payout to its shareholders is the same as the set of
implementable allocations when firms only issue the equity payout. In other words,
I show that, for a firm, issuing equity shares is the same as issuing equity payout, by
proving that every equilibrium allocations under st 6= 1 can be implemented under
st = 1, using the policy instruments available, i.e. the equilibrium is neutral to the
value of s, for all t. If there is an equilibrium set of allocations, prices and policies
that can be decentralized for a certain sequence of st 6= 1, then the same equilibrium
can be decentralized for a sequence of st = 1, for all t. But before show that result,
it is necessary to define and characterize the set of implementable allocations, prices
and policies when st = 1.
DEFINITION 2 (Set of implementable allocations) Assuming that the
equity shares are set as st = st+1 = 1, the set of implementable allocations, prices
and policies {dt, nt, ct, kt+1, bt+1, wt, rt}∞t=0, consistent with individual decisions and
the stochastic processes for z and ξ, and given the tax subsidy τ , is characterized by
the following implementability and feasibility conditions:






EUc(ct+1, nt+1) = 0 (1.26)



































(1− δ)kt + F (zt, kt, nt)− wtnt +
bt+1
Rt







≥ F (zt, kt, nt) (1.32)
TV C : lim
t→∞
Etβ
tλtkt = 0 (1.33)
TV C : lim
t→∞
Etβ
tλtbt = 0 (1.34)
TV C : lim
t→∞
Etβ
tλtst = 0 (1.35)
Where Rt = 1 + rt(1− τ) and ϕ(dt) is the equity payout cost function.
Proof . In order to show this proposition, I need to show that conditions (1.25),
(1.26), (1.27), (1.28), (1.29), (1.30), (1.31), (1.32), (1.33), (1.34) and (1.35) are
necessary and sufficient for an equilibrium allocation {dt, nt, ct, kt+1, bt+1, wt, rt}∞t=0.
Since the first three conditions (1.25), (1.26) and (1.27) are the first order condi-
tions and budget constraint for households; conditions (1.28), (1.29), (1.30) and
(1.31) are the first order conditions and the budget constraint for firms, where
mt+1 = βUc(ct+1, nt+1)/Uc(ct, nt) is the effective discount factor; condition (1.32) is
the enforcement constraint; and conditions (1.33), (1.34) and (1.35) are the transver-
sality conditions associated with the firms and households’ maximization problems,
then it is straightforward that all these conditions are necessary and sufficient. QED
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In order to show that issuing equity is equivalent to issuing and paying equity
payout, it is necessary to compare the set of implementable allocations in each case
and understand in which way those sets are related to each other 4. First, it is
important to prove that the set of allocations when st = st+1 = 1 is contained in
the set of allocations for all st ∈ <+. It is also necessary to show that the optimal
allocation in the larger set is an allocation in the setting st = st+1 = 1, so that it
follows that the optimal allocation is the same for both sets of allocations.
PROPOSITION 1. The set of implementable allocations under s∗t+1 = 1 is























Proof . Let st = s
∗
t+1 = 1. Then it implies that, in this case, the total amount of
equity payout received from owning shares d′t coincides with dt, the total amount of
dividends distributed to the shareholders in period t, i.e. d′t = dt. The equilibrium
conditions for firms (1.8), (1.9) and (1.10), collapse to the ones given in Definition
2, i.e. conditions (1.28), (1.29) and (1.30). If we inspect the transformed conditions
(1.15), (1.16) and (1.17), it is easy to confirm that these conditions are almost the
same as conditions (1.28), (1.29) and (1.30), except that without the assumption
that st = s
∗
t+1 = 1, we have d
′
t 6= dt. However, even without this assumption none
of the conditions (1.8), (1.9) and (1.10) depend directly in equity shares st, only
through the indirect influence of d′t in the equity payout cost function. The budget
constraint of the households and the firms also collapse to (1.27) and (1.31), respec-
tively, when st = s
∗
t+1 = 1 is imposed. Therefore, there are policies that implement
each allocation with st = s
∗
t+1 = 1. QED
Finally, we can show that the optimal allocation under st = s
∗
t+1 = 1 is the same
as the optimal allocation for any s∗∗t+1 6= 1. Then we have the following proposition:
4See Correia et al. (2008) for equivalence results and proofs on price-setting restrictions for the
conduct of cyclical fiscal and monetary policy
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given {τ}, k0, b0 and s0 is an equi-























Proof . We need to show that the optimal allocation under the larger set s∗∗t+1 6= 1
belongs to the set defined for any st = s
∗
t+1 = 1. Let’s consider the problem of choos-





















that maximizes utility subject to households’ budget constraint given in (1.27),
and solve firms’ optimization problem subject to the budget constraint and the en-
forcement constraint defined in (1.6), characterized by the conditions (1.21), (1.22),
(1.15), (1.16) and (1.17). When we set st = s
∗
t+1 = 1, then, given the equity payout




t − d)2 = stdt + pt(st − st+1) + κ(stdt +
pt(st− st+1)−d)2 and ϕd(d′t) = st + 2κst(d′t− d̄) = st + 2κst(stdt + pt(st− st+1)− d̄),
the equity payout cost function collapse to the original functional form presented
in Jermann and Quadrini (2012):(ϕ(dt) = dt + κ(dt − d)2). Given this, the firms’
budget constraint become the one under st = s
∗
t+1 = 1, and since the enforcement
constraint is common to both sets, then through Proposition 1 we know that the
equilibrium conditions for firms (1.15), (1.16) and (1.17) collapse to the ones given
in Definition 2, (1.28), (1.29) and (1.30), and the optimal solutions coincide. Thus,
the set of optimal allocations under s∗∗t+1 6= 1 also maximize welfare in the set of
allocations under st = s
∗
t+1 = 1. QED
1.4.1.2 First Best
In order to better characterize the equilibrium, it is necessary to find the First
Best allocation, or the allocation that maximizes the utility of the representative
agent subject to the disposable technology and the resource constraint of the econ-
omy. In this case, it is not possible to define the Pareto Optimal equilibrium allo-
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cation of this economy, that is, the allocation such that there is no other allocation
which some agents strictly prefer and which does not make any agents worse off,
since this model deals with the representative agent problem, not the general equi-
librium of the economy. Therefore, in order to find the First Best equilibrium of













ct + it = F (zt, kt, nt)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it
ct ≥ 0
k0 given
That is, a benevolent social planner maximizes the households’ utility function
subject to the resource constraint of the economy, in which capital investment follows
the law of motion defined previously. Given the presence of rational expectations
(so that each period’s decision takes into account new information acquired in that
period), the marginal utility of wealth (or the shadow price) λt is allowed to vary
across periods, being appropriately discounted. If we plug the capital law of motion
into the resource constraint of the economy, we can rewrite the latter as ct + kt+1−






U(ct+i, nt+i) + λt+i(F (zt+i, kt+1, nt+1)− ct+i − kt+1+i + 1− δ)
]}
(1.37)
Taking the necessary first order conditions with respect to the decision variables
and the multiplier we get:
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[Fk(zt+1, kt+1, nt+1)(1− δ)] = 1 (1.39)










t − ct − kt+1 + (1− δ)kt = 0 (1.41)
TV C : lim
→∞
Etβ
tλtkt = 0 (1.42)
From equation (1.38) we know that λt = Uc(ct, nt) =⇒ λt+1 = Un(ct+1, nt+1), for






[1− δ + Fk(zt+1, kt+1, nt+1)] (1.43)
From equations (1.38) and (1.40) we get the condition that represents the in-
tertemporal choice between consumption and labor:




We can retrieve the aggregate prices R, r, w and Em′ from the firms’ and the
households’ first order conditions only setting τ = 0 and κ = 0, as it is shown in
Proposition 4. From the firms’ maximization problem we have:
max
{nt,kt+1}∞i=0




Where H(z) is the distribution function for the stochastic productivity shock zt.
From the first-order conditions for this problem we get:
Fn(zt, kt, nt) = wt (1.46)
βEt[Fk(zt+1, kt+1, nt+1)−Rt + (1− δ)] = 0⇔ (1.47)
⇔ βEt[Fk(zt+1, kt+1, nt+1) + (1− δ)] = Rt (1.48)
Next, Proposition 3 identifies the implementable conditions and characterizes
the set of implementable allocations of the First Best equilibrium, and Proposition
4 shows that the set of equilibrium allocations of the social planner’s problem is the
same set of allocations that define the First Best equilibrium only when the financial
frictions are absent (τ = 0 and κ = 0).
PROPOSITION 3. (Set of implementable allocations of the First Best
allocation). Assuming that the equity shares are set as st = st+1 = 1, the set of im-
plementable allocations, prices and policies {dt, nt, ct, kt+1, bt+1, wt, rt}∞t=0, consistent
with individual decisions and the stochastic processes for z and ξ defined in the First
Best equilibrium of this economy, is characterized by the following implementability
and feasibility conditions:
1 = βEtmt+1 [1− δ + Fk(zt+1, kt+1, nt+1)] (1.49)
Fn(zt, kt, nt) = wt (1.50)
1 = RtEtmt+1 (1.51)
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ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt = F (zt, kt, nt) (1.52)







Proof . I need to show that conditions (1.49), (1.50), (1.51), (1.52) and (1.53) are
necessary and sufficient for an equilibrium allocation {dt, nt, ct, kt+1, bt+1, wt, rt}∞t=0.
Conditions (1.49) and (1.53) are derived directly from the social planner’s problem,
and equation (1.52) is the resource constraint of the economy. Condition (1.50),
which defines the labor demand, comes straightforward as a first order condition of
the firm’s problem (1.45), but additionally, if we combine the first order condition




Finally, condition (1.51) results from the combination of equations (1.43) and (1.48),
taking into account condition (1.53), relative to the stochastic discount factor. QED
PROPOSITION 4. (Implementability of the First Best allocation): As-
suming that the equity shares are set as st = st+1 = 1, and that the social planner’s
equilibrium set of implementable allocations and policies {dt, nt, ct, kt+1, bt+1}∞t=0, is
consistent with individual decisions and the stochastic processes for z and ξ, such
that prices can be recovered from the firms’s maximization problem, then that set of
implementable allocations, prices and policies {dt, nt, ct, kt+1, bt+1, wt, rt}∞t=0 corre-
sponds to the First Best allocation only if each allocation in this set of implementable
allocations can be implemented with policies which set τ = 0 and κ = 0.
Proof . We must show that any implementable set of allocations {dt, nt, ct, kt+1, bt+1}∞t=0
defined for st = st+1 = 1 in the competitive equilibrium with the implementation
of a policy such that τ 6= 0 and κ 6= 0 can only collapse to the First Best set of
allocations when that policy is set to omit the financial frictions, i.e. τ = 0 and
κ = 0. We know, from Definition 2, that such set of allocations is characterized by
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conditions (1.25) until (1.32). If we set τ = 0 and κ = 0 (which implies that the
enforcement constraint no longer binds, i.e. µ = 0, according to Proposition 5 and
6, then condition (1.26) and (1.30) collapse to condition (1.51), condition (1.28) col-




= wt, and the two budget constraints (1.27) and (1.31) (of
the household and the firm respectively) combined collapse into the resource con-
straint of the economy ct+kt+1−(1−δ)kt = F (zt, kt, nt). Therefore, it is shown that
any set of implementable allocations which characterize a competitive equilibrium
for any st = st+1 = 1 and where the financial frictions are absent (τ = 0 and κ = 0)
equals the set of implementable allocations which defines and characterizes the First
Best equilibrium. QED
The First Best allocation in this framework can therefore be defined as follows:
DEFINITION 3 (First Best Equilibrium): The First Best equilibrium can
be decentralized as an allocation {ct(st), nt(st), kt(st)}∞t=0 all st; debt and equity levels
{bt(st), dt(st)}∞t=0 all st; and prices and policies {wt(st), rt(st), pt(st),mt(s, st+1)(st)}∞t=0
all st, characterized by a set of functions for the social planner’s policies c
t(t),
nt(t),kt(t); (ii) firms’ policies d(st; kt, bt), n(st; kt, bt), b(st; kt, bt) and s(st; kt, bt);
(iii) aggregate prices w(st), r(st), p(st) and w(st, s’); (iv) law of motion for the
aggregate states s’ = Ψ(s), that solve the problems of the firms and the households,
such that all markets clear: (i) households’ policies satisfy conditions (1.20), (1.21)
and (1.22) subject to the budget constraint given in (1.20); (ii) firms’ policies are
optimal and satisfy conditions (1.8), (1.9), (1.10) and (1.11) maximizing the utility
function subject to the firm’s budget constraint and the enforcement constraint; (iii)
the wage and the interest rates clear the labor and bond markets through firms’ con-
ditions (1.8) and (1.10) and m(st, st+1) = βUc(ct+1, nt+1)/Uc(ct, nt); (iv) the law of
motion Ψ(st) is consistent with individual decisions and the stochastic processes for
zt and ξt.
From all these conditions, we can conclude that the First Best solution corre-
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sponds to a standard RBC where business cycle fluctuations are only driven by the
productivity/technological shock. In that framework, the enforcement constraint
is not binding, and the steady state solution is not affected neither by the equity
payout cost or by the tax advantage, which leaves firms indifferent in their choice
of financing through debt or equity. In other words, it corresponds to an econ-
omy where the Modigliani-Miller proposition apply 5, i.e. an economy under which
the total value (stocks plus debt) of a firm is independent of the firm’s financial
structure.
Given these conditions, it is necessary to identify the policy decisions affecting
the financial frictions represented by the parameters τ and κ that can decentralize
the First Best allocation of this model. It is shown in Proposition 5 and Proposition
6 below that such an allocation can only be decentralized through a competitive
equilibrium when we set both τ = 0 and κ = 0. These propositions are already
defined by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), therefore I reproduce them here for con-
venience.
In Proposition 5 it is shown that for a deterministic steady state with constant
z and ξ, the enforcement constraint is always binding. Proposition 6 shows that if
there is no tax advantage of debt, i.e. τ = 0 and there are no rigidities affecting the
substitution between debt and equity, that is, κ = 0, changes in ξ have no effect on
the real sector.
PROPOSITION 5: ”If τ > 0 the enforcement constraint binds in a steady
state.
Proof . In a deterministic steady state we have that m = 1/(1 + r) and
ϕd(d) = ϕd(d
′) = 1. Therefore, the first order condition for debt, equation (1.10),
simplifies to REm+ ξ̄µR/(1+r) = 1, where ξ̄ is the average value. Substituting the
above expression for m, we get R/(1+r)+ξ̄µR/(1+r) = 1. Because R = 1+r(1−τ),
this condition implies that µ > 0 if τ > 0. QED”
5See Modigliani and Miller (1958).
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PROPOSITION 6: ”With τ = 0 and κ = 0, changes in ξ have no effect on
employment n and next period capital k′.
Proof .When κ = 0 we have ϕd(d) = ϕd(d
′) = 1. Thus, the first order condition
(1.4) can be written as REm′ + ξµR/(1 + r) = 1. From the household’s first order




= 1, which implies that ξµ = 0 since R = 1+r when τ = 0. Therefore,
µ is always zero and, assuming that the aggregate prices do not change, n and k′
will not be affected by the change in ξ. We have to show next that the sequence of
prices remains constant if firms do not change n and k′. This becomes obvious once
we recognize that changes in debt issuance and equity payout associated with fluctu-
ations in ξ cancel out in household’s budget. Therefore, prices do not change. QED”
Therefore, according to this proposition, when τ = 0 and κ = 0 the only shock
that affects the economy is the productivity shock. This implies that the model
resembles a standard RBC framework where firms indifferent between debt and eq-
uity, i.e., where the Modigliani-Miller theorem applies. Given that, according to
these propositions, the First Best allocation can only be decentralized when τ = 0
and κ = 0. In the next Section 1.4.1.3, I study different scenarios of the model for
different values of τ and κ, assuming the presence or absence of the two shocks,
separately and simultaneously, and justify, for each case, why the First Best alloca-
tion is not achieved, comparing the equilibrium allocations. Then, in that section, I
also study the behaviour of the model assuming positive values for each one of the
shocks (financial and productivity), and compare the equilibrium outcomes of each
case with the First Best allocation.
1.4.1.3 Characterization with the financial frictions
This section studies how the two financial frictions of the model, the interest
rate subsidy represented by τ and the equity payout cost function which depends
on κ, are the major forces that prevent the equilibrium of this economy to achieve
the First Best allocation.
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First of all, it is important to understand how the First Best allocation can be
decentralized in this model. It was shown in Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 that
such an allocation can only be decentralized through a competitive equilibrium when
we set both τ = 0 and κ = 0.
For alternative values of τ and κ, however, these results are not necessarily true.
Now I analyse the behaviour of this economy when we let these two parameters
assume different positive values, first in an economy without random shocks, and
then with it.
1.4.1.3.1 First Case: τ = 0 and κ > 0 When we impose τ = 0, although
the steady state equilibrium always implies that µ = 0 (that is, the enforcement
constraint does not bind), it is not possible to achieve the First Best allocation in
this situation, because outside the equilibrium the presence of the equity payout
cost affects the stochastic discount factor, the firm’s budget constraint and also the
firm’s first order conditions in relation to labor and capital. The fact that κ > 0
implies that it is costly for the firms to re-adjust their financial structure, which
alone implies a larger volatility of the demand for labor and capital, respectively,
but also induces a larger movement of the shadow price of the enforcement constraint
µ, outside the steady state.
As it was already explained earlier in this paper, in order to better understand
this mechanism, it is important to first consider the special case in which the cost
of payout is zero, i.e., κ = 0. In this case ϕd(dt) = ϕd(dt+1) = 1 and condition
(1.10) becomes REmt+1 + ξtµtRt/(1 + rt) = 1, which implies that the Lagrange
multiplier µt is fully determined by the aggregate prices Rt, rt and Emt+1. It is
also clear from from conditions (1.8) and (1.9) that the production and investment
choices of the firm (labor and capital choices, respectively) only depend on these
prices. Taking as given Rt, rt and Emt+1, condition (1.10) with κ = 0 implies
that there is a negative relationship between ξt and µt. This means that lower
liquidation values of the firm’s capital make the enforcement constraint tighter, i.e.
the lower the probability that the lender can recover the full value kt+1, the tighter
is the enforcement constraint. Then, from condition (1.8) this negative relationship
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imposes that a higher µ implies a lower demand for labor. From condition (1.8) and
(1.9) it is possible to see that the labor and capital investment choices of the firm
only depend on aggregate prices. Changes in ξt only affect the investment policy of
the firm given by condition (1.5) if they change the aggregate prices Rt and Emt+1.
But as long as the aggregate prices are not affected, the policy of the firm remains
unchanged in these circumstances. It is also possible to observe that, in the absence
of the equity payout cost, if the enforcement constraint is not binding in neither
the current nor the next period, the Lagrange multiplier is µt = µt+1 = 0. Then
conditions (1.8) and (1.9) that determine the choice of labor and capital become
Fn(zt, kt, nt) = wt and Emt+1[1 − δ + Fk(zt+1, kt+1, nt)] = 1, that is, the marginal
productivities equal their marginal costs, just like in a standard real business cycle
framework, which constitutes the benchmark of this model.
When k > 0, this mechanism that establishes a negative relation between ξt and
µt is reinforced, since in that case it is costly to re-adjust the financial structure,
and the change in ξt induces a larger movement in µt. In other words, a fall in
the liquidation value of the firm’s capital (a negative financial shock) will make the
enforcement constraint tighter (µt increases). In the first period t after the shock,
this will lead to a reduction in the demand of labor, since the increases in µ increases
the marginal cost of labor, as it can be observed in condition (1.8). Then, starting
from the next period t+1, the input of capital will also decrease (see condition (1.9)).
Furthermore, in equilibrium changes in the financial policies of all firms also affects
aggregate prices prices Rt and mt+1, with some feedbacks on individual policies.
In the steady state, and assuming whether or not that there is no interest rate
benefit (i.e. τ = 0), having κ = 0 or a positive value for κ does not affect the
equilibrium conditions, because in this case we always have ϕd(dt) = ϕd(dt+1) =
1+2κ(dt− d̄) = 1+2κ(dt+1− d̄) = 1, since dt = dt+1 = d̄ must hold in the stationary
equilibrium. Hence, in these circumstances, the steady state calibrated value of κ
is irrelevant to determine changes on the steady state level of other variables of the
model.
Dynamically, however, the simulation of the model for different values of κ con-
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firms the mechanism between the value of κ, ξ and µ. Figure 1.1 plots the impulse
response functions (IRF’s) to the financial shock, for a model simulated with both
shocks and with both frictions (τ > 0 and κ > 0) and for the model simulated with
both shocks and the interest rate benefit but without the equity payout cost (τ > 0
and κ = 0). Figure 1.2 displays the same comparison between the impulse responses
of a one-time productivity shock of those two simulated models.
From Figure 1.1, in response to a positive shock to ξt (a negative financial shock,
since 1−ξt is the probability that the recovery value is zero, and therefore, represents
the financial shock as a phenomenon with negative effects over the economy), the
impulse responses of most of the variables are much greater when the equity payout
cost in included in the model (κ > 0). This fact is specially true for the multiplier
µ and the number of hours worked (nt), as predicted by the mechanism described
above, which predicts that, given the negative connection between the innovations
in ξt and the shadow price of the enforcement constraint µt, the volatility and the
impulse response of µt is much stronger the higher is the weight of the equity payout
cost, as measured by κ. As a consequence, the impulse responses to the financial
shock for labor, capital, output, consumption and also the aggregate prices Rt and wt
are much higher when the equity payout cost is present. The only exceptions are the
impulse responses for debt repurchases and equity payout, whose impulse responses
to the financial shock become weaker when κ > 0. One possible explanation is that
with the presence of the equity payout cost, re-adjustments of the financial structure
are costly and slower for firms to readjust, and therefore, the impulse responses of
debt and equity payout to the financial shock are smoother.
In relation to the productivity shock, these differences in the sign and the mag-
nitude of the impulse response functions are not that larger as in the financial shock
case, as can be observed in Figure 1.2. For κ = 0 all the impulse responses are
higher than in the case where the equity payout cost is present (and calibrated as
κ = 0.146), for most variables, except for debt repurchases bt and the Lagrange
multiplier µt. These impulse responses confirm the mechanism that operates when
a positive productivity shock occurs: firms increase their investment and raise its
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capital stock in the subsequent periods after the shock to take advantage of higher
expected productivity, which has an amplification effect over output, consumption,
the wage rate and the gross interest rate. Debt repurchases decrease (i.e. the
outstanding debt of firms increases) and the equity payout falls since firms prefer
to increase their leverage and take advantage of higher productivity to finance fu-
ture payments to shareholders, instead of raising the equity payout and dividends.
However, these effects occur when the equity payout cost is absent, but they are
substantially reduced when κ > 0. In that case, the cost of adjusting equity is high,
which makes the impulse response for equity payout much lower in magnitude and
smoother over time, and inducing firms to reduce the issuance of new debt, as can
be observed in the impulse response of debt repurchases in Figure 1.2.
However, the effect of the productivity shock over hours worked has a more inter-
esting behaviour when the equity payout cost is present. In fact, when it is expected
a higher productivity, then the marginal productivity of labor is also expected to in-
crease, raising its demand, as can be observed in condition (1.8). The marginal cost
of labor is lower when the equity payout is absent, since the wedge that augments
the wage rate only depends on the shadow price of the enforcement constraint, µt,
in that case. Therefore, when the productivity shock hits the economy and the
marginal productivity of labor rises, the difference to the marginal cost is greater
when κ = 0, and so the impulse response of hours worked to this shock is positive
and far greater than in the case where the equity payout cost is absent. Therefore,
to a certain extent, the effect of the productivity shock over employment depends on
the trade-off between debt and equity when the firm has to decide the composition
of its financial structure.
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Figure 1.1: Impulse Responses to one-time Financial Shock with and without the Equity Payout Cost
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Figure 1.2: Impulse Responses to one-time Productivity Shock with and without the Equity Payout Cost
1.4.1.3.2 Second Case: τ > 0 and κ = 0 The presence or absence of the
interest rate benefit is crucial in the model, because it can cause serious changes at
the steady state level which can bias completely the welfare analysis of the model.
The parameter τ is crucial for the quantitative performance of the model because it
determines whether or not the enforcement constraint is binding, as it was shown in
Proposition 5. In fact, in the deterministic steady state of this economy we have µ̄ =
τ(1− β)
1− τ(1− β)
, and hence, the enforcement constraint becomes tighter in the steady
state as the value of the tax benefit τ increases. This has important consequences
in the steady state variables of the model: as the value of τ increases and the
enforcement constraint becomes tighter, the majority of the variables (consumption,
capital, output, debt repurchases, equity payout and wages) increase; except for the
gross interest rate Rt, which decreases with τ (in the steady state it is determined
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by the condition R̄ =
1
β
(1−τ)1−β))), and hours worked, which decreases for values
of τ ≤ 0.35, and increases for 0.35 < τ ≤ 1.
As can be observed in Table 1.1 (and with more detail in Table 1.9, in Section
1.7.5 of the appendix), as the tax benefit increases and the enforcement constraint
gets tighter, the reduction in the gross interest rate boosts investment, and therefore
capital increases, but it is also easier to borrow, and debt also raises. For some
variables an increasing τ has amplification effects, not only because some of the
variables depend directly on τ in the steady state with a positive sign, but also
because depend positively on the capital steady state level. These are the cases of
output, consumption,wages and equity payout. However, the increase in the steady
state levels of those variables is not as strong as in the case of capital and debt
because there are some opposing effects that cancel part of this boost effect. This
is specially true for hours of work and consumption.
All these steady state level changes occur despite the fact that the interest rate
benefit is financed through a lump-sum tax over households.
These drastic shifts in the steady state levels of variables when we change the
value of τ obviously also produce dramatic differences in the behaviour of the steady
state period utility and in the expected utility of the model. In Table 1, the first and
second columns show that the steady state utility level per period and the expected
utility increase as τ increases, i.e., the welfare of households in the economy increases
as this distortion (a tax benefit for firms) becomes tighter, which is a highly counter-
intuitive result.
This problem arises since including or excluding the tax benefit affects the steady
state levels of the variables, including the steady state utility for each period. There-
fore, it is necessary to make corrections in the welfare costs calculations that take
into account this shift in the steady state levels of the variables, in order to avoid
serious biases in the results. The procedure that was followed to correct that bias
considers the model without the tax benefit (i.e. τ = 0) as the steady state bench-
mark, and will be fully explained in Section 1.6.1, in which the methodology to
compute the welfare costs of the shocks is presented.
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The expected utility results, already corrected for this bias in the deterministic
steady state, are also reported in the third column of Table 1.1. It can be observed
that, although there is a slight increase when we pass from the absence of the tax
benefit (τ = 0) to a small positive value (τ = 0.1), the expected utility decreases as
the value of τ also increases, as it is expected in the presence of a tax distortion in
the economy.
Table 1.1: The Effect of the Tax Subsidy (τ) in Steady State
SS Period Expected Expected
τ
Utility Utility (NC) Utility (C)
cSS nSS kSS bSS µSS
0 -0.913486 -52.1992 -52.2217 0.78702 0.30083 8.37959 2.32161 0.00000153
0.1 -0.904527 -51.6873 -52.2192 0.79314 0.30037 8.79302 2.63992 0.01072824
0.2 -0.89531 -51.1606 -52.2193 0.79985 0.30008 9.25907 2.99990 0.02148352
0.35 -0.881045 -50.3454 -52.2195 0.81117 0.30000 10.07974 3.63684 0.03766313
0.4 -0.876192 -50.0681 -52.2197 0.81532 0.30009 10.39236 3.88049 0.04306763
0.5 -0.866381 -49.5075 -52.2201 0.82424 0.30049 11.08893 4.42543 0.05389145
0.6 -0.856512 -48.9435 -52.2205 0.83406 0.30123 11.89910 5.06263 0.06473193
0.7 -0.846721 -48.3841 -52.2214 0.84489 0.30238 12.85136 5.81603 0.07558454
0.8 -0.837225 -47.8414 -52.2230 0.85683 0.30406 13.98423 6.71816 0.08644333
0.9 -0.828354 -47.3345 -52.2277 0.869999 0.30641 15.35098 7.81426 0.09730007
NOTE: SS - Steady State; NC - Not Corrected; C - Corrected; it is presented the results for
τ = 0.35 instead of τ = 0.3 because the former is the value used as the steady state target in the
original calibration of Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
1.4.1.4 Characterization with the financial shock
In this section, I consider the model with only the financial shock when τ = 0
and κ = 0, in order to compare it with the First Best equilibrium allocation. In
this case, from Proposition 6, we know that innovations in the financial shock ξ
have no effect on the real side of the economy, particularly over employment n
and next period capital stock kt+1. Therefore, assuming that the financial shock
would be the only source of uncertainty would be equivalent to assume that there
was randomness at all in this economy, and the model would therefore resemble a
frictionless deterministic economy, without any dynamic transition from one period
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to another. In this version of the model the financial flows become indeterminate
because firms are indifferent between debt and equity financing (the Modigliani-
Miller theorem applies in this case). In order to illustrate this statement, it can be
observed in Table 1.10 of Section 1.7.6 of the Appendix, that the expected utility of
the model with only the financial shock (model 10) equals the expected utility of the
frictionless model (model 16), when τ = 0 and κ = 0. This implies that the welfare
cost of these two models in relation to the benchmark economy (the model with
only the productivity shock when τ = 0 and κ = 0 (Model 6) must be the same.
This result will be confirmed in Section 1.6.3, where the findings of the welfare costs
analysis are presented.
1.4.1.5 Characterization with both shocks
Maintaining the assumption that τ = 0 and κ = 0, hitting this economy with
both the financial and the productivity shocks simultaneously is equivalent to the
First Best solution for this model, which corresponds to the economy without fric-
tions with only the technological shock. As it was shown in Propositions 5 and 6 this
is true because, as long as τ = 0 and κ = 0, the financial shock has no real effects
over the economy (particularly over employment nt) and next period capital kt+1
and therefore, business cycle fluctuations are only driven by productivity shocks.
This implies that when τ = 0 and κ = 0, in this framework, the model with both
shocks (model 4) is equivalent to the benchmark model with only the productivity
shock (model 6), in terms of welfare effects in the economy. As can be seen from
Table 1.10 of Section 1.7.6 of the Appendix, the expected utilities of both models are
very close, which will generate very close welfare costs, as Section 1.6.3 will show.
1.5 Empirical analysis
In order to evaluate the quantitative effects of the productivity and the financial
shocks over the real economy, the approach followed by Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) is based on the construction of time series using the standard Solow residuals
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approach for the productivity shocks and using the enforcement constraint for the
financial shock. The macroeconomic effects are then captured by the responses of
the model to the shocks. In this simulation, two points are important to emphasize:
first, the finding that financial shocks have played an important role in the U.S.
business cycle does not mean that other shocks are not relevant; and second, the
fact that this simulation do not include other shocks apart from the productivity
and the financial shocks does not bias the results since the approach used to identify
the financial shocks is independent of how many shocks are added to the model.
I follow exactly the same procedure as Jermann and Quadrini (2012) in order to
calibrate the model, and for convenience, I reproduce it here:
1.5.1 Parameterization
”The parameters are grouped into two sets: the first set includes parameters
that can be calibrated using steady state targets, some of which are common in the
real business cycle literature; and the second one includes parameters that cannot
be calibrated using steady state targets. Time periods are measured in quarters.”
1.5.1.1 Parameters set with Steady State targets
”In the case of the parameters set with steady state target, I set β = 0.9825,
implying that the annual steady state return from holding shares is 7.32 percent,
according to Jermann and Quadrini (2012) estimations. The utility function has the
functional form U(c, n) = ln(c) + α.ln(1 − n), where α = 1.8834 is chosen to have
steady state hours equal to 0.3. The Cobb-Douglas parameter in the production
function is set to θ = 0.36 and the depreciation to δ = 0.025. The mean value of
z is normalized to 1. These values are standard and the quantitative properties of
the model are not very sensitive to this first group of parameters.
The tax wedge is set to τ = 0.35, which corresponds to the benefit of debt over
equity if the marginal tax rate is 35 percent. This parameter is very important
for the model because it determines whether the enforcement constraint is binding
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or not. In fact, this value of τ and the all the remaining parameterizations of the
model are set in order to make the enforcement constraint always binding in the
simulations (except when we set τ = 0 in order to simulate the model without the
interest rate benefit).
The mean value of the financial variable, ξ̄, is chosen to have a steady state ratio
of debt over quarterly GDP equal to 3.36. this is the average ratio over the first
quarter of 1984 until the second quarter of 2010 for the nonfinancial business sector
based on data from the Flow of Funds (for debt) and National Income and Product
Accounts (for business GDP). The required value is ξ̄ = 0.1634.”
1.5.1.2 Parameters that cannot be set with Steady State targets
”The parameters that cannot be set with steady state targets are those deter-
mining the stochastic properties of the shocks and the cost of equity payout - the
parameter κ. In a steady state the stochastic properties of the shocks do not matter
and the equity payout is always equal to the long-term target, therefore an alter-
native procedure was followed to construct the series of productivity and financial
shocks.
For the productivity variable zt it was used the standard Solow residuals ap-
proach. Using the production function we get
ẑt = ŷt − θk̂t − (1− θ)n̂t (1.54)
where ẑt, ŷt, k̂t and n̂t are the percentage or log-deviations from the deterministic
trend. Using the calibration for θ and the empirical series for ŷt, k̂t and n̂t, we
construct the ẑt series.
To construct the series for the financial variable ξt, we follow a similar approach










The variable ξt is determined residually using empirical series for kt+1, bt+1/(1 +
rt) and yt. However, the validity of this procedures depends crucially on the validity
of the assumption that the enforcement constraint is always binding.”
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) have verified ex-post, after constructing the series
for the shocks and feed them into the model, whether the enforcement constraint
in always binding, but without forcing any of the endogenous variables to perfectly
match an individual empirical series.
”The data series of capital kt+1 and debt
bt+1
1 + rt
are end-of period balance sheet
data from the Flow of funds Accounts, and the empirical series for the product yt
is taken from the national Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). All series are in
real terms and the log value is linearly detrended.”
In order to compute the processes for the two shocks, Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) have estimated a vector autoregressive system of order one (VAR(1)), after
constructing the series for the productivity and financial variables over the first
















where εz,t+1 and εξ,t+1 are iid with standard deviations σz and σξ, respectively.
From this description of the procedure used to construct the series for the pro-
ductivity and the financial shocks, the fact that ”these series do not depend on the
number of shocks included in the model becomes more clear. Since no matter how
many shocks we include in the model, equations (1.54) and (1.55) will not be af-
fected”. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) state that ”the only way an additional shock
could affect the ξt series is in the eventuality that it could change the tightness of
the enforcement constraint. With additional shocks, one cannot guarantee that the
enforcement constraint will be always binding in the simulated period”. Jermann
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and Quadrini (2012) consider it unlikely with the typical shocks considered in the
literature. However, they extend the model following the Smets and Wouters (2007)
approach, and use a structural estimation with eight shocks (besides the productiv-
ity and the financial shocks) to simulate the model and check whether the inclusion
of more shocks affects substantially the main results of the model.
The only remaining parameter is the equity cost parameter κ. This is chosen to
have a standard deviation of equity payout (normalized by output) generated by the
model over the same period of time 1984.I-2010.II equal to the empirical standard
deviation.
The full set of parameters are reported in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2: Parameterization
Description Parameters
Discount factor β = 0.9825
Tax advantage τ = 0.3500
Utility parameter α = 1.8834
Production technology θ = 0.3600
Depreciation rate δ = 0.0250
Enforcement parameter ξ̄ = 0.1634
Payout cost parameter κ = 0.1460
Standard deviation productivity shock σz = 0.0045
Standard deviation financial shock σξ = 0.0098





Source: Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
1.5.2 Estimation
Since the model cannot solved analytically, I used numerical methods in order to
estimate this model. In this case, the model is solved using a linear approximation of
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the dynamic system under the assumption that the enforcement constraint is always
binding. To check the validity of this assumption and to check the accuracy of the
linear solution, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) also solved the model nonlinearly
using a global approximation method.
Taken into account the assumption that the enforcement constraint is always bind-
ing, the model can be solve by log-linearizing the dynamic system around the steady
state. The equilibrium in the base model is characterized by a system composed of
8 dynamic equations:
wUc(c, n) + Un(c, n) = 0 (1.57)










+ d− c = 0 (1.59)






Em̃(c, n, d, c′, n′, d′)
[
1− δ + (1− µ′ϕd(d′))Fk(z′, k′, n′)
]
ξµϕd(d) = 1 (1.61)






(1− δ)k + F (z, k, n)− wn− b+ b
′
R
− k′ − ϕ(d) = 0 (1.63)
ξ
(
k′ − b′ 1− τ
R− τ
)
= F (z, k, n) (1.64)
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According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012)’ approach, ”the first three equations
are the first order conditions and budget constraint for households. In equilibrium
the tax payments of households is accounted by a lower interest earned on bonds,
R, and the gross pre-tax interest rate is 1 + r = (R − τ)/(1 − τ). The next three
equations are the first order conditions for firms. The term m̃(c, n, d, c′, n′, d′) =
β(Uc(c
′, n′)/Uc(c, n))(ϕd(d)/ϕd(d
′)) is the effective discount factor. The remaining
two equations are the firms’ budget and enforcement constraints.
After linearizing around the steady state the system can be resolved for the eight
variables ct, dt, nt, wt, Rt, µt, kt+1, bt+1, as linear functions of the states, zt, ξt, kt, bt.”
1.5.3 Results and Analysis
In order to study the effects induced by the productivity and the financial shocks,
sixteen simulations of the model were run: four major simulations depending on the
inclusion or absence (simultaneous or not) of the productivity and the financial
shocks; and then for each one these four cases, four more simulations depending
whether the financial frictions set by the parameters τ and κ are active (simultane-
ously) or not. In the model with only the financial shock active, the productivity
shock is kept constant at its unconditional mean z̄, and the same procedure is
followed when the model with only the productivity shock is active (the financial
variable ξt is kept constant at its unconditional mean ξ̄. The full list of all the
sixteen simulated models is in Section 1.7.3 of the Appendix.
After simulating the model, I give a brief description of the main findings achieved
by Jermann and Quadrini (2012). But before start describing the behavior or the
simulated variables and comparing it with the data, it is very important to stress two
important aspects about the model: first, ”the macroeconomic effects of financial
shocks in this model are mostly driven by the unexpected ”variations” in ξt, not the
”level” of this variable”. Although a low value of ξt may produce moderate variability
on hours and investment, if the decrease has not taken place recently (i.e. if the
economy had time to adjust to the lower ξt), it is the change that matters, not the
level of the variable. It is in this sense that the 2008 financial crisis is characterized
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by the most severe financial conditions experienced by the US economy during the
last three decades. The second aspect is the fact that ”the time series constructed
for the shocks do not depend on the number of shocks included in the model, which
implies that, given empirical series for kt+1, bt+1/(1 + rt) and yt, the exact same
series for the financial shocks ξ would be generated”.
Their main findings suggest that the performance of the model improves with
the inclusion of the financial shock, which captures the firm’s ability to borrow as
well as tight financial conditions. The model with financial shocks is able to better
capture the dynamics of output, labor and the financial variables than the model
with productivity shocks only. With financial shocks only, the dynamics of the
major macroeconomic variables (such as output and labor) fit very well to the data.
For these variables, the financial innovations of the simulated model generate sharp
declines in all three recessions registered in the U.S in the last decade: 1990-91, 2001
and 2008-09. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) justify this performance of the model in
response to financial shocks based on the mechanism which links these shocks to the
demand of labor, since they generate a high volatility in working hours. As it was
explained earlier in Section 1.3.1, the strong correlation between financial shocks
and hours of work can be seen from the demand of labor given by the firm’s first
order condition (1.3), where the variable µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the enforcement constraint and the term µϕd(d) determines the labor wedge. If the
economy is hit by a negative financial shock, which makes the enforcement constraint
tighter (µ increases), the labor wedge also increases, increasing the marginal cost
of labor, reducing the demand of working hours. Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
argue that, intuitively, if the firm wants to keep the same scale and hire the same
number of workers, it has to reduce equity payout, since the marginal cost of each
worker has risen. Due to the equity payout cost, that reduction is costly and it is
not immediate, therefore the firm chooses to sacrifice both the equity payout and in
part the input of labor.
The model with financial shocks is also able to capture the main features of the
empirical series of the financial flows, debt and equity payout, although the volatility
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of debt repurchases generated by the model is somewhat higher than in the data.
In general, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) conclude that the model with both
the financial and the productivity shocks is able to replicate reasonably well the
dynamics of the major real variables included in the model (specially output and
labor) as well as the dynamics of the financial variables debt repurchases and equity
payout.
1.6 The Welfare Cost of Financial Shocks
1.6.1 Estimation Methodology
This section constitutes the main focus of this paper, since it describes how the
welfare costs of both shocks are computed and also reports the main results. In
particular, it is reported the isolated welfare cost associated exclusively with the
financial shock.
In order to compute these potential welfare costs of financial shocks, I follow
Lucas’ strategy (1987, 2003) to compare the welfare effects of implementing a sta-
bilization policy aimed at eliminating all variability caused not by consumption
fluctuations, but instead by the financial shock. In other words, I compute the
percentage increase in consumption that an agent would require to be as well off
as under the First Best allocation of this economy. In this case, the First Best
allocation is equivalent to the equilibrium allocation of this economy without the
enforcement constraint (τ = 0, i.e. the financial shock has no real effects and there
is no substitutability between debt and equity, i.e. κ = 0). This translates into a
comparison between the utility derived from a consumption stream cFt associated
with the model simulated with both frictions and the financial shock, and the util-
ity derived from a consumption stream cFBt , associated with the standard model
calibrated with only the productivity shock and no frictions, i.e. the First Best
equilibrium. In other words, in this model, the welfare cost of the financial shock
is the percentage change in the consumption of an agent of the economy hit by the
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shock necessary to achieve the same level of utility attained by an agent in the First
Best economy. These utilities are both computed in steady-state. Assuming that
the latter is preferred to the former, we have:
U(cFt ) < U(c
FB
t )
where F stands for the economy simulated with only the financial shock and FB
represents the First Best equilibrium.
To quantify the potential welfare gains or costs that can result in moving from
F to FB, we can proceed as follows:
UF (ξt > 0, (1 + λ)c
F
t , nt) = U
FB(ξt = 0, c
FB
t , nt) (1.65)
This way, welfare costs are measured in percentage units of the level of consumption
realized under economy F. Since both economies considered are not deterministic but
stochastic, preferences must be computed as expected utilities, and the expectation
is taken with respect to the common distribution of the shocks ξt and zt, for all
t. The functional form for the utility function is U(ct, nt) = ln(ct) + αln(1 − nt),





βtUF (ξt > 0, (1 + λ)c
F
t , nt) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUFB(ξt = 0, c
FB




βtln((1 + λ)cFt ) + αln(1− nFt ) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtln(cFBt ) + αln(1− nFBt ) (1.67)
Now in order to determine cFt and c
FB
t in steady-state, it is necessary to calibrate
and simulate both models and use the generated series to compute λ. However,
this process is not as simple as it may seem, since it is necessary to overcome some
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technical problems that arise when the steady state simulated values for each variable
are computed.
However, first of all, before presenting the complete description of the methodol-
ogy used to compute the welfare effects in this model, it must be stressed I report all
the welfare costs for each type of economy that can be simulated in this framework,
depending of the presence and/or absence of the shocks (financial and technological)
and the financial frictions (the tax subsidy and the equity payout cost), in compar-
ison with the First Best equilibrium (i.e. the economy without financial frictions
and with the productivity shock) and also in comparison to a frictionless economy
(i.e. the model simulated with no shocks and no frictions). This ensures a complete
welfare overview of this model considering all possible scenarios.
In order to achieve that goal, I performed simulations for sixteen different types of
economies that can be considered assuming different combinations of inclusion/exclusion
of the shocks and the financial frictions present in this framework. I considered four
base types of model to estimate: the economy without shocks (WS); the economy
with only the financial shock (F); the economy with only the productivity shock (P);
and the economy with both shocks (BS). Then, for each one of these different base
models, I considered the presence or omission of the two financial frictions: the in-
terest rate subsidy (τ) and the equity payout cost function (κ). Table 1.8 in Section
1.7.3 of the Appendix gives a description of all those different simulated economies
and the correspondent numerical order by which each model was simulated.
Given the set of parameter values described earlier and in order to consider
changes in policy and take into account the effects of the transitional dynamics,
the next step was to run 120 simulations with 100000 periods each for the sixteen
different models, using a different initial seed as a starting point for each simulation.
The simulation is done using a linear first-order approximation of the calibrated
model. From each one of these simulations, I obtained series of simulated values
for c and n, from where we can compute a stream for the utility U , for t = 100000
periods :
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U i = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtln(cit) + αln(1− nit) (1.68)
for i = F, P, FB,BS
The economy without any type of shock corresponds to a frictionless, stationary
economy, where the simulated values for all variables are the same for all periods,
and therefore constitutes the deterministic steady state of this model. Hence, its
expected value can be computed as the sum of infinite terms of a geometric series
(βi), where the period utility UWS = ln(cWSt ) + αln(1− nWSt ) is constant across all




βtln(cWSt ) + αln(1− nWSt )⇔ (1.69)
⇔ UWS = ln(c
WS
t ) + αln(1− nWSt )
1− β
(1.70)
After simulating all the models, I computed the expected lifetime utility for each
simulation over the 100000 periods, and then I calculated the weighted average of the
expected utilities across the 120 different simulations, in order to find the expected
utility for each one of the 16 different economies.
However, after inspecting the estimates of those expected utilities for the different
sixteen simulated economies presented in Table 1.10 in the Appendix, we must
conclude that there are very significant differences in the level of those estimates.
This is essentially due to the presence or omission of the tax benefit τ . From
Proposition 5 we know that if τ > 0 the enforcement constraint binds in a steady
state, and that implies that changing the value of τ causes major differences in the
steady state levels of the variables of the simulated models, which also affects steady
state period utility levels. This constitutes a problem for the welfare analysis of the
model, since it produces biased welfare costs estimates.
58
Therefore, a correction procedure in the calculation of the expected utilities for
the different sixteen economies was implemented in order to overcome this problem.
Since the utility estimates depend directly in the estimates of consumption c and
labor n, this correction is operated in the simulated values of these two variables.
For instance, for a specific calibrated value of τ , the simulated series for consump-
tion can be obtained as the deterministic steady state value of that variable times
its dynamic behavior in the presence of one or more shocks (given as a percentage
change):
ct(τ > 0) = c
SS
τ>0(1 + ĉτ>0)
Where SS stands for Steady State and ĉ represents the percentage change in
consumption due to the stochastic innovations in zt or ξt.
As can be observed in Table 1.10 in the Appendix, steady state utility levels,
and consequentially, expected utility levels are higher when the tax advantage is
present in the model (τ > 0), rather than when it is absent. Therefore, in order to
implement the correction I consider the model simulated without the distortion (i.e.
the tax benefit) as the steady state starting point for all the simulated models, even
for those where the calibrated value of τ was positive (i.e. τ = 0.35).
The correction consists in multiplying the simulated series by the ratio of the
steady state value of consumption when τ = 0 over the steady state value of con-
sumption when τ > 0, that is:





= cSSτ=0(1 + ĉτ>0) (1.71)
And then we also apply this correction to labor:





= nSSτ=0(1 + n̂τ>0) (1.72)
With this correction, the simulated series for consumption and labor for all
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models departure from the same steady state levels, and consequentially the steady
state utility levels will also be corrected as well:






) + αln(1− nt(τ > 0)iCorrectedSS) (1.73)
For i = F, P, FB,BS and also for WS. Table 1.11 in Section 1.7.7 of the
Appendix reports the estimates for the expected utilities of the 16 models corrected
in the state state for the value of τ .
Finally, after obtaining the estimates for the corrected expected utilities, it is
possible to compute the welfare costs of each shock, always taking into account
that the ultimate purpose of these exercises is to isolate the welfare cost associated
exclusively with the financial shocks.
1.6.2 Welfare Cost Calculation
As it was previously mentioned, the welfare cost of the financial shock is defined
as the percentage change in the consumption of an agent in the economy with the
shock necessary to achieve the same level of utility attained by an agent in the First
Best equilibrium economy. In order to find a measure to quantify that welfare cost,




βtln(cFBt ) + αln(1− nFBt ) = E0
N∑
t=0
βtln((1 + λ)cit) + αln(1− nit)⇔ (1.74)
⇔ λ = e(
1−β
1−βN )(U
FB−U i) − 1 (1.75)
For i = F, P,BS, and where UFB = E0
N∑
t=0
βtln(cFBt ) + αln(1− nFBt ).
Asymptotically, as N →∞ we have:
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λ = e(1−β)(U
FB−U i) − 1 (1.76)
for i = F, P, FB,BS.
When we want to define the welfare effects in relation to the frictionless economy
(WS) instead of using the First Best economy (FB) as the benchmark, then the
condition that define the welfare measure becomes:
λ = e(1−β)(U
WS−U i) − 1 (1.77)
For i = F, P,BS, and where UWS =
ln(cWSt )+αln(1−nWSt )
1−β , since it is a deterministic
steady state expected utility.
1.6.3 Results
Table 1.3 resume the main findings of the welfare cost analysis, computed using
the procedure described in the previous section. This table contains the welfare
costs of the financial and the productivity shocks, measured in percentage of the
consumption of an agent of the frictionless economy without shocks and of the
model with both shocks simultaneously active. This table reports the welfare costs
results distinguishing the four possible cases regarding the calibration of the two
main frictions present in this model: the tax subsidy τ and the equity payout cost
parameter κ. Therefore, the findings reported refer to a comparison between two
economies that will only differ in the type of shock but not in the type of friction
that affects those economies. In that respect, those economies are equivalent, and
therefore, the welfare costs reported are directly comparable within the same type
of calibrated economy. Table 1.4 reports the differences in the magnitude of the
welfare costs of the financial shock versus the productivity shock, measured as the
ratio of the financial shock welfare cost over the productivity shock welfare shock, in
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relation of the frictionless economy (first row) and to the economy with both shocks
(second row), also considering the four different combinations of parameterization
for τ and κ.
Table 1.3: Welfare Effects (in % of the consumption of an agent in the economy
affected by the shock)
Financial Frictions
τ = 0.35 τ = 0 τ = 0.35 τ = 0
κ = 0.146 κ = 0.146 κ = 0 κ = 0
MODEL F P F P F P F P
Without Shocks 0.0245 0.0013 0.0264 0.0014 0.0015 −0.0053 0 −0.0064
With Both Shocks −0.0016 −0.0248 −0.0018 −0.0268 0.0054 −0.0013 0.0066 −0.0002
F - Model with only the Financial Shock; P - Model with only the Productivity Shock; τ -
represents the tax benefit; κ - represents the equity payout cost
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Table 1.4: Relations Between the Welfare Effects of the Different Simu-
lated Models (in % of consumption)
τ = 0.35 τ = 0 τ = 0.35 τ = 0
Frictions
κ = 0.146 κ = 0.146 κ = 0 κ = 0
F/P(WS) 18.85 18.86 −0.283 0
F/P(BS) 0.065 0.067 −4.154 28.17
F/P(WS) - Ratio of the Welfare Cost of the Financial Shock over the Productivity Shock, com-
puted in relation to the model Without Shocks; F/P(BS) - Ratio of the Welfare Cost of the Fi-
nancial Shock over the Productivity Shock, computed in relation to the model with Both Shocks;
τ - represents the tax benefit; κ - represents the equity payout cost parameter.
Table 1.5: Welfare Effects of the Model with Both Shocks in comparison
with the Economy Without Shocks (in % of consumption)
τ = 0.35 τ = 0 τ = 0.35 τ = 0
Frictions
κ = 0.146 κ = 0.146 κ = 0 κ = 0
MODEL BS BS BS BS
WS 0.0261 0.0282 −0.0040 −0.0066
WS - Model without Shocks; BS - Model with Both Shocks; τ - represents the tax benefit; κ -
represents the equity payout cost
63
At a first glance from Table 1.3, it is possible to observe that, in general, the
estimated welfare effects according to this method are quite small in terms of mag-
nitude, for almost all cases covered. On average, there is a welfare cost (instead of
a welfare benefit) as a consequence of either the financial or the productivity shock,
in comparison with a economy without shocks. However, there are some exceptions,
that depend essentially in the presence or absence of the financial frictions, which I
will later examine with more detail.
The most important findings reported in Table 1.3 refer to the estimates of the
welfare effects computed in a simulation model in which both frictions are active
(the tax benefit τ > 0 as well as the equity payout cost κ > 0), and in comparison
with the model without shocks, since these results confirm the expected scenario in
which financial shocks have negative welfare consequences over the business cycle.
The long-run welfare cost in the economy with only the financial shock relative to
the economy without shocks represents 0.0245% of consumption, that is, each agent
in the economy with only the financial shock would have to be compensated with an
increase of 0.0245% on his consumption in order to be as well off as in the frictionless
economy, when both τ > 0 and κ > 0. The productivity shock also induces a welfare
cost, but much smaller than in the case of the financial shock: an agent in a economy
affected by the productivity shock would have to be compensated in 0.0013% of his
consumption to be as well off as in the economy with no shocks.
However, in terms of magnitude, these welfare costs differ significantly between
the two shocks, at least when the equity payout cost function is active (κ). For
the economies with both frictions τ and κ, the welfare cost in the economy with
only the financial shock (0.0245%) is nearly 18.85 times larger than the welfare
cost in the economy with only productivity shock (0.0013%), when compared with
the no-shock economy, as can be observed from Table 1.4. In fact, the welfare
cost associated with the financial shock corresponds to approximately 93.87% of the
welfare cost of the two shocks combined (which is of 0.0261%, as can be observed
in Table 1.5) in relation to the economy without shocks, as it is possible to see by
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inspecting Table 1.3 and 1.5. One possible cause for this is the fact that the effects
of the financial shock are largely amplified and propagated due to the presence of
the tax advantage τ (which, as it was shown by Jermann and Quadrini (2012),
assures that the enforcement constraint is always binding as long as τ > 0 in the
steady state, or as long as it is large enough when uncertainty is present), and due
to the equity payout cost function, which, the higher the κ, the stronger will be
the rigidity affecting the substitution between debt and equity, forcing the firms to
cut employment nt to maintain their production decisions unchanged and to keep
satisfying the enforcement constraint.
But we cannot abstract from the fact that these welfare effects are computed
from simulations of economies in which both frictions are present and where we
are hitting those economies with only the financial and the productivity shocks. In
other words, given that both the economy with the financial shock and the economy
without shocks are simulated assuming that both frictions are active, the estimates
presented in Table 1.3 only reflects the isolated welfare effect of the financial shock
over the economy. The distortions in welfare that are due to the presence or absence
of the frictions are controlled for, and hence this large difference in the welfare costs
magnitude between the financial and the productivity shock can only be explained
by the amplification and propagation effects of the financial shock, as it is defined
and introduced in the model.
If we consider the welfare effects of each shock when compared to the economy
with the two shocks simultaneously, the situation is precisely the reverse, as it would
be expected: each agent in the economy with only the financial shock would have
to reduce his consumption 0.0016% in order to attain the same utility level as in
the two-shocks framework, while in the economy with only the productivity shock
this reduction would have to be of 0.0248%. The fact these two values are negative
naturally means that agents in the economy with both shocks are worse off than
in the economies affected with only one shock. In this case, when comparing the
economies with just one shock against the model with both, we can consider these
estimates as welfare gains, instead of costs.
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The rest of Table 1.3 gives us a clear insight of the influence of the financial
frictions (τ and κ) in the welfare effects findings.
When we keep the equity payout cost active, i.e. κ > 0 and omit the tax
benefit i.e. τ = 0, the welfare situation is quite similar to the previous one, both
in terms of direction and magnitude of the effects. In this case, the welfare cost of
the financial shock corresponds to 0.0264% of consumption, while the welfare cost
of the productivity shock is much lower, no more than 0.0014% of consumption.
In comparison to the economy with both shocks, the situation is once again the
opposite. It is possible to verify that two facts remain very close to the scenario
where τ > 0: the relation between the welfare costs associated with the two shocks
and the weight associated with each of them in relation to the welfare cost imposed
by the shocks in simultaneous. In this scenario the welfare cost of the financial
shock is approximately 18.86 times higher than the welfare costs imposed by the
productivity shock, when they are compared against the deterministic economy, and
the situation reverses when the welfare effects are calculated in comparison with the
two-shocks economy, as it is clear from Table 1.4. It is also possible to check that
the welfare costs of the financial shock corresponds to approximately 93.62% of the
welfare cost of the economy with both shocks (0.0282%) and, while the productivity
shock only accounts for 4.9645% of that value.
The omission of the tax benefit does not bring dramatic changes to the welfare
cost analysis, since, as an example, we can see that the importance of the welfare
cost of the financial shock remains quite high (especially when compared to the
productivity shock welfare cost), but only increased 0.0019 percentual points, which
is a small increment in relation to the situation in which the tax benefit is active.
The simulations for this scenario in which κ > 0 and τ = 0 were conducted assuming
that the enforcement constraint is always binding, even with uncertainty, although
it is not possible to ensure, for τ = 0, that this assumption is always true (at least
outside the steady state). One possible explanation for this slight increase in the
welfare cost is that without access to the tax-advantaged debt, the firm will not be so
tempted to issue new debt in order to compensate the slow adjustment of the equity
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payout. With the reduction in the issuance of debt and since the adjustment of the
equity payout is still costly, it is harder for the firm to finance capital investment,
which reduces the capital stock and the productivity, and also decreases output.
This contributes to reinforce the impact of the financial shock, which is mainly due
to the presence of the equity payout cost, and which makes a change in ξ produce a
larger movement in µ, tightening the enforcement constraint and leading to a larger
amplification and propagation effects of the financial shock over the economy, also
affecting negatively welfare.
However, when we analyse the scenarios in which κ = 0, i.e. the equity payout
adjustment cost is absent, the results diverge considerably from the previous two
cases. From Table 1.3, when κ = 0, the welfare effects estimates are not so intuitive
as the precious findings, because although the estimates are positive for the financial
shock when computed against the economy without shocks, we get negative results
for the productivity shock. In other words, an agent in the economy hit only by the
productivity shock would have to decrease his consumption in order to attain the
same utility level as in a framework with no shocks, when the equity payout cost is
absent (and firms are able to easily change their financial structure). This is true
for the economy with only the productivity shock when compared to the no-shock
framework whether the tax benefit is present in the model or not. One possible
explanation for this has to do with the mechanism triggered by the introduction of
the equity payout cost in the model: when κ > 0 and a positive productivity shock
hits the economy, firms increase their investment and their capital stock to take
advantage of higher productivity levels, which induces an amplification effect over
output, consumption, wages and the interest rate, and consequentially benefits the
welfare of the economy.
As for the financial shock, it produces a very small welfare cost (only 0.0015%
of consumption) when the tax advantage is included in the model, but in the case
where both financial frictions are excluded (κ = 0 and τ = 0) the welfare effect is
zero. This result is expected, since from Proposition 5 we know that when κ = 0
and τ = 0, the model becomes a standard RBC with only the productivity shock.
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Since in this case it is assumed that κ = 0 and τ = 0 and we are comparing the
economy with only the financial shock and another without shocks, we can conclude
that these two frameworks are identical (the financial shock does not produce any
disturbance in the economy, given these assumptions).
It is also important to take into account that the economy affected with only the
productivity shock and with no financial frictions (τ = 0 and κ = 0) represents the
First Best solution of this framework, i.e., the economy from where it is not possible
to move without decreasing the utility level of its agents. Since the standard RBC
economy (with no frictions and only the technology shock) represents the First Best
benchmark of this model, I also computed the welfare effects in relation to that
setting, considering all the other possible scenarios of this model, regardless of the
inclusion or omission of the financial frictions. The results are reported in Table 1.6.
In general, in terms of magnitude of the welfare effects, the findings are very close
to the ones reported in Table 1.3 and 1.5. Of course the results change slightly, but
it is important to stress that in this case we are comparing economies with different
assumptions about the inclusion/exclusion of the frictions, and that implies that the
steady state equilibrium values imply different expected utility levels, although they
are corrected according to the procedure described earlier in section 1.6.2. As we
can observe, all the findings indicate that there is in fact a welfare cost that an agent
in each one of the different economies simulated has to incur if he wants to be as
well off as in the benchmark economy. The only exception seems to be the welfare
cost of both shocks in an economy without the financial frictions (an agent in that
economy would have to decrease his consumption 0.0002% in order to achieve the
same utility level as in the First Best economy). Theoretically, this estimate should
equal zero, since Proposition 6 states that when κ = 0 and τ = 0 the financial shock
has no real effects over the economy and therefore the model becomes the standard
RBC framework with only the productivity shock. However, since the value of the
estimate is quite low, it is almost negligible and the fact that is different from zero
may result from approximations issues generated in the simulations of both models.
In terms of magnitude, the differences between the financial and productivity
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welfare costs are smaller than in the previous analysis, as can be observed in Table
1.7. When both financial frictions are active, the financial shock induces a welfare
cost approximately 4 times higher than the one caused by the technology shock
alone, when compared to the benchmark economy. Once again, this differences can
be misleading, since we are comparing simulated models with different assumptions
about the financial frictions, which affect the steady state levels of the variables.
Table 1.6: Welfare Costs (in % of consumption) in relation to the Standard
RBC Model (only the productivity shock and no frictions)
τ = 0.35 τ = 0
Frictions
κ = 0.146 κ = 0.146
MODEL F P BS F P BS
RBC 0.0307 0.0075 0.0323 0.0328 0.0078 0.0346
τ = 0.35 τ = 0
Frictions
κ = 0 κ = 0
MODEL F P BS F P BS
RBC 0.0075 0.0007 0.0021 0.0064 0.0000 −0.0002
F - Model with only the Financial Shock; P - Model with only the Productivity Shock; BS - Model
with Both Shocks; τ - represents the tax benefit; κ - represents the equity payout cost
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Table 1.7: Relations Between the Welfare Costs of the Different Simulated Models
(in % of consumption)
τ = 0.35 τ = 0 τ = 0.35 τ = 0
Frictions
κ = 0.146 κ = 0.146 κ = 0 κ = 0
F/P(RBC) 4.0933 4.2051 10.2282 −
F - Model with only the Financial Shock; P - Model with only the Productivity Shock; τ -
represents the tax benefit; κ - represents the equity payout cost
1.7 Conclusion
Do financial shocks that affect firms’ ability to borrow induce significant wel-
fare costs to the economy? The research developed in this paper suggest that they
do. Using the model developed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), which incorpo-
rates some financial frictions formalized as a tax benefit and an equity payout cost
that try to mimic the financial flows associated with firms’ decisions regarding their
financial structure, i.e. debt and equity financing, I followed a strategy based on
Lucas (1987), later updated by Lucas (2003) to measure and compute the welfare ef-
fects associated with a financial shock representing the tightening of firms’ financing
conditions (specially during recessions) and a standard productivity shock.
I have investigated the welfare effects for sixteen different scenarios of this model,
assuming different calibrations for the parameters that represent the financial fric-
tions (τ and κ) and assuming different combinations of the inclusion and/or exclusion
of the financial and the productivity shock. Those welfare effects were computed in
relation to an economy without frictions and without shocks and also in relation to
the standard RBC model with only the productivity shock and where the financial
frictions are absent.
The findings suggest that the welfare costs caused only by the financial shock
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also small, but non negligible, specially when compared with the welfare costs of
the productivity shock, since the former are approximately 18 times larger than the
latter when computed in comparison with the frictionless model and approximately 4
times larger when compared with the RBC benchmark economy. These findings are
also specially relevant for recession periods, since the research conducted by Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) revealed that tight financial conditions have also played an
important role in the recent 1990-91, 2001 ans 2008 financial crisis.
One possible extension of this analysis is to include heterogeneity at the firms
and the households level in order to infer if the welfare costs differ significantly
between different segments of the population, and also include a more defined role
for the lender (represented by financial institutions that include commercial banks,
investment banks, brokers, dealers and other specialists) by introducing a financial
intermediary into the model.
Appendix
1.7.1 A.1 - Derivation of the Enforcement Constraint
The decision to default arises after the realization of revenues but before repaying
the intra-period loan. The total amount of liabilities is lt + bt+1/(1 + rt), that is,
the intra-period loan plus the new intertemporal debt. At this stage, in terms of
liquidity, the firm holds the total value of production in period t, that is, lt =
F (zt, kt, nt).
As stated previously, the lender acquires the right to liquidate the firm’s capital
in case of default. It is assumed that at the moment of contracting the loan the
liquidation value of physical capital kt+1 is uncertain: with probability ξt the lender
will be able to recover the whole value kt+1, but with probability 1 − ξt the lender
is unable to recover anything. The liquidation value cannot be observed before the
actual default by neither the parts. It is also assumed that the firm has all the
bargaining power in the renegotiation process and the lender only gets the threat
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value. Therefore, in order to derive the renegotiation outcome two separate cases
must be considered.
1. Liquidation value is kt+1:
Since the lender can expropriate the whole capital, the firm has to make a
payment that leaves the lender indifferent between liquidation and keeping
the firm in operation. The amount of payment that the firm needs to do in
order to satisfy this condition is kt+1− bt+1/(1 + rt), and must promise to pay
bt+1 at the beginning of the next period, when the intertemporal debt is due.
Therefore, the ex-post value of defaulting is




Where Vt+1 is the cum-divident market value of the firm.
2. Liquidation value is zero:
If the liquidation value is zero, liquidation is clearly not the best option for
the lender. Instead, the best option is to wait to the next period when bt+1 is
due. In the current period the lender gets no payments and the firm retains
the liquidity lt = F (zt, kt, nt). Hence, the ex-post default value is
lt + Emt+1Vt+1
When the debt is contracted, the expected liquidation value is







Enforcement requires that the value of not defaulting is not smaller than the
expected value of defaulting, that is,

















1.7.2 A.2 - The First Best Solution in the Deterministic
Steady State
Let’s denote by X̄ the value of variable X at the non-stochastic (deterministic)


















Using the steady state equation of condition (14), and equations (18) and (19),
we get an expression for the hours of work in steady state:
n̄ =
(1− θ)(1− β(1− δ))
(1− θ + αz̄)(1− β(1− δ))− αδβθz̄
(1.80)
From this condition, we can retrieve the expressions for capital, consumption








(1− θ)(1− β(1− δ))





(1− θ)(1− β(1− δ))



















(1− θ)(1− β(1− δ))




The steady state expressions for equity d̄ and debt b̄ can be obtained substituting
the expressions for n̄, c̄ and k̄ in the firm’s budget constraint and in the enforcement
constraint.
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1.7.3 A.3 - Types of Simulated Models
Table 1.8: Types of Simulated Models
File Description
model1 With both shocks (zt and ξt) and both frictions (τ > 0 and κ > 0)
model2 With both shocks (zt and ξt) and τ = 0 and κ > 0
model3 With both shocks (zt and ξt) and τ > 0 and κ = 0
model4 With both shocks (zt and ξt) and no frictions (τ = 0 and κ = 0)
model5 Without the financial shock (ξt = 0) and both frictions (τ > 0 and κ > 0)
model6 Without the financial shock (ξt = 0) and no frictions (τ = 0 and κ = 0)
model7 Without the financial shock (ξt = 0) and τ = 0 and κ > 0
model8 Without the financial shock (ξt = 0) and τ > 0 and κ = 0
model9 Without the productivity shock (zt = 0) and both frictions (τ > 0 and κ > 0)
model10 Without the productivity shock (zt = 0) and no frictions (τ = 0 and κ = 0)
model11 Without the productivity shock (zt = 0) and τ = 0 and κ > 0
model12 Without the productivity shock (zt = 0) and τ > 0 and κ = 0
model13 Without shocks (zt = ξt = 0) and both frictions (τ > 0 and κ > 0)
model14 Without shocks (zt = ξt = 0) and τ = 0 and κ > 0
model15 Without shocks (zt = ξt = 0) and τ > 0 and κ = 0
model16 Without shocks (zt = ξt = 0) and no frictions (τ = 0 and κ = 0)
1.7.4 A.4 - Welfare Cost Measure Derivation
In order to obtain the condition that determines the measure for the welfare




βtln(cFBt ) + αln(1− nFBt ) = E0
N∑
t=0









βtln(1 + λ) + E0
N∑
t=0










FB−U i) − 1 (1.88)
for i = F, P,BS
When N →∞ we have:
λ = e(1−β)(U
FB−U i) − 1 (1.89)

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Importance of Financial
Shocks for the Predictability of
Recessions
2.1 Introduction
The importance of financial shocks as a source of serious economic downturns
has been increasingly accepted in recent years by several authors, and currently,
this acknowledgement is indisputable. Although the literature related with financial
and banking shocks has expanded significantly (Bernanke et al. (1999), Guerron-
Quintana (2009), Christiano et al. (2010), He and Krishnamurthy (2012), Kiyotaki
and Moore (2012), Krishnamurthy (2010), He et al. (2010), Mendoza and Smith
(2006), Mendoza (2010), Kiyotaki and Moore (2012), Negro et al. (2017) are recent
examples of that trend), and the number of theoretical models that aim to explain
how those financial frictions affect the real side of the economy has proliferated at
a steady pace since the 2008 financial crisis, not all of those frameworks are able to
properly replicate the behavior of financial and real variables during those episodes,
especially in terms of volatility and magnitude of the shocks.
The main objective of this paper is to compare the empirical time series of major
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macroeconomic (financial and real) aggregates against the simulated series obtained
using the model proposed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), in terms of persistence,
propagation and amplitude effects caused by a financial and a productivity shock.
The impulse response functions are also computed in relation to both shocks. The
ultimate goal is to infer if this framework is able to replicate the behavior of those
financial and real variables during and after events as the 2008 financial crisis as it
is described in the data.
In order to characterize the general environment that surrounded the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis, a short survey is also included in this paper, in which I describe the
main causes, triggers and consequences of that recession, since its early beginnings
with the burst of the housing bubble at the end of 2006, including the start of the
collapse of the financial system at the end of 2007 with the subprime crisis, and
until the later period of worldwide economic depression which is now denominated
the Great Recession.
In this paper I analyse the empirical behavior of financial and real variables
during and after the recent 2008 financial crisis. I establish a comparison between
empirical evidence based on macroeconomic data available for the U.S. before, during
and after the collapse of financial system in the U.S. in 2008, and the results provided
by the simulation of the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model for the same time
period.
In order to achieve these goals, I start by providing a general overview and
context of the financial crisis, through a brief description of the major events which
characterize the ”oficial” time interval 1 of this crisis settled by NBER.
The data collected includes U.S. quarterly data which covers the period between
the first quarter of 1952 until the second quarter of 2014, and it is based upon the
same database used by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) 2.
1The U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) officially sets the beginning of the
recession at the end of the fourth semester of 2007 and sets the end at the second quarter of 2009.
2The original sample ranged from the first quarter of 1952 until the second quarter of 2010,
although the authors focused on the interval 1984.I-2010.II to perform the simulations of their
model.
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Since the Great Recession originally started in the U.S. with the subprime finan-
cial crisis, I focus essentially on U.S. data. Although the full sample ranges between
1952.I-2014.II, I focus my analysis essentially on the period between 1984.I - 2014.II,
because it includes the time range originally chosen by Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
(1984.I - 2010.II) to calibrate their model and perform simulations. One of the major
exercises of this paper is precisely to quantify and evaluate the main changes in the
calibration of the model caused by the inclusion of this new set of observations in
the original sample, and also study the performance of the model while replicating
the data, specially in terms of the response of the major aggregates to exogenous
shocks.
The data relative to the period between the third quarter of 2010 and the second
quarter of 2014 is also heavily scrutinized, since this corresponds to the time range
not covered by the original Jermann and Quadrini (2012) sample. This post financial
crisis period coincides with the peak of the so called Great Recession, in which the
negative effects of the initial financial crisis had already led to a worldwide slowdown
that affected all the sectors of the economy.
All time series (financial and real) included in this study are seasonally adjusted.
The major empirical sources are the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve
Board, the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Saint Louis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) database.
The methodology adopted in this paper is described as follows: first, the database
originally used by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) is updated and extended until the
second quarter of 2014 (1952.I-2014-II); then series for capital productivity, debt
stock, equity payout, debt repurchase and total factor productivity are computed,
the along with the most important statistical moments of each series (mean, vari-
ance, standard deviation, correlations, etc). Then I simulate the Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) model and compute statistical moments and IRF’s for the main
macroeconomic variables. Finally, I compare the results.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, a brief discussion of the literature
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related with the 2008 financial crisis is presented, as well as a brief description of
some of the subsequent theoretical macroeconomic models that were developed to
explain the shocks that originated the Great Recession and the long lasting effects
that those events triggered in the aftermath of the crisis in the global economy.
Section 3 covers a concise survey describing the sequence of events that led to the
2008 financial crisis in the U.S. and characterizes the empirical behavior of financial
and real variables during and after that period. Section 4 provides a general overview
of the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model, describes the data collected and the
methodology adopted to update the dataset and construct the series for productivity
and financial shocks, which are subsequently used to run the simulations of the
model. Section 5 presents and describes the results of the simulations and discusses
the main findings. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Literature
Recently, this subject of the 2007 financial crisis has been object of several studies
from many distinguished authors. In order to support and complement this empirical
survey, I cover some papers from Hall (2010), citetBrunnermeier2009, Chari et al.
(2008), Afonso et al. (2010), Adrian et al. (2012), Gorton and Metrick (2012) and
Gorton (2010).
From these references, I highlight the contribution of Brunnermeier (2009), that
presented an analysis aimed to ”explain the economic mechanisms that caused losses
in the mortgage market to amplify into such large dislocations and turmoil in the
financial markets”, and to describe ”common economic threads that explain the
plethora of market declines, liquidity dry-ups, defaults, and bailouts that occurred
after the crisis broke in the summer 2007”. This author provided a detailed descrip-
tion of financial markets, explained the securitization process since its origins and
laid out a complete timeline of the main events of the 2008 financial crisis. Chari
et al. (2008) exposed and debunked three claims about ”the way the financial crisis
affected the global economy and also presented three underappreciated facts about
85
how the financial system intermediates funds between households and corporate
businesses”, and Gorton and Metrick (2012) conducted a survey that selected and
summarized 16 documents, including academic papers and reports from regulatory
and international agencies, that ”covers the key facts and mechanisms in the build-
up of risk, the panics in short-term-debt markets, the policy reactions, and the real
effects of the financial crisis”. Adrian et al. (2012) studies both aggregate and micro
level data and highlights the shift in the composition of credit between loans and
bonds, and construct a model of direct and intermediate credit to capture the key
stylized facts that characterize the financial crisis period of 2007-2009.
In order to construct a credible empirical survey, it is important to provide a
historical perspective and a theoretical background for understanding the recent fi-
nancial crisis and its consequences. In Section 2, I cover some papers that provide
important empirical results about financial crises, which constitute important clues
to shed light on the 2008 financial crisis but also predict and prevent future reces-
sions. For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) use long historical time series on
public debt, along with modern data on external debts and they show that strong
increments in private debt are a ”recurring antecedent to banking crises”, and these
banking crises, independently of its domestic or external origin, usually precede or
accompany sovereign debt crises. Afonso et al. (2010) examines the impact of the
financial crisis of 2008 on the federal funds market, specifically the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers, and concludes that, after that event, ”banks become more restric-
tive in which counterparties they lend to” and ”amounts and spreads become more
sensitive to borrower bank characteristics”. Blanchard (2009) provides a discussion
of how ”could such a relatively limited and localized event (the subprime loan crisis
in the United States) have effects of such magnitude on the world economy”. The au-
thor answers that question by identifying the essential initial conditions which have
shaped the crisis (”the underestimation of risk contained in newly issued assets;
the opacity of the derived securities on the balance sheets of financial institutions;
the connectedness between financial institutions, both within and across countries;
and, finally, the high leverage of the financial system as a whole”); by identifying
the two amplification mechanisms behind the crisis (”the sale of assets to satisfy
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liquidity runs by investors” and ”the sale of assets to reestablish capital ratios”);
by showing how the amplification mechanisms have played out in real time, moving
from subprime to other assets, from institution to institution, and from the United
States, first to Europe, and then to emerging countries; and by proposing a change
in future regulation and policies in order for them to avoid a repeat of some of those
initial conditions. Other authors such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) argue that the
global imbalances of the 2000s, specially in the U.S., caused by economic policies
that included ”the interaction among the Feds monetary stance, global real interest
rates, credit market distortions, and financial innovation” created the toxic mix of
conditions making the U.S. the epicenter of the global financial crisis.
Nowadays it is largely accepted by several authors such as Brunnermeier (2009)
and Gorton and Metrick (2012) that the 2008 financial crisis has its origins in the
transformation of the banking system in the last 30 years, from which we can high-
light two major changes. First, the deregulation process of the banking system which
led to the exponential increase in the demand for secondary market products such
as derivative securities and for collateral; and second, the rise of the denominated
shadow banking system, especially in the U.S.A., which settled its development
largely in the securitization process of the banking system. This securitization pro-
cess was developed mainly through the issuance of tranches of loans that came to
be used as collateral in repo transactions, freeing other types of assets, mostly trea-
suries, for use as collateral for derivatives transactions and for use in settlement
systems.
2.3 A Brief Survey of the 2007-2009 Financial
Crisis
The main goal of this section is to answer two major questions regarding the
2008 financial crisis and the following global recession: which sequence of events
and cumulative effects triggered the collapse of the U.S. financial system in 2008
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and what were the main consequences of this financial failure over the worldwide
economy until today?
In order to achieve these goals, this section provides a general overview and
context of the financial crisis, through a brief description of the major events which
characterize the ”oficial” time interval 3 of this crisis settled by NBER.
In order to construct a credible empirical survey, it is also important to provide
a historical perspective and a theoretical background for understanding the recent
financial crisis and its consequences.
2.3.1 Overview and Context of the Crisis
Nowadays it is largely accepted by several authors such as Brunnermeier (2009),
Gorton and Metrick (2012), and Gorton (2010) that the 2008 financial crisis has
its roots in the transformation of the banking system in the last 30 years, from
which we can highlight two major changes. First, the deregulation process of the
banking system which led to the exponential increase in the demand for secondary
market products such as derivative securities and for collateral; and second, the rise
of the denominated shadow banking system, especially in the U.S., which settled
its development largely in the securitization process of the banking system. This
securitization process was developed mainly through the issuance of tranches of
loans that came to be used as collateral in repo transactions, freeing other types
of assets, mostly treasuries, for use as collateral for derivatives transactions and for
use in settlement systems. Adrian and Shin (2010b) argued that the ”financial crisis
of 2007-09 highlighted the changing role of financial institutions and the growing
importance of the shadow banking system, which grew out of the securitization of
assets and the integration of banking with capital market developments. This trend
was most pronounced in the United States, but it also had a profound influence on
the global financial system as a whole.”
3The U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) officially sets the beginning of the
recession at the end of the fourth semester of 2007 and sets the end at the second quarter of 2009.
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This repo transactions refer to the sale and repurchase (”repo”) market, which
is essentially a short-term market for firms, banks, and institutional investors that
is based upon a form of banking that involves the short-term (mostly overnight)
deposit of money on call, backed by collateral. A repurchase agreement (or ”repo”) is
essentially a transaction in which one side of the transaction wants to borrow money
and the other side wants to save money by ”depositing” in a safe asset. In this case,
the borrowers are the banks and the lenders are the depositors, which are generally
another firm such a bank, insurance company, pension fund, institutional investor,
or hedge fund. Gorton and Metrick (2009) analyzed extensively the repo markets
during the ”Panic of 2007-2008” by using a novel data set that includes credit spreads
for hundreds of securitized bonds to trace the path of crisis from subprime-housing
related assets into markets that had no connection to housing. They concluded that
there was indeed a run the repo market and that ”the U.S. banking system was
effectively insolvent for the first time since the Great Depression”.
When some institution deposits money, the collateral may involve a ”haircut” or
margin, which is the percentage difference between the market value of the pledged
collateral and the amount of funds lent. This haircut protects the depositor against
the risk of borrower default by the bank. In other words, the size of the haircut
reflects the credit risk of the borrower and the risk of the pledged collateral. Another
important feature of repo is that the collateral can be rehypothecated, i.e., the
collateral received by the depositor can be used in another transaction, that is, it
can be used to collateralize a transaction with another party.
The securitization process and the housing boom registered during the 1990’s
and the 2000’s 4 (the latter until the burst of the housing bubble in 2007) were two
important factors behind the change in the risk sharing structure between economic
agents. In fact, the government deregulation of financial institutions ultimately
increased risk, by permitting such institutions to alter the composition of their asset
portfolios towards more high-risk securities. This preference for riskier, short-term
assets led to higher leverage ratios, and accelerated the spread of complex financial
4The Appendix proves a brief explanation of the development of the securitization process.
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holding companies that replaced the long established separation between investment
banks, commercial banks and insurance companies. This process of repackaging
loans and passed them on to various other financial investors contributed to disperse
or in some cases transfer the risk from one financial investor to another, shrinking the
risk taken by banks. However, since banks increasingly financed their asset holdings
with shorter maturity instruments during the pre-crisis period, their exposition to
a liquidity shortage increased significantly.
The traditional roles attributed to these types of financial institutions has also
changed and intertwined, redefining the main goals, functions and instruments of
those institutions and their correct placement inside the financial and money markets
worldwide. This is particularly important in macroeconomic models which include
financial intermediaries, since the authors must identify and characterize exactly
what is the role and the competences of the financial intermediaries included in the
model and how those characteristics can affect the equilibrium of the model and the
final results.
According to Gorton (2010), ”the shadow banking system is, in fact, a real
banking system”, in which the traditional role of depositors is played by firms,
banks or another institutional investors seeking a place to save cash in the short
term, often money market funds and corporations, and the role of lenders is played
essentially by financial firms such as banks, insurance companies, pension funds,
institutional investors, or hedge funds) seeking cash to finance themselves.
The transfer of loans from the traditional banking system to the ”shadow” bank-
ing system, through the securitization process, and the increasing banks’ investment
in shorter maturity assets, in contrast to long-term liabilities, created a maturity
mismatch in banks’ balance sheets, therefore exposing the banks to funding liquid-
ity risk. These two trends in the banking system constituted two major sources
of the lending and housing booms that were in the origin of the financial crisis.
As a consequence, several major financial institutions have failed (Lehman Broth-
ers, Bear Stearns, Northern Rock, AIG, etc), and several stock markets have fallen
dramatically, especially in the week after the FED bailout plan was passed.
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In order to better understand how all these financial concepts intertwined and
combined each other, culminating in the deepest recession of the last decades, the
next section presents a timeline of all the main events which preceded and occurred
during the peak of the crisis, starting with the burst of the housing price bubble
and the subprime mortgage crisis.
2.3.2 The Subprime Mortgage Crisis - A Timeline
First of all, it is important to stress that in the decade before the starting events
that later led to the financial crisis in 2008, the U.S. economy was experiencing a
low interest rate environment, both because of large capital inflows from abroad,
especially from Asian countries, and because the Federal Reserve Bank had adopted
a lax interest rate policy. The Federal Reserve feared a deflationary period after
the bursting of the Internet bubble in 2001, and therefore did not counteract the
building up of the housing bubble, which began since 2006.
The major event that is considered as the beginning of the financial crisis was ”an
increase in subprime mortgage defaults, which was first noted in February 2007”,
according to Brunnermeier (2009). Roughly at the same time, the phenomenon that
was designated by some authors as the housing prices ”bubble” burst out in the late
2006 and beginning of 2007. The housing price bubble is defined by the fact that
house prices were rising fast and steadily more than fundamentals during the credit
boom of the 1990’s, although there is a large debate in the literature concerning the
exact definition of a bubble 5. U.S. home loan lenders and home-builders started to
report successive losses, as can be observed in the S&P Case-Shiller 20-City Home
Price Index in Figure 2.1. The bursting of the housing bubble forced banks to write
down several hundred billion dollars in bad loans caused by mortgage delinquencies.
The unexpected fall in the house prices also led to the reduction in construction
activity. However, although housing construction is sufficiently large industry that
5In 2003, long before the burst of the bubble in 2007, Case and Shiller (2003) documented
the house price increases, and presented two types of evidence that suggest that ”fundamentals”
cannot account for the price increases on their own.
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this reduction would have shown up in the decline of overall GDP, this reduction is


































































Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC/FRED
Figure 2.1: S&P Case-Shiller 20-City Home Price Index
After the gradual emergence of these events, by the end of July of 2007, financial
and credit markets witnessed massive downgrades of mortgage-backed securities by
the main rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch), leading to a
fast decline of the prices of mortgage-related products. During this period, we can
take as examples two subprime mortgage underwriters (Ownit Mortgage Solutions
and New Century Financial Corp.) that filed for bankruptcy, and the case of Bear
Stearns, which in June of the same year began to show signs of distress since it had
to inject nearly $3.2 billion in order to avoid the default of two of its own hedge
funds. In Europe, the first victim of he subprime crisis was the German bank IKB,
on July, since the bank proved unable to provide the promised credit line.
In August problems in mortgage and credit markets spill over into interbank
markets, mainly through a run on repurchase or ”repo” market, characterized by
92
steep rise in price of haircuts and termination of repo market lending on collateral in
form of asset-backed securities (ABS’s) or asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP).
This massive deleveraging lead quantitative hedge funds to suffer heavy losses. One
of the most notorious examples of this phenomenon at this time was the run on the
U.S. home loan lender Countrywide Financial Corp.
On August 9 the ECB injected 95 billion euros of liquidity into the interbank
market, in a first attempt to avoid a systemic effect of the bank run over the tra-
ditional commercial banking system, and this action is then followed soon after by
other central banks worldwide. The Federal Reserve Board approved a 50-basis-
points reduction in the discount rate, ”broadened the type of collateral that banks
could post, and lengthened the lending horizon to 30 days”, according to Gorton
(2010) and Brunnermeier (2009). For the rest of this month, the participants of the
interbank, money and commercial paper markets started to show several signs of
distress and distrust in lending to each other, as the sudden increase in the interest
on asset-backed commercial paper occurred during this period, as Figure 3.2 illus-
trates. This ”liquidity crunch” was accompanied by a steep rise in the perceived
default risks by banks, leading the LIBOR and other benchmark interest rates to
rise temporarily. During this period, rating agencies systematically continued to































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)/FRED
Figure 2.2: Asset Backed Commercial Paper Outstanding in the U.S.
On September 9 there was a run on U.K. bank Northern Rock, ”the first in 150
years”, according to Gorton (2010), and three days later the Fed decided to lower the
federal funds rate by half a percentage point (50 basis point) and also the discount
rate.
Between October and December several massive write-downs were registered by
major financial firms, such as Citigroup, UBS and Morgan Stanley. In response, the
Fed decided to reduce the federal funds rate by 0.25 percentage point on December 11
of the same year. Next day, in order to revive interbank lending, the Fed announced
the creation of the Term Facility Auction (TAF), ”through which commercial banks
could bid anonymously for 28-day loans against a broad set of collateral, including
various mortgage-backed securities”, according to Brunnermeier (2009). Officially,
the National Bureau of Economic Research has declared December of 2007 to be the
business cycle peak of the subprime crisis until then.
Due to the fast increase in the number of write-offs and liquidations, on March
of 2008 the Fed announced an increase of 40 billion dollars in the size of the TAF
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and also announced the creation of the Term Securities Lending Facility program
in order to restore and promote liquidity into the interbank market. Through this
unprecedented quantitative easing measure, the Fed expanded its securities by lend-
ing Treasury bonds against a range of eligible assets (see Gorton (2010) and Gorton
and Metrick (2012)). According to Brunnermeier (2009), ”some market participants
might have (mistakenly) interpreted this move as a sign that the Fed knew some
investment bank might be in difficulty. Naturally, they pointed to the smallest, most
leveraged investment bank with large mortgage exposure: Bear Stearns.” Since Bear
Stearns was considered ”too big to fail”, i.e. too large and ”interconnected” to al-
lowed to fail suddenly, on March 16 JPMorgan Chase agreed to buy it, with Federal
Assistance from the Fed of New York, which created the Primary Dealer Credit
Facility, an overnight funding facility for investment banks in distress.
During those first months of 2008, several interest rate spreads associated with
mortgage-backed securities (in relation to Treasury bonds) rose steadily, particu-
larly those related to the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Ultimately, after successive losses in the stock prices of these two institutions,
the Federal government was forced to take over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on
September of 2008.
Although it had survived the first liquidity crunch in March 2008 mainly because
of the injection conceded by the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, Lehman Brothers’
shares plunged on September 9. After all major banks declined the possibility
to take over Lehman Brothers without a government guarantee, the investment
bank, previously perceived as ”too big to fail”, was forced to file for bankruptcy on
September 15, 2008.
After this, events started to unwind very quickly, and soon other large investment
banks as Merrill Lynch and large international insurance companies as AIG (heavily
linked to the credit securitized derivatives markets) began to declare huge liquidity
shortages and huge losses on their stock prices, in the hope to be bailed out by the
Fed. In fact, the Federal Reserve lent 85 billion dollars to AIG to avoid bankruptcy
in exchange for an 80 percent equity stake.
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Since Lehman Brothers had several affiliates and counterparties around the
world, the effects of this bankruptcy soon spread into the global financial markets.
Several money market funds, such as the Reserve Primary Fund, ”broke the buck”
i.e. ”their share price dropped below $1”, causing a run on the money markets,
according to Gorton and Metrick (2012) and to Brunnermeier (2009).
Fearing the serious consequences of a potential run on money market funds, on
September 19 the U.S. Treasury announced a temporary $80 billion guarantee for
brokers’ money market funds, and the Federal Reserve announced the Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Funds Liquidity Facility.
Despite all the efforts conducted by the Fed to prevent a massive run on the
credit market and on the money market funds, the deterioration of the financial
stability continued to increase at an alarming rate. On September 25, Washington
Mutual, one of the largest savings and loan funds in the U.S. was seized by the
authorities (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), after the majority of its
”costumers and fund managers withdrew funds electronically”, which is described
by Brunnermeier (2009) as a ”silent bank run”.
By October, the U.S. overall stock market collapsed, ”losing about $8 trillion
in the year after its peak in October 2007”, according to Brunnermeier (2009),
and the financial crisis was spread to Europe and to the rest of the world, and its
consequences were already spilling over the range of the financial markets, starting
to affect the real side of the economy, as can be observed in the peak of 10.0% of







































































































































Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics/FRED
Figure 2.3: Unemployment Rate in the U.S.
From that point on, several central banks (U.S., England, China, Canada, Swe-
den, Switzerland, and the European Central Bank (ECB)) started to develop and
implement a coordinated action in the financial markets, in order to help the world
economy to overcome the crisis as soon as possible, which included measures such
as the cut of major target interest rates, and the announcement of ”unlimited pro-
vision of liquidity to U.S. dollar funds”, according to Gorton and Metrick (2012).
The Fed proposed and adopted a bailout plan (the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP)), that included ”foreclosure-mitigation elements for homeowners, provisions
to purchase troubled mortgage assets, and a coordinated forced recapitalization of
banks.” Various stock markets have fallen dramatically, especially in the week af-
ter the bailout plan implemented by the Fed was passed. Spreads on a variety
of different types of loans over comparable U.S. Treasury securities have widened
dramatically. However, since the number of distressed banks and the number of
failures (see Figures 2.4 and 2.5) didn’t cease to increase, in November 2008 the Fed
announced the creation of several facilities that allowed the Fed to buy commercial














































Figure 2.5: Number of Commercial Banks in the U.S.
This unprecedented adoption of extraordinary off-balance measures by the Fed
(quantitative easing) triggered a massive increase in the size of the Fed’s balance
sheet, as can be observed in Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8. The Fed started to buy
unconventional securities like repurchase agreements, as can be observed in Figure
2.9. In fact, the Fed’s total assets, which presented a very well behaved, constant
path until the second quarter of 2008, more than doubled from about $8.9 billion in
that quarter to about $2 trillion in December 2008. This unprecedented and huge
absorption of more risky assets (such as commercial paper, asset backed securities
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and MBS’s) by the Fed continued to increase irregularly after the end of 2008, but

















































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System/FRED







































































MBS held by the Fed as a % of Fed's Total Assets
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System/FRED

















































































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)/FRED































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)/FRED
Figure 2.9: Repurchase Agreements held by the Federal Reserve
Overall, asset prices fell substancially during the 2008 financial crisis, especially
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the prices of non-subprime-related assets (see Figure 2.10). Financial firms could
only deleverage in response to the increase in haircuts by selling assets. There
was no suspension of convertibility (the banks refused to give back the cash to
their depositors), therefore financial firms had to try to sell loans and mortgages.
Commercial paper issued by financial institutions has declined, commercial paper
issued by nonfinancial institutions is essentially unchanged during the financial crisis.
Due to the quick succession of cases of financial institutions with shares collapses,
imminent or effective bankruptcy, stock markets start to melt down since the last




























































Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council/FRED












































Source:S&P Dow Jones Indices LLC/FRED
Figure 2.11: S&P 500 Dow Jones Index
However, contrary to what many studies may claim about the nature of the
2008 financial crisis, bank lending to nonfinancial and financial corporations and
individuals has not declined during the financial crisis, but has actually increased,
as Figures 2.12, 2.13, 2.14 and 2.15 illustrate. This claim was noticed, studied and
documented by Chari et al. (2008), and these authors concluded that bank credit
has not declined during the financial crisis but, on the contrary, actually appears to
have risen relative to the trend that was preciously following. From Figure 2.12, it is
possible to observe that the total amount of bank credit, defined as ”the aggregate
amount of assets held by these banks excluding vault cash” by Chari et al. (2008),
has actually increased until the last quarter of 2008, as well as the total amount of
loans and leases that integrate total credit, as Figure 2.13 displays. If we decompose
further total credit, its main components also followed an upwards path during the
financial crisis, as Figure 2.13 illustrates. Consumer loans, commercial and industrial
loans and real estate loans at all commercial banks have increased during the peak of


































































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System/FRED






























































Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)/FRED
























































Consumer Loans at All Commercial Banks
Commercial and Industrial Loans, All Commercial Banks
Real Estate Loans, All Commercial Banks
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)/FRED
Figure 2.15: Total Consumer Credit Owned and Securitized, Outstanding
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2.3.3 Data Description
Nowadays it is generally accepted that the sequence of events that led to the
financial crisis started during the first semester of 2007, and that the crisis reached
its peak around the middle of 2008 6. However, when we analyze data from the
last thirty years, it is very clear that the changes that occurred since then in the
financial and banking sectors laid the foundations for the events that later triggered
the 2007 crash of the financial system, leading up to one of the major recessions
since the 1930’s Great Depression.
In the empirical analysis which follows, I used quarterly data originally collected
from Jermann and Quadrini (2012), which covers the period 1984.I-2010.II. I col-
lected most recent data from the same sources as Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
to update their series until the second quarter of 2014. I also collected other vari-
ables (mostly financial) in order to describe a wider scenario of the economic and
financial environment that surrounded the U.S. financial markets and the banking
system before, during and after the financial crisis. Most data was collected from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor and the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, all through FRED, a database from the Economic
Research of the Federal Bank of St. Louis which comprises over 267,000 economic
time series from 80 sources. In this sample most variables are in logs and linearly
detrended over all the time periods.
In real terms, since the beginning of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007 until
2014, all the major macroeconomic variables have suffered heavy drops. Figure
2.16 displays quarterly data on the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the
U.S. from 1984 onward. As it is clear from this figure, since 1984 real GDP has not
declined as deeply and sharply as during the current recession, which started in 2007
with the collapse of the U.S. financial markets. Although there was a downturn in
6The FRED database of the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis officially settled that the financial crisis started on December 1, 2007 and ended in the
second quarter of 2009, on June 1, 2009.
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the beginning of the 1990’s, the U.S. economy recovered relatively fast during the
nineties due to the stock market boom 7, until the turn of the century. However,
this boom was followed by a new slowdown caused by the 2001 dot-com bubble,
which persisted in the following years, but was vastly surpassed after 2007. In fact,
the 2008 financial crisis seems to mark a trend break in real GDP as well as in its
main components.
In order to illustrate this point, Figure 2.17 represents the evolution of real
GDP along and its main components (except for net exports): private consumption,
government expenditures and private investment. We can observe that all variables
declined substantially during the financial crisis period, in comparison with the rest
of the time interval considered, especially from the beginning of 2008, except for the
government expenditures, possibly due to its countercyclical nature as an automatic
stabilizer. Although the financial markets started to show signs of distress from the
early beginning of 2007 on, the real side of the economy only started to collapse in
the beginning of 2008. However, in order to take into account that the first signs
of distress had its origins in the financial sector since January 2007, I highlight the























































































































































Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis/FRED








































































Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis/FRED
Figure 2.17: GDP and its main components
In Figure 2.18 it is possible to see with more detail the evolution of the cyclical
behaviour of GDP and its components between the first quarter of 2000 until the
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second quarter of 2014. Like GDP, private consumption, government expenditures
and private investment also registered a turning point during the ”official” financial
crisis period, around the second quarter of 2008, although with very different de-
grees of volatility (as expected, private investment is the most volatile variable). In
general, all these variables are coincident with the economic activity and procycli-
cal, although government expenditures presents a countercyclical behaviour, as it
is expected if we consider its role as an automatic stabilizer. It is very clear from
this figure that there is a time gap between the collapse of the financial system
and the first signs of distress in the real side of the economy. Private investment,
as it is expected according to the standard empirical literature, exhibits a leading
behaviour, since it started its decline earlier than GDP, around the second half
of 2007. This delay in the response of the real variables to a shock originated in
the financial sector can be explained by several factors which resulted from direct
authorities’ intervention, such as the successive efforts of the Federal Reserve to
contain the contagion effects of the financial shock into other sectors of the economy
(or at least to minimize those spillovers). However, there are also more theoretical
factors, which support that this delay can also be explained at the light of a pre-
existent mechanism which linked the financial sector to the real side of the economy,



































































Source: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis/FRED
Figure 2.18: GDP and its main components (detrended)
In response to the breakdown in the production levels the unemployment rate
suffered a huge and sudden increase. Figure 2.3, previously presented in section 3.2,
displays data for the unemployment rate in the U.S. since the first quarter of 1984
until the second quarter of 2014. Although there was a small jump from approx-
imately 4% to 6% from 2001 and 2004, due to the internet bubble, the economy
recovered until the end of 2006. Then, matching with the beginning of the financial
crisis, from 2007 on, the unemployment rate raised steeply until reach almost 10%
in 2010. From the beginning of 2011 the unemployment rate started to decrease
slowly, and is almost returning to the 6% 2004 levels. The economy is starting to
recover, but the jump in the unemployment rate was the highest in the last thirty
years.
The negative spillovers of the financial crisis also affected the production factors,
labor and capital. Figure 2.19 displays an index of aggregate weekly hours of all
employees, and from this graph it is clear that its volatility has increased substan-
tially in the last fifteen years, after presenting a relatively increasing trend since
1984. Although this variable has suffered a significant decrease since the beginning
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of the 2000’s, its breakdown deepened significantly a year after the breakthrough of
the financial crisis in 2007. However, in the beginning of 2010 the number of hours










































































Index of Aggregate Weekly Hours
Source: U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics/FRED
Figure 2.19: Index of Aggregate Weekly Hours (U.S.)
Regarding the price of labor, the level of wages, measured in this case by the
compensation received by all employees, from Figure 2.20 we can observe that the
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 seems to have accelerated the rate at which
the wages are falling, inducing a break in the upward trend that has been verified
since the first quarter of 1984. It is important to stress, however, that this break
only occurred after the second quarter of 2008, when the financial crisis had already





















































































U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis/FRED
Figure 2.20: Nominal Wages (U.S.)
Using the method used by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) 8 I recalculated the
capital stock series to include the period 2010.III-2014.II to their original sample.
From figure 2.21 we can observe that the capital stock of the economy has been
exhibiting an increasing path since the middle 1980’s, but the recent 2007 financial
crisis caused a trend break in the upward path, at least after the second quarter
of 2008. The depressing effects of the financial shock lasted for several years after
the initial impact, but the capital stock quickly recovered its upward trend until the
first quarter of 2014.































































Source: Series constructed according to the Jermann and Quadrini (2009) methodology
 based on data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve Board and from NIPA
Figure 2.21: Capital Stock (U.S.)
Following the same methodology, I also reconstructed the debt stock to include
the subperiod 2010.II-2014.II. From Figure 2.22, it is clear that the debt stock had a
certain delayed response to the financial crisis, since it steadily increased during that
period until it drop suddenly at the end of 2008. But this beahvior is related with
the phenomenon already described in the previous section that claims that bank
credit actually has increased during the financial crisis and only started to drop by
the end of 2008 and beginnings of 2009. Although by the beginning of 2010 the debt
stock had already started to recover its steady upwards trend, the financial crisis












































































Source: Series constructed according to the Jermann and Quadrini (2009) methodology










Figure 2.22: Debt Stock (U.S.)
From Figure 2.23 we can analyse what happened during the financial crisis in
terms of technological advance and productivity of the U.S. economy, as measured
by the total factor productivity 9. It is possible to observe that the volatility of
this variable has increased substantially over the last thirty years, especially after
the hit of the dot-com bubble of the early 2000’s. Throughout the official financial
crisis period the total factor productivity registered a huge drop in relation to its
mean, achieving a negative peak of approximately −0.02% in percent deviations
from the trend in the last quarter of 2009, the lowest since the 1984. However, that
descending path had already started at the end of 2004, although in that time period
the variable had reached a positive peak.
9This variable is the productivity shock computed as a standard Solow residual using the Jer-






















































































































































Source: Series constructed according to the Jermann and Quadrini (2009) methodology based on data
from the Flow of Funds Account of the Federal Reserve and NIPA
Figure 2.23: Total Factor Productivity (U.S.)
In terms of prices, the inflation rate (see Figure 2.24) registered the lowest
peak (approximately −8.9%) throughout the whole time interval considered (1984.I-
2014.II) precisely in the fourth quarter of 2008, in the peak of the financial crisis.
This is clearly an outlier, since the inflation rate in the U.S. gravitated around its
average of approximately 3% without major deviations, although its volatility has
increased since the beginning of the XXI century. This sudden and huge drop in
the inflation rate during the financial crisis may reflect the steep fall in aggregate


























































Source: US. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Figure 2.24: Inflation Rate (measured by CPI) in the U.S.
Figure 2.25 plots a variety of types of interest rate data with different maturities
(Federal Funds rate, 1-month LIBOR, 1-month AA financial commercial paper rate,
1-month and 1-year Treasury Constant Maturity rates, and 3-months Treasury Bill).
These figures show that while spreads have certainly widened, the level of interest
rates of various types of borrowing are well below levels in recent non-crisis years.
From the beginning of 2004 up until the first quarter of 2007, the major interest
rates references of the US financial markets exhibited a steep increase, but as soon
as the subprime crisis started affecting markets, the level of these interest rates
plummeted heavily, although at different rhythms. Before the official financial crisis
period ended, all these interest rates were below 1%, and continued to shrink further
until the end of the sample (2014.II), to levels close to 0%, which resembles closely
a liquidity trap situation, or at least implies that the zero lower bound constraint







































































1-Month AA Financial Commercial Paper Rate
1-Month LIBOR
3-Months Treasury Bill
1-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System/FRED
Figure 2.25: Nominal Interest Rates (U.S.)
In order to infer about how the interest rates’ behaviour during the financial
crisis was affected by inflation fluctuations, it is important to inspect the Treasury
Inflation-Protected Security (TIPS) interest rates presented in Figure 2.26. TIPS
are securities issued by the U.S. Treasury whose principal is indexed to the season-
ally unadjusted Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the interest rate of semi-annual
coupon payments is fixed. 10 TIPS are considered to be one of the few risk-free
financial instruments offering a full hedge against high inflation to investors, by in-
dexing the return to the price level. For these securities, the principal increases with
inflation and decreases with deflation.In other words, when the price level increases
investors receive higher payments, and, in case of deflation, investors are protected
with a floor that guarantees them a payment of at least the original principal value.
When the security matures, the U.S. Treasury pays the original or adjusted princi-
pal, whichever is greater. Therefore, by inspecting Figure 2.26, we observe that in
the pre-crisis period the 5-year and 10-year TIPS interest rates level were close to
10The U.S. Treasury started the issuance of these debt instruments in 1997 with two main
purposes: to fully protect investors from inflation risk (and consequent losses in purchasing power)
and to provide daily data on future inflation market expectations to the Federal Reserve.
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the 1% − 2% interval, also followed by nominal assets interest rates (2.25). In the
first quarter of 2008, TIPS interest rates suffered its first major breakdown (espe-
cially the 5-year TIPS interest rate), but since TIPS are indexed to inflation, the
associated interest rates recovered quickly, reaching a new peak in the last quarter
of 2008. However, it was precisely during that period that the inflation rate suffered
its major fall, and consequentially the TIPS interest rates plummeted heavily from
that point on, reaching negative values from the end of 2010 onwards. We can better
understand and interpret the relationship between TIPS interest rates and inflation
by defining breakeven inflation. For a given maturity, the spread between the yields
of nominal securities and TIPS can be interpreted as an inflation expectation, also
known as breakeven inflation,because it represents the level of inflation that, if re-
alized, would provide the same return to investors in nominal and inflation-indexed
securities, making the investors indifferent between these different Treasury securi-
ties. Using the Fisher relationship the breakeven inflation can be interpreted as the
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System/FRED
Figure 2.26: Treasury Inflation-Indexed Security (TIPS) Interest Rates
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Figure 2.27 plots the joint evolution of equity payout and debt repurchases also
updated from 1984.I until 2014.II. The two patterns identified by Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) still hold on after the 2008 financial crisis: the two series maintain
a strong negatively correlation with each other and the tendency to equity payouts
increase in booms while debt repurchases increase during or around recessions also
persists. However, from this figure it is also very clear the inversion in the path of
the two variables that occurred at the end of the financial crisis, signalling the end


















































































Source: Series constructed according to the Jermann and Quadrini (2009) methodology
based on data from the Flow of Funds Account of the Federal Reserve and NIPA
Figure 2.27: Equity Payout and Debt Repurchase
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2.4 Calculations of the Productivity and the Fi-
nancial Shocks Series
2.4.1 General Overview of the Model
In this paper I establish a comparison between empirical evidence based on my
analysis of the macroeconomic data available for the U.S. before, during and after
the collapse of financial system in the U.S. in 2008, and the results provided by the
simulation of the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model for the same time period.
Therefore, it is important to present and explain the main equations and mech-
anisms behind the Jermann and Quadrini (2012), especially those that are directly
related with the two shocks that I want to re-estimate and simulate in the present
paper, the productivity and the financial shock. In this section I provide that brief
characterization of the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) framework, starting by char-
acterizing firms (since their optimization problem is constrained by the enforcement
constraint, from which the financial shock series is constructed), and then I proceed
to characterize households.
2.4.1.1 Firms
There is a continuum of firms, in the [0, 1] interval. The production function





t , where zt is the stochastic level of productivity, kt is the input of capital
and nt is the input of labor. It is assumed that zt is governed by a stochastic
autoregressive process of order 1 (AR(1)): zt = ρzzt−1 + εz, where εz is assumed to
be i.i.d., with the mean equal to zero and with an homoescedastic variance equal
to σz. Innovations to zt are defined as the productivity shocks in this framework,
and they affect all firms. The capital stock kt is chosen at time t− 1 and therefore
predetermined at time t, and the input of labor nt is chosen at time t.
The law of motion of capital is given by kt+1 = (1−δ)kt+it, where it is investment
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and δ is the depreciation rate.
It is assumed that firms use both equity dt and debt bt in order to finance them-
selves. In this model, one of the main features is the pecking order in the financial
decision of firms between equity and debt. Debt is preferred to equity because of its
tax advantage, but the firms’ ability to borrow of limited by an enforcement con-
straint which is subject to random disturbances, designated as ”financial shocks”.
Given that rt is the net interest rate, the effective gross interest rate for the firm is
Rt = 1 + rt(1− τ), where τ denotes the tax benefit. This tax deduction enjoyed by
firms is paid for by a lump-sum tax on households. The tax advantage also implies
that the aggregate amount of debt Bt will always be strictly positive.
In order to finance working capital, in addition to the debt, bt, firms can raise
funds with an intra-period loan lt. According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012),
”working capital is required to cover the cash flow mismatch between the payments
made at the beginning of the period and the realization of revenues” (after produc-
tion). Therefore, according to Lucas timing, the intra-period loan is repaid at the
end of the period and there is no interest, by assumption. The assumption of the
existence of this intra-period loan is a short cut to the fact that firms carry ”cash”
or ”liquidity” to the next period. The loan is then used to pay the equity holders
(including dividends) and to finance working capital (wages and investment), im-
plying that the payments of dividends comes from previous periods earnings. Firms
also issue equity shares st to its shareholders at the market price pt.
Firms start the period with intertemporal debt bt. Before producing they choose
labor, nt, investment, it = kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt and equity payout, dt, and they issue
new intertemporal debt, bt+1. Firms also contract an intra-period loan lt, since the
payments to workers, suppliers of investments, shareholders and bondholders are
made before the realization of revenues. That contract defines the equivalent of a
cash-in-advance (CIA) condition:
lt = wtnt + it + dt + bt − bt+1/Rt (2.1)
The firm’s budget constraint is the following:
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bt + wtnt + kt+1 + dt = (1− δ)kt + F (zt, kt, nt) + bt+1/Rt (2.2)
Using the previous two conditions follows that the intra-period loan is equal to
the firm’s production function/revenues, i.e. lt = F (zt, kt, nt). However, this is only
true as long as there is the tax benefit (τ > 0).
Since firms can default on their obligations and divert some of its own resources
(specifically, the amount of liquidity available at period t, which corresponds to the
intra-period loan lt = F (zt, kt, nt)), the ability to borrow in both time horizons is
constrained by the limited enforceability of debt contracts. According to Jermann
and Quadrini (2012), ”the decision to default arises after the realization of revenues
but before repaying the intra-period loan”. At this stage the firm holds a total
amount of liabilities given by the intra-period loan plus the new intertemporal debt,
i.e. lt + bt+1/Rt. In case of default, the only asset available for liquidation is the
physical capital kt+1, since firms can easily divert the total amount of liquidity
available at that period.
The renegotiation process between the firm and the lender 11 in the event of
default, in this economy, takes place without the introduction of a well defined
system of financial intermediation. If the firm defaults, the lender acquires the right
to liquidate the firm’s capital. It is assumed that at the moment of contracting the
loan the liquidation value of physical capital kt+1 is uncertain. With probability ξt
the lender will be able to recover the whole value kt+1 but with probability 1 − ξt
the recovery value is zero. Neither the lender nor the firm are able to observe the
liquidation value before the actual default. Therefore, these two cases are considered
separately to determine the renegotiation outcome. In order to do so, it is assumed
that the firm has all the bargaining power in the renegotiation and the lender gets
only the threat value.
Therefore, the enforcement constraint faced by firms is given by:










When this constraint is binding, higher debt, either intertemporal or intra-
temporal, tightens the enforcement constraint, and a higher stock of capital has
the opposite effect. When this enforcement constraint does not bind, that is, when
lt < kt+1 − bt+1/(1 + rt), it imposes a liquidity cost that acts in the economy as
an inflation tax: if the disposable amount of liquidity lt = F (zt, kt, nt) given by the
production is not sufficient to make the payment that leaves the lender indifferent
between liquidation and keeping the firm in operation, then that implies that the
firm will not be able to finance working capital imposing an implicit tax on its
workers, investors, shareholders and bondholders.
The probability ξt is stochastic and follows the process ξt = ρξξt−1 + εξ. It is
common for all firms and depends on market conditions. We can interpret ξt as
the probability of non-default by the firms. Stochastic innovations to this variable
will be considered the ”financial shocks” of this model, since it affects the tight-
ness of the enforcement constraint, therefore affecting the borrowing capacity of the
firm. Hence, so far, we have two sources of aggregate uncertainty in this model:
productivity shocks, zt, and financial shocks, represented by ξt. Since there are no
idiosyncratic shocks, I will focus on the symmetric equilibrium solved for a repre-
sentative firm.
From this enforcement constraint, it is possible to conclude that whether the
financial shock affects employment depends crucially on the trade-off between debt
and equity when the firm has to decide the composition of its financial structure. In
other words, the Modigliani-Miller theorem asserting the irrelevance of firms asset
structures does not apply in this economy when the enforcement constraint binds.
12
To formalize the rigidities affecting the substitution between debt and equity,
and in order to capture the frictions associated with paying dividends, I assume
12Jermann and Quadrini (2012) provide a more detailed explanation on how to achieve this
conclusion using the enforcement constraint as a starting point.
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that the firm’s payout is subject to a quadratic adjustment cost, following Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) framework. Given that dt is equity payout, the actual cost for
the firm is given by:
ϕ(dt) = dt + κ(dt − d)2, (2.4)
Where κ ≥ 0, and d is a parameter equal to the long-run payout at the steady
state.
According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012), the equity payout can be interpreted
as a way of modelling the flexibility and ”the speed with which firms can change the
source of funds when financial conditions change, i.e. it can be interpreted as the
financial cost in which firms have to incur due to the trade-off between equity and
debt”. In order to change the composition of its portfolio, the firm must incur in
legal and accounting costs associated with issuing and repurchasing equity shares,
as well as costs associated with adjusting their equity payouts to shareholders. The
parameter κ is a measure of the scale of the adjustment cost of the firm’s payouts
to shareholders. The quadratic cost function implies that the adjustment cost is
increasing in the deviation of today’s equity payout from its long term steady-state
payout target. The convex functional form of the adjustment cost given here is
meant to mimic the empirical evidence that the preferences of managers turn to
dividend smoothing over time.
The parameter κ is determinant to evaluate the impact of financial shocks over
the rest of the economy. When κ = 0, the economy is almost equivalent to a fric-
tionless economy, and in this case, ”debt adjustments triggered by the enforcement
constraint can be costlessly accommodated through changes in firm equity”, ac-
cording to Jermann and Quadrini (2012). When κ > 0, the substitution between
debt and equity becomes costly and the adjustment to a different financial structure
becomes slower, affecting the firm’s production decisions. This is the main reason
why financial shocks will produce non-negligible short-term effects on the production
decision of firms.
Besides issuing non-contingent bonds bt, firms also issue equity shares st, at the
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market price pt. Let us denote the total amount of equity payout received from
owning shares as d′t (and the net equity payout simply as dt), in order to solve the
firm’s optimization problem. Then, d′t can be defined as d
′
t = stdt + pt(st− st+1), as
the sum of the total amount of dividends distributed by the shareholders in period
t and the total net amount of share repurchases available in the same period.
The individual state variables are the capital stock, k, the debt, b, and the equity
shares, s. The aggregate states are the equity payout d and the input of labor, n.












(1− δ)kt + F (zt, kt, nt)− wtnt +
bt+1
Rt
+ ptst = bt + ϕ(d
′







≥ F (zt, kt, nt)
Where mt+j is the stochastic discount factor, which will be defined later in the
hoseholds’ optimization problem. This variable, along with the wage and the interest
rate are all determined in the general equilibrium and are all taken as given by the
representative firm.
The first-order conditions of this optimization problem for dt, nt, kt+1 and bt+1
and st+1 are given by the following conditions, after substituting ϕd(d
′
t) = st +
2κst(d
′
t− d̄) = st+2κst(stdt+pt(st−st+1)− d̄) back into each one of these conditions:
Fn(zt, kt, nt) = wt
(
1





1 + 2κ(d′t − d̄)















1 + 2κ(d′t − d̄)
1 + 2κ(d′t+1 − d̄)
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1 + 2κ(d′t − d̄)
1 + 2κ(d′t+1 − d̄)
)
pt+1 = pt (2.9)
According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012), each one of these conditions have
an intuitive interpretation that provides further insights into the model. The first
condition (2.6) determines optimality for labor, where the left hand side of the equa-
tion is the marginal productivity of labor and the right hand sight is the marginal
cost of labor, as usual. However, in this case the marginal cost differs from the
standard expression because the wage rate is augmented by a wedge that depends
on the ’effective’ tightness of the enforcement constraint, given by µϕd(d). Due to
this wedge, a tighter constraint increases the effective cost of labor and reduces its
demand, decreasing employment. Therefore, this friction in labor demand consti-
tutes the main channel of transmission of financial shocks to the real sector of the
economy.
From the second condition (2.7) it is not immediately clear whether the determi-
nation of the optimal level for capital in this economy depends or not directly in the
interest rate rt. In this case, the marginal productivity of capital is also negatively
influenced by the wedge µtϕd(dt), which implies that the tighter the enforcement
constraint and the higher the cost of equity payout, the lower will be the stock
of capital demanded in equilibrium. Solving the third condition (2.8) in order of
ξtµtϕd(dt) and substituting the result into the second condition, we get an expres-














From this condition shows that the determination of capital in equilibrium does
not depend directly on ξt, and therefore its innovations (the financial shocks) do not
have a direct impact over the stock of capital. However, the financial shocks have
an indirect effect over the demand for capital through two channels: the multiplier
µt and the interest rate Rt. The higher the µt, i.e., the tighter is the enforcement
constraint, the higher the wedge over the marginal productivity of capital, and
consequentially the smaller the demand for capital. If we consider the special case in
which the cost of payout is zero, i.e., κ = 0, this implies that ϕd(dt) = ϕd(dt+1) = 1.
Applying this condition, (9) and (19) become, respectively:
Emt+1
[
(1− µt+1)Fk(zt+1, kt+1, nt+1)
]
+ ξtµt = 1
Emt+1
[
(1− µt+1)Fk(zt+1, kt+1, nt+1)− (rt + δ)
]
=
Rt − (1 + rt)
Rt
As we can see from the second expression, even in the absence of the cost of
equity payout, the demand for capital is always pinned down by the tightness of the
enforcement constraint.
2.4.1.2 Households
The households sector is composed by a continuum of homogeneous households.
According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012) assumptions, ”households are the owners
(shareholders) of firms. In addition to equity shares, they also hold non-contingent
bonds issued by firms”.
Households maximize their lifetime expected utility subject to their budget con-












wtnt + bt + st(dt + pt) =
bt+1
1 + rt
+ st+1pt + ct + Tt
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where where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the information set
at time t = 0, Ω0, ct is consumption, β is the discount factor, and Tt = Bt+1/[1 +
rt(1− τ)]−Bt+1/(1 + rt) are lump-sum taxes financing the tax benefit of debt and
firms.
After defining the Lagrangian of the problem, the first order conditions with
respect to nt, bt+1 and st+1 are:
wtUc(ct, nt) + Un(ct, nt) = 0 (2.12)
Uc(ct, nt)− β(1 + rt)EUc(ct+1, nt+1) = 0 (2.13)
Uc(ct, nt)pt − βE(dt+1 + pt+1)Uc(ct+1, nt+1) = 0 (2.14)
TV C : lim
t→∞
Etβ
tλtbt = 0 (2.15)
The first condition determines the supply of labor and the second condition is the
Euler equation that determines the interest rate. The third condition determines the
price of shares, which states that, adjusted for dividends and discounting, the share
price follows a first-order univariate Markov process and that no other variables can
Granger cause the share price. Using forward substitution in this last condition I









According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012), this last equation confirms that
firms’ optimization is consistent with households’ optimization. Therefore, ”the
stochastic discount factor is mt+j = β
jUc(ct+j, nt+j)/Uc(ct, nt)”.
2.4.2 Parameterization
As in Jermann and Quadrini (2012), the parameters are grouped into two sets:
one that includes parameters that can be calibrated using steady state targets,
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and the other one which includes parameters that cannot be calibrated using those
targets.
In the case of the first set of parameters, the majority of the calibrated values
follows closely the standard RBC related literature for the US historical data. Table
2.1 presents all the calibrated values for this set of parameters.
The time discount parameter is defined as β = 0.9825, implying that the annual
steady state return from holding shares is 7.32 percent, according to Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) estimations. The utility function has the functional form U(c, n) =
ln(c) + α.ln(1− n), where α = 1.8834 is chosen to have steady state hours equal to
0.3. The Cobb-Douglas parameter in the production function is set to θ = 0.36 and
the depreciation to δ = 0.025. The mean value of z is normalized to 1. These values
are standard and the quantitative properties of the model are not very sensitive to
this first group of parameters.
The tax wedge is set to τ = 0.35, which corresponds to the benefit of debt over
equity if the marginal tax rate is 35 percent. This parameter is very important
for the model because it determines whether the enforcement constraint is binding
or not. In fact, this value of τ and the all the remaining parameterizations of the
model are set in order to make the enforcement constraint always binding in the
simulations (except when we set τ = 0 in order to simulate the model without the
interest rate benefit).
Finally, the mean value of the financial variable, or the enforcement parameter, ξ̄,
is chosen to have a steady state ratio of debt over quarterly GDP equal the historical
value, over the whole span of the sample considered. In the original sample, this
corresponded to the average ratio over the first quarter of 1984 until the second
quarter of 2010 for the nonfinancial business sector based on data from the Flow of
Funds (for debt) and National Income and Product Accounts (for business GDP).
The required value was set to ξ̄ = 0.1634, in the original Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) sample. However, for the main objectives of this paper, the calibration of
this particular parameter is crucial to the main findings, since the calibrated value of
ξ̄ determines the construction of the financial shock, and therefore its conditioned on
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the particular time span chosen to compute the value of this mean. For that reason,
and since Jermann and Quadrini (2012) haven’t specified the exact method used to
calibrate this parameter, I will describe in detail in section 4.3 how I calibrated this
parameter, and under which assumptions.
Table 2.1: Parameters set with Steady State targets
Description Parameters
Discount factor β = 0.9825
Tax advantage τ = 0.3500
Utility parameter α = 1.8834
Production technology θ = 0.3600
Depreciation rate δ = 0.0250
Payout cost parameter κ = 0.1460
Source: Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
According to Jermann and Quadrini (2012), ”the parameters that cannot be
set with steady state targets are those determining the stochastic properties of the
shocks and the cost of equity payout - the parameter κ. In a steady state the stochas-
tic properties of the shocks do not matter and the equity payout is always equal to
the long-term target, therefore an alternative procedure was followed to construct
the series of productivity and financial shocks”. For that reason, a detailed explana-
tion of the calibration of the remaining parameters (set with or without steady state
targets) and the method to estimate the time series for the two stochastic shocks is
provided in the next section.
2.4.3 Data and Methodology
The data collected in this paper includes the same database used by Jermann
and Quadrini (2012), updated until the second quarter of 2014 (the original sample
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ranged from the first quarter of 1952 until the second quarter of 2010, although the
authors focused on the interval 1984.I-2010.II to perform the simulations of their
model. Therefore, my sample includes U.S. quarterly data which covers the period
1952.I - 2014.II.
I focus essentially on U.S data since the Great Recession originally started in
that country with the subprime financial crisis, and in order to identify and isolate
the effects of the financial shock over the majority of the variables studied. Inside
the full sample, I focus essentially on the period between 1984.I - 2014.II, because it
includes the time range originally analyzed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) (1984.I -
2010.II), and upon which they calibrated their model in order to perform simulations.
One of the major exercises of this paper is precisely to compare the main changes
that including this observations to the original sample caused in the calibration
of the model, and also compare the performance of the model in anticipating and
replicate the empirical behavior, in terms of impulse responses and simulations of
the major aggregates.
I also emphasize the period 2010.III - 2014.II, because it is precisely the time
period which updates the original Jermann and Quadrini (2012) sample, and cor-
responds to the post-2008 financial crisis period but coincides with the peak of the
so called Great Recession (the period in which the initial financial crisis had al-
ready transformed into a worldwide phenomenon that affected all the sectors of the
economy.
All time series included in this study, financial and real, are seasonally adjusted.
In order to obtain the data, the major sources are the Flow of Funds Accounts of
the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) database.
In terms of methodology, the initial step is to construct series for productivity
and financial shocks, following the approach of Jermann and Quadrini (2012), but
extending their original sample (1952.I-2010.I) until 2014.II, and compute series for
capital stock, debt stock, equity payout, debt repurchases and total factor produc-
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tivity, along with the most important statistical moments of the each series. Then I
simulate the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model and compute statistical moments
and IRF’s for the main macroeconomic variables. Finally, I compare the results.
From the general overview of the model presented in Section 4.1, the productivity
shock is constructed as a total factor productivity (TFP) series derived after log-





ẑt = ŷt − θk̂t − (1− θ)n̂t (2.16)







t+1 = bt+1/(1 + rt) is the end of period liability. The linearized version of
this constraint is:
ξ̂t = φkk̂t+1 + φbb̂
e
t+1 + ŷt, (2.17)
where φk = −ξ̄k̄/ȳ and φb = ξ̄b̄e/ȳ are constructed using steady state targets.
The hat sign denotes percent deviations from the steady state and the bar sign
denotes steady state values.
Recalculating the times series for these two shocks (ẑt and φk) according to the
extended sample 1984.I-2014.II, implies that we need to reestimate parameters ξ̄,
φk, φb and also the debt/output and capital/output ratios. However, when adopting
this method to conduct that reestimation process, a serious problem emerged when
collecting the data from the exact same sources used by Jermann and Quadrini
(2012): I detected that their original estimation suffered from a methodological
issue related to the fact the constructed TFP and financial shock series combines a
nominal GDP of the total economy constructed with either total real GDP or with
inputs pertaining to the private business sector only (Business Value Added) 13.
This problem was detected due to statistical discrepancies between the updated
parameters and the original Jermann and Quadrini (2012) parameters needed to
construct both the productivity and the financial shocks, as can be observed in
13This problem was later also detected and corrected by Pfeifer (2016).
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Table 2.2. In other words, the estimates that I obtained for the coefficients ξ̄, φk,
φb are not exactly equal to the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) estimates computed
for the same time interval (1984.I-2010.II).
Table 2.2: Productivity and Financial Shock Parameters Estimations - Sample
1984.I-2010.II
Original J&Q Data Updated Data
Sample 1984.I-2010.II Method 1 Method 2
ξ̄ 0.1634 0.2111 0.4707
Debt/output 3.36 5.8859 2.5223
Capital/output 9.4799 10.6232 4.6468
φk -1.5489 -0.5601 -1.2489
φb 0.5489 0.3231 0.7205
Source: Author’s own calculations.
Therefore, I adopted two different methods to estimate these parameters based
on two different approaches Jermann and Quadrini (2012) when computing the
Nominal GDP used in the calculations of the two shocks measures:
Method 1:
Nominal GDP = Real GDP ×Business Price Index
Method 2:
Nominal GDP = Business V alue Added×Business Price Index
Where Real GDP is the Real Gross Domestic Product in billions of chained
(2009) dollars and seasonally adjusted at annual rates, extracted from the Bureau of
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Economic Analysis (NIPA); Business V alue Added is the total value added accumu-
lated in the business sector, also extracted from NIPA; and Business Price Index,
which is the price index for the business sector also added from NIPA.
Table 2.3 sums up the estimates obtained for the updated sample between Sample
1984.I-2010.II according with these two approaches:










Source: Author’s own calculations.
We can then use the above equation to construct the ξ̂t series once we have em-
pirical measurements for the end of period capital, k̂t+1, the end of period liabilities,
b̂et+1, and output ŷt. Following is the description of how these series are constructed.
The series for the Capital Stock kt were constructed as follows:
kt+1 = kt −Depreciation+ Investiment (2.18)
where Depreciation is measured as ”Consumption of fixed capital in nonfinancial
corporate business” plus ”Consumption of fixed capital in nonfinancial noncorpo-
rate business”, Investment is measured as ”Capital expenditures in nonfinancial
business”, and all series were extracted from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the
133
Federal Reserve Board. Both variables are deflated by the price index for business
value added from NIPA. The initial kt is chosen so that the capital-output ratio in
the business sector does not display any trend during the sample period 1052-2014
(the full complete sample in years). This procedure undertaken by Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) is not relevant for these results based on the subperiod 1984-2014,
since the initial value of kt is important only for the early dates. The k̂t+1 series
used in equation (2.4.3) is constructed by linearly detrending the logarithm of kt+1
over the period 1984.I-2014.II.
The Debt Stock is constructed using the equation:
bet+1 = b
e
t +Net New Borrowing (2.19)
In this case, the variable bet+1 = bt+1/(1 + rt) is used instead of simply bt+1
because this is the model equivalent of the end-of-period debt reported in the data.
Net New Borrowing is measured by ”Net increase in credit markets instruments
of nonfinancial business”, also from NIPA. Since the constructed stock of debt is
measured in nominal terms, we deflate it by the price index for business value added
from NIPA. Contrary to Jermann and Quadrini (2012) 14, the initial (nominal) stock
of debt was set to 105.232, which was the value reported at the extraction date in
the same balance sheet data from the Flow of Funds used by authors. However,
since this recursion was started in 1952, the initial value is not important for the
results of the paper based on the subperiod 1984-2014. The series for the stocks of
debt were not directly used since they are not seasonally adjusted. The b̂et+1 series
used in equation was, therefore, computed by linearly detrending the log of bet+1 over
the sample period 1984.I-2014.II.
The construction of Output series ŷt is the point of my analysis where I divide
the calculations into two different approaches: first, following Jermann and Quadrini
14Jermann and Quadrini (2012) set this value to 94.12, which was the value reported at the
time their analysis was executed in the balance sheet data from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the
Federal Reserve Board in 1952.I for the nonfarm financial business. This discrepancies are due to
the systematic updates that the Flow of Funds perform regularly over these data sets.
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(2012), I use the business value added series from NIPA; and second, I use the real
GDP in billions of chained (2009) dollars from the Flow of Funds. The resulting
series ŷt used in equation is constructed by linearly detrending the log of yt over the
period 1984.I-2014.II.
Then, following Jermann and Quadrini (2012), it is assumed that both shocks
follow an Autoregressive process of order 1 (AR(1)) process, which is estimated as
















where εz,t+1 and εξ,t+1 are iid with standard deviations σz and σξ, respectively.
Several VAR(1) estimations were performed for the two different approaches
and for 4 different subsamples: the benchmark sample 1984.I-2014.II, the complete
sample 1952.I-2014.II, the original sample used by Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
1984.I-2010.II and the subsample 2010.III-2014.II, which corresponds to the period
not analyzed in the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) paper.
However, when conducting these regressions, a problem emerged: several VAR(1)
estimations reported that the system are unstable, due to the presence of a unit root
(ρξ > 1), for all the time periods considered and assuming both estimating methods.
The autoregressive system represented above illustrates an example of one of those
unstable VAR(1) estimations, where the financial shock series ξ̂t+1 has a unit root.
This poses a serious issue since it is not possible to run simulations on Dynare with
an unstable system.






In order to overcome this problem, I followed two different strategies: I forced
the estimation of the VAR(1) system manually imposing ρξ = 0.99, and I estimated




















where εz,t+1, εξ,t+1, εz,t and εξ,t are iid with standard deviations σz and σξ, re-
spectively.
The VAR(2) specification for shocks proved to be stable for almost all cases
considered, both in type of method and sample size.
After obtaining these estimates, I run simulations on Dynare for all the en-
dogenous variables included in the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model using the
updated calibration obtained with the new series for the shocks and the estimates
obtained from the VAR(1) and VAR(2) systems for the two shocks. Those findings
are reported in the next section.
2.5 Simulations and Findings
2.5.1 Volatility and Correlation
In order to evaluate the performance of the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model
in replicating the volatility of the main macroeconomic aggregates found in the
data, Table 2.4 establishes a comparison between the standard deviations of the
main variables of the model computed with empirical evidence against the standard
deviations of the same variables obtained by conducting stochastic simulations for 3
different scenarios: the model where the coefficients that define the VAR(1) system
of the two shocks are set with the original Jermann and Quadrini (2012) calibration;
the model where the coefficients that define the VAR(1) system that characterize the
two shocks are computed using Method 1; and the where the coefficients that define
the VAR(2) system that characterize the two shocks are computed using Method 2.
All these simulations are conducted for the period 1984.I-2014.II.
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From Table 2.4, in relation to output volatility, it is clear that the stochastic
simulation that most closely approximates the data is the model where the shocks
stochastic processes are estimated through a VAR(1) system by using Method 1 to
calibrate the parameters that define those shocks. The simulation conducted under
the original Jermann and Quadrini (2012) calibration actually overestimates those
fluctuations, while the simulation where the shocks processes are estimated through
a VAR(2) underestimated that volatility.
In general, for the real variables (output, consumption, hours worked, wages
and capital stock), the three methods underestimate the empirical findings for the
standard deviation, although the model estimated using the original calibration pro-
posed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) is the one that presents the highest standard
deviations of the three approaches. In turn, the model that uses the shocks series
estimated assuming a VAR(2) stochastic system to define them is the simulation
where that underestimation is the strongest. This conclusions are specially true for
real wages, since the empirical standard deviation for this variable is approximately
0.187223, while for the simulation with the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) calibration
is close to 0.041666, for the second simulation (using a VAR(1) system and Method
1) the standard deviation is 0.037289 and for the third simulation (using a VAR(2)
system and Method 2) that value is approximately just 0.015417.
In relation to the financial variables and the shocks, however, that behavior is
completely different. Although all simulations still underestimate the volatility of
debt repurchases, they all overestimate by a large amount the empirical standard
deviation of equity payouts (0.026741 in the data, 0.857787 in the first simulation
with the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) calibration, 0.195599 in the simulation that
uses the VAR(2) system and Method 2 and the highest value, 1.149209, obtained
in the simulation with VAR(1) and using Method 1). Regarding the productivity
shock, zt, the third simulation that assumes a VAR(2) system for the shocks and uses
Method 2 presents the closest approximation (0.016621) to the empirical standard
deviation (0.014452), since the other two simulations both overestimate the standard
deviation obtained from data. The same conclusion holds for the financial shock,
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since the standard deviation of the third simulation (0.028459) is the closest to the
value of 0.038141 computed with empirical evidence.
Table 2.4: Standard Deviation - Sample: 1984:I - 2014.II
Variables Data Original Stochastic Stochastic
Simulation Simulation Simulation
J&Q VAR(1) With VAR(1) With VAR(2)
Calibration Method 1 Method 2
y 0.055765 0.068739 0.056966 0.02164
c 0.050827 0.038352 0.032734 0.014088
n 0.045732 0.015528 0.020834 0.009132
w 0.187223 0.041666 0.037289 0.015417
k 0.082407 0.053501 0.041944 0.015534
b 0.208294 0.073372 0.02882 0.032355
d 0.026741 0.857787 1.149209 0.195599
z 0.014452 0.052861 0.038078 0.016621
ξ 0.038141 0.112304 0.125215 0.028459
Table 2.5 reports the correlations between real GDP and the simulated series
of all variables obtained from the three stochastic simulations of the model, for the
period 1984.I-2014.I. As we can observe, all simulations tend to underestimate the
empirical correlation between consumption and output (92.92%): the first simula-
tion gives a correlation of 82.10% between these two variables, while the second
simulation reports a correlation of approximately 88.12% and the third simulation
(using a VAR(2) and Method 2 to compute nominal GDP) reports a correlation of
88.25%. However, for the majority of the variables, the simulations seem to overes-
timate the empirical correlation between GDP and the remaining variables. This is
specially true for the first simulation that uses the original calibration from Jermann
and Quadrini (2012), since that, besides consumption, the estimated correlation be-
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tween GDP and all the other variables overestimates the data in all cases.
The second simulation that uses a VAR(1) system to characterize the two shocks
and uses Method 1 to compute nominal GDP to construct those series also tends to
overestimate the correlation between GDP and the other variables, except for the
capital stock, whose correlation with GDP (11.27%) is underestimated in this case,
and is the one that is closer to the empirical value value (21.25%).
The third simulation that assumes that the two shocks can be defined by a
VAR(2) system and uses Method 2 presents a more mixed pattern regarding the
correlation between each variables and GDP: it underestimates the correlation be-
tween GDP and consumption, between GDP and hours worked (and in this case
is the closest value to the empirical estimate), between GDP and debt repurchases
and between GDP and the financial shock, and in this case the size of the underes-
timation is very large (correlation of 57.71% in the data and of only 0.18% in this
simulation).
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Table 2.5: Correlation with real GDP - Sample: 1984:I - 2014.II
Variables Data Original Stochastic Stochastic
Simulation Simulation Simulation
J&Q VAR(1) With VAR(1) With VAR(2)
Calibration Method 1 Method 2
y 1 1 1 1
c 0.9292 0.8210 0.8812 0.8825
n 0.5403 0.8965 0.8843 0.4281
w 0.3254 0.9756 0.9019 0.9169
k 0.2125 0.6530 0.1127 0.7338
b 0.3900 0.6699 0.5330 0.0597
d 0.1149 0.7943 0.6997 0.1038
z 0.1052 0.5660 0.6840 0.9266
ξ 0.5771 0.9269 0.8449 0.0018
2.5.2 Impulse Response Functions
The impulse responses functions (IRF’s) reported in this section were all obtained
by simulating the model for 3 different cases: a first simulation where the parameters
of the model were calibrated with the original Jermann and Quadrini (2012) values,
assuming the same VAR(1) system as the authors, for the sample period 1984.I-
2010-II; a second simulation for the same economy but using the updated version of
the series originally used by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) for the same time period;
and a third simulation of the same economy but using the updated version of the
series used by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and for the extended sample period
1984.I-2014.II. For these two last cases, the simulations were first run by assuming a
VAR(1) system to characterize the stochastic processes of the two shocks, and then
the same simulations were run assuming a VAR(2) system for the same shocks.
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Figure 2.28 to Figure 2.31 report the IRF’s of output, capital stock, consumption,
hours worked, debt, equity payout, and wages to the productivity and the financial
shock, both simulated jointly, when the parameters that characterize both shocks
were estimated assuming a VAR(1) system, and were updated according to Method
1. Then, Figures 2.32 and 2.31 report the same IRF’s for output, capital stock,
consumption and hours worked to both shocks, but using the calibrated parameters
of both shocks generated by a VAR(2) system and the data were updated according
to Method 2.
2.5.2.1 Simulations run assuming a VAR(1) system to calibrate the
shocks
Figure 2.28 displays the output and capital stock IRF’s to a positive productivity
and a positive financial shock, simulated for the three cases explained above. Both
output and the capital stock immediately increase after each shock hits the economy,
for the three cases considered, but what stands out is the fact both the response
of output and the capital stock to the productivity shock in the simulation that
uses an updated series to estimate the parameters of both shocks for the extended
period 1984.I-2014.II is higher (at least in the first periods after the shock hits
the economy) than the simulations that use parameters calibrated according to the
original size sample (1984.I-2010.II). This suggests that adding the post-crisis period
to the estimation somehow amplificates and propagates further the impact of the
productivity shock.
Regarding the financial shock, the responses of output in all cases is positive and
even higher than the responses obtained for the productivity shock, but followed
immediately by a decreasing path along the simulation horizon. However, the initial
response of output in the simulation estimated with the extended sample is lower
than the responses of the simulations that use the original sample period. The same
is true for the dynamic path of the capital stock when faced with a financial shock,
although in this case the capital stock actually increases immediately after the initial
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Figure 2.28: Output and Capital IRF’s to both Productivity and Financial Shocks
The same behavior can be observed in the IRF’s of consumption and hours
worked to the productivity and the financial shock, as is illustrated in Figure 2.29.
When faced with the productivity shock, both consumption and hours display in-
creasing dynamic paths in the third simulation (estimated with the extended and
updated sample (1984.I-2014.II) that are wider and higher than the analogous re-
sponses of the other two simulations, at least at the initial impact of the shock.
When faced with the financial shock, this pattern changes considerably: the initial
response of consumption is negative in all simulations, although it is higher in the
third simulation (with the extended sample) than in the other two simulations (with
the original data and calibration and with the updated sample but the same time
period). However, these paths quickly invert their relative position, because after 6
periods, the consumption IRF in the third simulation is lower than the other two
responses, although by period 13 it surpasses the path of the second simulation. In
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relation to hours, although all the initial responses to the financial shock are positive
in the three simulations, the response of the third simulation calibrated with the
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Figure 2.29: Consumption and Hours IRF’s to both Productivity and Financial
Shocks
Figure 2.30 displays the IRF’s of debt and equity payout to a positive produc-
tivity shock and a positive financial shock. Regarding total debt, it is clear that
all the responses to a positive productivity shock are initially negative, and also
that the response of the third simulation is substantially higher than the responses
obtained in the other two simulations (that are calibrated using the initial sample
period 1984.I-2010.II). Although in all simulations debt increases over time as the
effect of the shock fades away, the dynamic path obtained in the third simulation
is much smoother than in the other two simulations. In response to a financial
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shock, debt immediately increases with the impact of the shock in all simulations,
but the impulse response is much wider in the first simulation (that uses the original
calibration of Jermann and Quadrini (2012)), followed by the second simulation (es-
timated for the same period but with the updated series), and finally by the lowest
and much smoother response, that belongs to the third simulation (estimated with
the updated data and for the extended period 1984.I-2014.II).
For the equity payout paid to shareholders, all responses to the productivity
shock are negative, which is a puzzling result, since equity payouts tend to generally
increase during expansionary periods according to the data, although in all simu-
lations there is a quick recovery and equity payouts start to grow after the initial
impact of the shock. In this case, the more extreme response belongs to the third
simulation, although it quickly converges to the remaining responses 12 quarters
after the shock hits the economy. The opposite behavior is evident when we observe
the impulse responses of the equity payout to the financial shock. The initial re-
sponse is positive for all simulations, but they quickly decay to converge once again
to the steady state. However, the highest initial impulse response is obtained in
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Figure 2.30: Debt and Equity Payout IRF’s to both Productivity and Financial
Shocks
Finally, in relation to the IRF’s of wages to both the productivity and the finan-
cial shocks, the pattern observed in the previous cases also repeats here (see Figure
2.31): the wage response to the productivity shock is increasing for all simulations,
although the highest path (and the only one that has an immediate positive response
to the initial impact of the shock) is the one obtained in the third simulation, us-
ing the updated sample for the period 1984.I-2014.II. In relation to the financial
shock, the widest wage response belongs to the first simulation, that is estimated
with the original Jermann and Quadrini (2012)) calibration. The third simulation
initially produces the lowest response, but after 13 periods inverts its position with
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Figure 2.31: Wages IRF’s to both Productivity and Financial Shocks
2.5.2.2 Simulations run assuming a VAR(2) system to calibrate the
shocks
Figures 2.32 and 2.33 display the impulse response functions for output, capital
stock, consumption and hours to the productivity and the financial shocks. As can
be observed, using a VAR(2) system to determine the parameters of the two shocks
analyzed increase the volatility and amplitude of the impulse responses, since it is a
second order approximation to the true parameters that define both shocks, which
implies that the nonlinearities proliferate substantially. Furthermore, it is important
to take into account that, in this case, the two shocks are not orthogonal, i.e. the
correlation of the error terms is definitely not equal to zero, which implies that a
shock in one variable is likely to be accompanied by a shock in another variable.
However, the findings for these type of simulations are nonetheless presented. It is
important to emphasize that, in this case, the second simulation is estimated with
the updated sample extended until 2014.II, but the parameters of both shocks were
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calibrated according to the VAR(1) strategy proposed by Jermann and Quadrini
(2012).
As we can observe in Figure 2.32, the impulse responses of output to the produc-
tivity shock and to the financial shock computed by assuming a VAR(2) system to
characterize both shocks are much broader than the responses obtained in the simu-
lations generated by assuming a VAR(1) process for the same variables. In this case,
the output IRF’s to the productivity shock are higher for the third simulation (that
uses the extended sample until 2014.II) and lower for the first simulation (that uses
the original Jermann and Quadrini (2012) calibration), which reinforced the previ-
ous result obtained in the analogous analysis conducted for the VAR(1) simulations.
This pattern is repeated for the responses of output to the financial shock, but in
that case, we get a different conclusion: the highest positive response of output to
the financial shock is obtained in the second simulation, and the lowest in the third
simulation (although there is an inversion of positions along the dynamic path).
For the capital stock, the impulse responses are even more atypical, specially for
the first simulation that uses the original calibration for the period 1984.I-2010.II.
The responses of capital to the productivity shock are all positive and increasing
for the first and the third simulations, but decreasing in the second simulation.
In relation to the financial shock, the responses of capital in the first and second
simulations are positive but gradually decrease over the simulation horizon (the
highest response is obtained for the first simulation), while in the third simulation
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Figure 2.32: Output and Capital IRF’s to both Productivity and Financial Shocks
The same atypical behavior is also evident in the IRF’s of consumption and hours
worked to both shocks, as can be observed in Figure 2.33. In this case, the responses
of the first simulation (where the parameters of both shocks were calibrated with
the original values proposed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012)) are the lowest and
smoother of all simulations, specially in the case of the response of consumption
IRF’s to the productivity shock. In turn, the third simulation (estimated assuming
a VAR(2) system for the shocks and for the period 1984.I-2014.II) presents the more
extreme responses to both shocks, although it is somehow more atypical in the of
the response of consumption to the financial shock, since it presents a negative and
decreasing path after the shock hits the economy.
In relation to the responses of hours worked, the behavior observed assuming a
VAR(1) system for the shocks resembles the responses obtained assuming a VAR(2)
process: the responses of hours to the productivity shock are increasing, although
they are negative at the initial impact of the shock except for the third simulation
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(estimated assuming the VAR(2) process for the shocks and with the updated ex-
tended sample). In relation to the financial shock, the opposite pattern is observed:
all the responses of hours are initially positive, but decreasing; and the highest re-
sponse is generated in the first simulation (estimated with the original sample and
calibration for the shocks), while the lowest and smoothest response corresponds to
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Figure 2.33: Consumption and Hours IRF’s to both Productivity and Financial
Shocks
2.5.3 Simulated Series
In order to evaluate the performance of the model in generating accurate sim-
ulated series of the main macroeconomic and financial variables of the model and
compare them against the empirical series of the same variables, I simulated the
model assuming a VAR(1) process for both shocks using 3 different approaches:
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1. Deterministic Simulation: I fed the innovations of the VAR(1) process of
the shocks into the model and computed the simulated series for key macroe-
conomic and financial variables assuming the original Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) calibration scheme;
2. Stochastic Simulation 1: I calibrated the model with the matrix of the
VAR(1) process of the shocks, but not feeding the series of the innovations of
both shocks into the model to obtain the simulated series of the main variables
of the model, using the original Jermann and Quadrini (2012) calibration
scheme;
3. Stochastic Simulation 2: I calibrated the model with the matrix of the
VAR(1) process of the shocks, but not feeding the series of the innovations of
both shocks into the model to obtain the simulated series of the main variables
of the model, using the updated and extended sample (1984.I-2014.II) based
on the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) calibration scheme.
The comparison between those simulated series and data are displayed in Figures
2.34 to 2.40. At a first glance, in general, these figures suggest that the model is able
to replicate reasonably well the behavior of most variables before the 2008 financial
crisis (specially in terms of volatility), but it is unable to anticipate or reproduce
the behavior of those variables around or during recession periods, specially as deep
and lengthy as the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession proved
to be.
In relation to output (Figure 2.34), it is possible to observe that none of the sim-
ulations is able to replicate accurately the behavior of output observed in the data,
specially during the 2008 financial crisis. However, all the simulations approximate
the empirical behavior relatively well before the 2008 financial crisis, particularly
the two stochastic simulations in the beginning of the simulation horizon (between
1984.I until 1992.IV) and the deterministic simulation 2003.I until 2006.III. From
that point on, none of the simulations anticipated the sudden drop that occurred in
the second quarter of 2008, neither in depth or length.
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The same behavior can be observed for the simulated series of consumption
(Figure 2.35), although in this case, the simulations were not able to approximate
relatively well the volatility of the empirical series. Before the 2008 financial crisis,
specially until the second quarter of 2007, the simulations approximated the empiri-
cal series of consumption, but, after this point, they did not anticipated the increase
that started during this period that lasted until the end of 2000, and underestimated
the empirical path of this variable during this period. When the sudden decrease
registered in consumption started to manifest its first signs in the late 2006, none
of the simulations anticipated the huge drop that happened later in 2008, although
the two stochastic series registered a slight depression between the middle of 2005
until precisely the second quarter of 2008.
For the capital stock (see Figure 2.36), we can observe that the three simula-
tions consistently underestimated the path of capital throughout almost the whole
simulation horizon, at least until the third quarter of 2003 (although the simula-
tions seemed to replicate the volatility of the data relatively well). Contrary to the
previous variables, the capital stock has been gradually decreasing since the middle
of 2000, although it started to decreased at a faster rate at the end of 2008. How-
ever, none of the simulations were able to anticipate and replicate such a deep fall,
although the stochastic simulations perform slightly better than the deterministic
simulation.
In relation to hours worked, we can observe in Figure 2.37 that all simulations
fail to anticipate the major downturns and upturns of the empirical series, and
even replicate the volatility observed in the data. In this case, it is the deterministic
simulation that best approximates the behavior of the empirical series, both in terms
of volatility, and in terms of anticipating the moments of booms and recessions. This
simulation was even able to anticipate and, although in a lesser degree, reproduce
the sudden fall in hours worked in the second quarter of 2008.
An equivalent analysis can be made about the performance of the simulated
series for real wages (see Figure 2.38), since none of them was able to replicate the
behavior of the empirical series in terms of cyclicality or volatility, specially around
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and during the 2008 financial crisis. The only period where the simulations were
close to the data was between the first quarter of 1989 and the first half of 1996.
In relation to debt, all the simulations were able to perform better and replicate
more accurately the trajectory of the empirical series, as we can observe in Figure
2.39, specially in terms of volatility of the series. Although all simulations were able
to replicate the debt path between 1984.I and the middle of 1989, from that point on
they anticipated (particularly both stochastic simulations) a boom when in reality
debt has dropped steadily during this period; and once again in the beginning of 1998
they failed to do so again since both stochastic simulations anticipated a fall when
in fact debt has increased during this period. The only series that were consistently
closer to the data, both in volatility and behavior, was the series generated by the
deterministic simulation, that accompanied relatively well (although sometimes over
or underestimating) the trajectory of the empirical series. However, in the second
quarter of 2010 this simulation anticipated a sudden recovery of debt after the strong
fall caused by the 2008 financial crisis, this is not reflected in the data, where debt
continued to decreased until the third quarter of 2013.
Finally, in relation to equity payout (see Figure 2.40), the performance of the
three simulations failed to replicate above all the volatility of the empirical series,
since all simulates series overestimated strongly that volatility. That difference in
volatility is so stark that makes it very difficult to evaluate the performance of the

























































































































































































































































































































































































VAR(1) Original J&Q Deterministic Simulation
VAR(1) Original J&Q Stochastic Simulation
VAR(1) UPDATED J&Q STOCHASTIC SIMULATION SERIES (1984.I-2014.II)























































































































































































































































































































































































VAR(1) Original J&Q Deterministic Simulation
VAR(1) Original J&Q Stochastic Simulation
VAR(1) UPDATED J&Q STOCHASTIC SIMULATION SERIES (1984.I-2014.II)



























































































































































































































































































































































































VAR(1) Original J&Q Deterministic Simulation
VAR(1) Original J&Q Stochastic Simulation
VAR(1) UPDATED J&Q STOCHASTIC SIMULATION SERIES (1984.I-2014.II)




























































































































































































































































































































































































VAR(1) Original J&Q Deterministic Simulation
VAR(1) Original J&Q Stochastic Simulation
VAR(1) UPDATED J&Q STOCHASTIC SIMULATION SERIES (1984.I-2014.II)


























































































































































































































































































































































































VAR(1) Original J&Q Stochastic Simulation
VAR(1) UPDATED J&Q SIMULATED SERIES (1984.I-2014.II)



























































































































































































































































































































































































VAR(1) Original J&Q Deterministic Simulation
VAR(1) Original J&Q Stochastic Simulation
VAR(1) UPDATED J&Q STOCHASTIC SIMULATION SERIES (1984.I-2014.II)
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VAR(1) Original J&Q Stochastic Simulation
VAR(1) UPDATED J&Q STOCHASTIC SIMULATION SERIES (1984.I-2014.II)
Figure 2.40: Simulated and empirical series for Equity Payout
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2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I compared the empirical time series of major macroeconomic
aggregates during the period 1984Q1-2014Q2 with the simulated series computed
from the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model in terms of variability, persistence
and amplitude of a productivity and a financial shocks. To conduct that analysis,
I compared the respective impulse responses to each shock to the productivity and
the financial shocks, the simulated series generated with the model against the data
and I also compared the performance of different types of simulations against the
data in terms of volatility and correlation with GDP.
In general, in terms of volatility, the model tends to underestimate the volatility
observed empirically, except for the simulated series of two shocks (productivity
and financial). In terms of correlation with GDP, the model overestimates the data,
for almost every variables. However, when considering only the sample 2010.III-
2014.II, the results change substantially. Therefore, the 2008 financial crisis period
is perceived as a structural break for almost every variable included in the model,
both real and financial.
The analysis of the Impulse Response Functions (IRF’s) suggest that the inclu-
sion of an updated calibration estimated with an extended sample that includes the
subperiod 2010.III-2014.II helps to amplificate and propagate the effects of both
the productivity and the financial shock, and also reinforces the idea that the 2008
financial crisis constitutes a structural break in the data for the majority of the
variables analyzed.
The simulated series generated by the model, in turn, lead to the conclusion that,
although the model is relatively able to replicate and anticipate the trajectory of the
data before the 2008 financial crisis, the model is unable to replicate the magnitude
and the timing of the huge losses registered by the majority of the real variables
during this period.
The 2007-2009 financial crisis constitutes one of the deepest shocks of the last
decades, both in terms of propagation and amplification. Overall, the Jermann and
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Quadrini (2012) model is able to explain the empirical evidence associated with
the time sample considered (1984.I-2010.II). The model seems to replicate relatively
well the empirical evidence on volatility and on correlation between the simulated
variables and data. However, after updating the data until 2014.II and after re-
calibrating the model the model seems unable to reproduce more deep, prolonged
and deep recessions triggered by productivity or financial shocks such as the 2008
financial crisis.
Appendix
2.6.1 The Development of the Securitization Process
In order to better understand and explain the securitization process, it is essential
to start by clarifying the meaning of certain types of assets, such as collateralized
debt obligations (thereby called CDOs). CDOs are structured financial products
created by banks to disseminate risk through several investors. In order to create
them, banks start by forming diversified portfolios of mortgages and other types of
loans, corporate bonds, and other assets like credit card receivables. Then these
portfolios are sliced into different types of tranches, which are then sold to investor
groups with different risk profiles.
There are essentially three types of tranches: the ”super senior tranches”, which
are considered the safest tranches, since offer investors a (relatively) low interest
rate, but it is the first to be paid out of the cash flows of the portfolio; then, in the
opposite side of the risk spectrum, there are the ”equity tranches”, the most junior
tranches or ”toxic waste”, which are paid only after all other tranches have been
paid out; and the mezzanine tranches, between these two extremes.
The exact cutoffs between the tranches are typically chosen to ensure a specific
rating for each tranche. For example, the top tranches are constructed to receive
a AAA rating. The more senior tranches are then sold to various investors, while
the toxic waste is usually (but not always) held by the issuing bank, to ensure
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that it adequately monitors the loans. Buyers of these tranches or regular bonds
can also protect themselves by purchasing credit default swaps (CDS), which are
contracts insuring against the default of a particular bond or tranche. The buyer
of these contracts pays a periodic fixed fee in exchange for a contingent payment in
the event of credit default. Estimates of the gross notional amount of outstanding
credit default swaps in 2007 range from $45 trillion to $62 trillion. One can also
directly trade indices that consist of portfolios of credit default swaps, such as the
CDX in the United States or iTraxx in Europe. Anyone who purchased a AAA-rated
tranche of a collateralized debt obligation, combined with a credit default swap, had
reason to believe that the investment had low risk, because the probability of the
CDS counterparty defaulting was considered to be small.
Most investors prefer assets with short maturities, such as short-term money
market funds. It allows them to withdraw funds at short notice to accommodate
their own funding needs (for example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983); Allen and Gale
(2007)) or it can serve as a commitment device to discipline banks with the threat
of possible withdrawals (as in Calomiris and Kahn (1991); Diamond and Rajan
(2001)). Funds might also opt for short-term financing to signal their confidence in
their ability to perform (Stein, 2005). On the other hand, most investment projects
and mortgages have maturities measured in years or even decades. In the traditional
banking model, commercial banks financed these loans with deposits that could be
withdrawn at short notice.
The same maturity mismatch was transferred to a shadow banking system con-
sisting of off-balance-sheet investment vehicles and conduits. These structured in-
vestment vehicles raise funds by selling short-term asset-backed commercial paper
with an average maturity of 90 days and medium-term notes with an average matu-
rity of just over one year, primarily to money market funds. The short-term assets
are called asset backed because they are backed by a pool of mortgages or other
loans as collateral. In the case of default, owners of the asset-backed commercial
paper have the power to seize and sell the underlying collateral assets. Asset-backed
commercial paper had become the dominant form of outstanding commercial paper
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by the start of 2006.
The strategy of off-balance-sheet vehiclesinvesting in long-term assets and bor-
rowing with short-term paper exposes the banks to funding liquidity risk: Investors
might suddenly stop buying asset-backed commercial paper, preventing these ve-
hicles from rolling over their short-term debt. To ensure funding liquidity for the
vehicle, the sponsoring bank grants a credit line to the vehicles, called a liquidity
backstop. As a result, the banking system still bears the liquidity risk from holding
long-term assets and making short-term loans even though it does not appear on
the banks’ balance sheets.
Another important trend was that the maturity mismatch on the balance sheet of
investment banks increased. This change was the result of a move towards financing
balance sheets with short-term repurchase agreements, or repos. In a repo contract,
a firm borrows funds by selling a collateral asset today and promising to repurchase
it at a later date. The growth in repo financing as a fraction of investment banks’
total assets is mostly due to an increase in overnight repos. The fraction of total
investment bank assets were financed by overnight repos roughly doubled from 2000
to 2007. Term repos with a maturity of up to three months have stayed roughly
constant at as a fraction of total assets. This greater reliance on overnight financing
required investment banks to roll over a large part of their funding on a daily basis.
In summary, leading up to the crisis, commercial and investment banks were
heavily exposed to maturity mismatch both through granting liquidity backstops to
their off-balance sheet vehicles and through their increased reliance on repo financ-
ing. Any reduction in funding liquidity could thus lead to significant stress for the
financial system, as we witnessed starting in the summer of 2007.
Another important aspect of the securitization process was the increasing widespread
of several structured products that allow to satisfy the different risk needs of dif-
ferent investors groups. Risk can be shifted From the investors who are more risk
averse to those who wish to bear it, and it can be widely spread among many
market participants, allowing for lower mortgage rates and lower interest rates on
several types of loans. One of the most important innovations introduced with the
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securitization process was the possibility that certain institutional investors to hold
indirectly off-the-balance-sheet assets that they were not allowed to hold previously
by mandatory requirements. The implementation of important changes in the regu-
latory and ratings arbitrage was one of the forces behind the increasing demand for
structured investment vehicles, during the pre-2007 crisis period.
For example, some international agreements on bank regulation were imple-
mented, such as Basel I and Basel II accords, which imposed important rules on
capital requirements of banks (designated as ”capital charges”). The Basel I accord
required that banks hold capital of at least 8 percent of the loans on their balance
sheets, but this rule could be easily overcome if banks move a pool of loans into
off-balance-sheet vehicles, and then granting a credit line to that pool to ensure a
AAA-rating, allowing banks to reduce the amount of capital they needed to hold to
satisfy Basel I regulations without changing the amount of risk for the bank. The
subsequent Basel II accord implemented capital charges based on asset ratings in
order to correct this problem, but banks were able to reduce their capital charges
by pooling loans in off-balance-sheet vehicles, therefore reducing the idiosyncratic
risk for each bank. As a consequence, assets issued by these vehicles received a
better rating than did the individual securities in the pool. In fact, issuing short-
term assets improved the overall rating even further, since banks sponsoring these
structured investment vehicles were not sufficiently downgraded by rating agencies
for granting liquidity backstops. In addition, securitized assets may have received
more favorable ratings compared to corporate bonds because rating agencies (espe-
cially Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch) collected higher fees for structured
products.
The major consequence of this increased demand for securitized, short-term prod-
ucts, which could be moved out of the balance sheet in order to maintain the risk
credit borne by banks, ultimately led to a boom of cheap, unrestricted and un-
surveilled credit in the banking markets, leading to very low lending standards.
This combination of factors, in turn, resulted in the housing bubble that escalated
during the 1990’s until 2007, that was in the root of the financial crisis.
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Chapter 3
Using Tax Subsidies to Overcome
the Zero Lower Bound
3.1 Introduction
This paper takes a medium-scale New Keynesian DSGE model proposed by
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) (based on the model originally developed by Smets
and Wouters (2007)) 1 to investigate the role of a subsidy on the interest rate as an
effective fiscal policy tool capable of overcoming a liquidity trap. In this case, the
liquidity trap takes the form of a zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest
rate. Using the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model as the primary theoretical
reference to conduct this analysis allows us to study the lasting post-2008 financial
crisis period characterized by low economic growth, low inflation and near zero
interest rates.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, now designated as the Great Recession, the major
1The model by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) was initially designed to analyse the macroeco-
nomic effects of financial shocks. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) have shown that financial shocks
had one of the most substantial contributions to the volatility of the growth rate of output in the
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis (approximately 46%). The authors also showed that financial
shocks can capture almost all of the decline in GDP in the third quarter of 2008 and about half of
the decrease in the fourth quarter of 2009.
163
economies such as the U.S. have experienced an unusual combination of features
that include the weak growth of the GDP, low core inflation, and a real interest
rate close to zero. The process of recovery has been much slower than usual in most
high-income countries and has lasted longer than in previous financial crises, which
suggests that other mechanisms are at play, in addition to the central banks’ efforts
to stabilize the financial system through quantitative easing measures. The Federal
Reserve (Fed) pushed the federal funds rate to near zero by the end of 2008, and held
it there through 2011 and beyond, which allowed commercial banks to accumulate
substantial cash reserves in their accounts. This pattern of excess liquidity in the
market accompanied by a real interest rate close to zero implies the presence of
a liquidity trap, under which conventional central bank open-market operations
are exceedingly ineffective as an expansionary policy tool. Monetary authorities,
therefore, began to consider alternative policy approaches for escaping the trap,
including raising the inflation target, depreciating the currency and targeting long-
term interest rates directly. However, less conventional policies that involve fiscal
measures are also considered, such as an excess reserve tax for commercial banks
and a major expansion in the federal loan guarantee program for smaller businesses,
both studied by Pollin (2012).
In this paper I study the role of a tax benefit on the interest rate as an instrument
to overcome a liquidity trap. I also analyze whether the imposition of a zero lower
bound constraint amplifies or not the negative impact of a financial shock in the
economy, particularly during and after the 2008 financial crisis. To accomplish this
goal, I use the structural DSGE model developed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012),
originally estimated with Bayesian maximum likelihood techniques. This model
was constructed as a second approach of a DSGE model aimed to explore how the
dynamics of real and financial variables are affected by financial shocks and financial
frictions. Their first approach was a parsimonious real business cycle (RBC) model
with only two shocks (the standard technological shock and the financial shock),
and this second method was developed to assess the contribution of the financial
shock in comparison with seven other shocks, thus providing a richer and more
robust scenario of the impact of financial shocks on the economy. This structural
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approach follows closely the model estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007), but
with the addition of financial frictions and financial shocks. Then, I compare the
main findings against the results obtained in the most recent related literature,
particularly the model estimated by Lindé et al. (2016). These authors update
the Smets and Wouters (2007) by adding a financial accelerator mechanism, shocks
originated in the financial sector and by introducing explicitly the zero lower bound
into the model. They extend the model with a financial accelerator and allow for
time-variation in the endogenous propagation of financial shocks. However, their
approach to the financial shock and to the financial friction differ significantly from
the approach presented by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), and they do not focus on
the role of the interest rate subsidy as an attainable instrument to circumvent the
effects of the zero lower bound, which is the fundamental premise of this paper.
In this paper I incorporate the corrections and changes proposed by Pfeifer
(2016), who showed that the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model suffers from several
methodological issues which affect considerably some of the findings of the model.
Pfeifer (2016) showed that the TFP series constructed by Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) combined the GDP of the total economy with inputs (capital stock, depre-
ciation, debt stock) related to the private business sector only. The author also
remarked that the structural framework was affected by some errors in three equi-
librium conditions and that some of the steps undertaken to perform the Bayesian
estimation also suffered from some issues. After fixing these problems and reestimat-
ing the model, Pfeifer (2016) concluded that the marginal efficiency of investment
(MEI) shocks are the largest contributors to generate output volatility, and that fi-
nancial shocks, in contrast, accounted for only 6.5% of output variance as opposed to
the 46% originally reported by Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Despite this finding,
Pfeifer (2016) acknowledged that financial shocks contribute with approximately 2
to 3 percentage points to the observed GDP decline during the Great Recession, en-
suring that studying financial shocks as a source of volatility in the economy remains
relevant.
The introduction of the zero lower bound constraint into this model share some
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similarities with several models well established in the literature, such as Correia
et al. (2013), Carlin and Soskice (2018), Chari et al. (1991), Christiano et al. (2011),
Eggertsson (2009), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Eggertsson and Woodford
(2006) and Krugman (1998). The majority of these models are built upon New
Keynesian foundations and were constructed to characterize the monetary policy at
the zero lower bound, but also to study the beneficial effects that a well designed
fiscal policy can provide by improving total welfare. Although these models study
different set-ups for the fiscal and monetary policies (jointly or independently) and
analyse the role of different instruments (such as lump sum taxes, wage and con-
sumption taxes, sales taxes and investment tax credits, etc) to overcome the zero
lower bound problem, and assuming the presence of different types of frictions (price
and wage stickiness, adjustment costs of capital, collateral constraints, financial in-
termediation, heterogeneous agents, etc), the literature is absent in explaining the
role of interest rate subsidies in circumventing a liquidity trap.
Furthermore, the majority of these models are designed and calibrated to reflect
the pre-crisis period and are not fully equipped to accommodate structural breaks
in estimated coefficients, moments and probabilistic density of those models during
the peak of the recession and the post-crisis slow recovery period. For instance,
the Smets and Wouters (2007) framework, which includes a large number of shocks,
was adopted as the standard version of several models used by central banks and
several authors to study the economy in the pre-2008 era and conduct forecasting
exercises. However, after the Great Recession of 2008, many researchers realized
that to account for the depth of the recession in a more efficient capacity, this model
needed additional features such as unlikely shocks and financial frictions that could
explain the slow recovery and the missing disinflation following the great recession.
Hence, there is a vast new branch of the literature that extend the New Keynesian
founded structural macroeconomic models as the benchmark by adding different
types of shocks and frictions to the original setup. One of those cases is the model
developed by Lindé et al. (2016), which augments the original Smets and Wouters
(2003) and also the Smets and Wouters (2007) structure through three extensions:
first, they take the zero lower bound explicitly into account when estimating the
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model over the full sample 2; second, they introduce unexpected shocks such as a
risk-premium and investment-specific technology shocks to the benchmark model
and to show that these shocks are non-Gaussian they also add regime switching
processes in the volatility of some of those shocks; and third, they conduct an
exhaustive analysis to understand how the performance and properties of the basic
model can be improved by introducing a financial accelerator mechanism and shocks
originated in the financial sector. 3 However, they conclude that current extensions
of the benchmark model (at least as they addressed them) are often not rich enough
to analyze the major policy challenges that both the monetary and macroprudential
policy have to face in the current global macroeconomic environment.
The main goal of the implementation of the zero lower bound constraint in the
context of the New Keynesian structural model proposed by Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) is to analyse how a subsidy over the nominal interest rate can be used to
entirely avoid the ZLB restriction and replicate the effects of a economy where the
nominal interest rate can float freely. The methodology adopted to implement the
ZLB constraint follows closely the procedure conducted by Correia et al. (2013),
in which they introduce the ZLB restraint assuming that the monetary policy fol-
lows a Taylor rule truncated at zero. They show how a combination of different
distortionary taxes and other fiscal instruments (designated as unconventional fis-
cal policy) 4 is able to neutralize the effects of the zero lower bound constraint,
and enables the implementation of the first-best allocation, depending on the set
of available instruments and on the assumptions adopted in the model (such as in-
clusion of capital and stickiness of prices and wages). Other researchers such as
2Lindé et al. (2016) use two alternative approaches to accomplish the introduction of the ZLB
into the model: first, they ”implement the ZLB as a binding constraint on the policy rule with an
expected duration that is determined endogenously by the model in each period”, and second, the
authors ” impose the expected duration of the ZLB spells during the recession to be consistent
with external information derived from overnight index swap rates”
3Lindé et al. (2016) insert an additional observable variable, the Baa-Aaa corporate credit
spread, to engineer the financial accelerator, based upon the Bernanke et al. (1999).
4The scheme proposed by Correia et al. (2013) combines an ”increasing path for consumption
taxes and a decreasing path for labor taxes”, and it also entails the adoption of temporary measures
such as an investment tax credit and a cut in capital income taxes.
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Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2009), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015) and
more recent works such as Nakata (2017) also use the truncated Taylor rule at zero
to incorporate the ZLB constraint into the model.
In this paper I will focus on the interest rate subsidy as the only fiscal policy
instrument, besides lump-sum taxes. Other papers that have studied the interaction
between the effects of financial shocks and the adoption of non-standard monetary
policy instruments when the zero lower bound is binding are Eggertsson and Wood-
ford (2006), Correia et al. (2013) and also Correia et al. (2016), that study how the
optimal monetary and fiscal policy can be used in a monetary model with financial
intermediaries and conclude that credit subsidies can be employed to overcome the
zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate, therefore shielding the
economy from financial shocks on credit spreads.
The structural approach adopted by Jermann and Quadrini (2012) follows closely
the model initially constructed by Smets and Wouters (2007), which includes seven
shocks (productivity, marginal efficiency of investment (MEI), intertemporal pref-
erences, labor supply, price markup, government spending and monetary policy) to
which Jermann and Quadrini (2012) added the financial shock and the financial
frictions. The contribution of this paper is to use this extended model to infer if
the introduction of the interest rate subsidy is enough to circumvent the zero lower
bound constraint and escape a liquidity trap and to measure how the presence of
each one of these shocks can stimulate or hinder the achievement of that objective.
Although this model includes eight shocks, there is a smaller subset of shocks (e.g.
productivity, financial or preference shocks) that are generally more popular when
performing simulations of the model since they usually generate larger responses
from the endogenous variables, and consequently, increase the probability that the
ZLB constraint will bind. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) justified the importance of
both financial and productivity shocks as key forces driving the large fluctuations in
the U.S. economy in the Great Recession, and the inclusion of the preference shock
is also pivotal because Correia et al. (2013) argue that, based on the findings of
Christiano et al. (2011) and Eggertsson (2009), the interaction of this shock with the
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zero lower bound can generate a potentially big recession. Furthermore, according
to Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015) ”positive shocks to the discount factor or to
the productivity raise the probability of the economy hitting the ZLB.” Williamson
(2017) also argues that a temporarily-high discount factor shock or a temporarily-low
productivity growth shock help to induce a binding ZLB constraint, where inflation
and output are higher than they would otherwise be. In this paper, all eight shocks
are used to simulate the model and study the impact of the ZLB constraint. However,
in this case the more conventional shocks (preference, technology and government
expenditures shocks) and even the financial shock have a much lower contribution to
the volatility of output, labor and consumption and investment than in the original
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) framework (largely due to the reestimation conducted
by Pfeifer (2016)). Furthermore, the impulse responses of some variables to these
shocks (particularly investment) do not fit completely with the expected outcomes
predicted by economic intuition, and that is the reason why the simulation exercises
undertaken in this paper also focus in the role of some less explored shocks in the
zero lower bound literature, such as the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI)
shock or the price markup shock.
In order to impose the zero lower bound constraint into the Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) model, I simulate the model using Occbin, a library of numerical routines
developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) that solves the model through a piece-
wise linear solution algorithm compatible with Dynare. This model includes only
one occasionally binding constraint, which implies that the nominal interest rate
cannot be lower than zero (the zero lower bound constraint, henceforth the ZLB
constraint). In such cases, the Occbin algorithm is designed to assume the existence
of two regimes: one where the occasionally binding constraint is slack and another
one where the constraint is binding. The model is linearized under each regime
around the non-stochastic steady state, and choose the regime that applies at the
point of linearization as the ”reference” regime and the other regime as the ”alterna-
tive” 5. It is important to stress that the Occbin algorithm demands the fulfilment
5Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) stress that it is irrelevant whether the occasionally binding
constraint is binding at the reference regime or the alternative regime.
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of two requirements to ensure its correct implementation: the reference regime must
ensure that the conditions for existence of a rational expectations solution recom-
mended by Blanchard and Kahn (1980) hold; and that ”if shocks move the model
away from the reference regime to the alternative regime, the model will return to
the reference regime in finite time under the assumption that agents expect that no
future shocks will occur”.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, a brief discussion of the litera-
ture related to the zero lower bound and financial shocks and financial frictions is
presented. In Section 3 the full New Keynesian DSGE model developed by Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) is explained. Then, I simulate the fiscal policy with the interest
rate subsidy at the ZLB in Section 4 and discuss the implications of my results on
the evaluation of this type of fiscal instrument. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Literature
This paper builds upon extensive literature on the zero lower bound in New Key-
nesian DSGE models, although not all of those studies include financial shocks and
financial frictions. Most of those models focus primarily on studying the optimality
of monetary policy and fiscal policy at the zero lower bound, where the government
and the monetary authority use the nominal interest rate and a wide range of dif-
ferent taxes and subsidies as policy instruments. Relative to this paper, authors
such as Krugman (1998), Correia et al. (2013), Carlin and Soskice (2018), Chari
et al. (1991), Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2009), Eggertsson and Woodford
(2003), Eggertsson and Woodford (2006) and many others analyse a much more
wide menu of fiscal instruments, which include direct and distortionary taxes (on
savings, capital, consumption, wages, etc) and subsidies (on credit, on investment,
etc). Despite many of these authors give more attention to the ability of the govern-
ment or the central bank to combat deflation or to overcome distortions imposed by
staggered prices or staggered information, there is a consensus that the zero bound
represents a severe challenge for policymakers, therefore justifying the imposition
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of inefficient policies or the use of unconventional tools, as Correia et al. (2013)
suggests.
Although that there are several studies on the zero lower bound investigating
alternative instruments of both monetary and fiscal policies, the role of an interest
rate subsidy as a fiscal policy tool to overcome the zero lower bound constraint is
mostly missing in the literature. The two closest studies to this theme are Cor-
reia et al. (2016) and Singh (2014), although they use very different approaches to
characterize their models and to define the interest rate subsidy.
Correia et al. (2016) use a broader set of monetary and fiscal policy instruments
to study optimal policy in a monetary model with costly financial intermediation.
In this model, banks and other financial intermediaries are ”subject to an enforce-
ment constraint that generates inefficiently high and volatile credit spreads.” Under
the zero lower bound constraint, the manipulation of the nominal interest rate as
the standard instrument of monetary policy is limited. Therefore, to escape this
constraint, central banks consider alternative tools, which include different forms
of credit policies. The authors focus mainly in the role of credit subsidies as a
useful tool to overcome liquidity traps and show that, under certain assumptions,
credit subsidies can be employed to shelter the economy from the adverse effects
of financial shocks on credit spreads. Furthermore, they argue that credit subsidies
are particularly useful to assist the interest rate policy in avoiding other distortions,
especially those associated with the stickiness of prices and information. The prin-
cipal conclusion of this paper is that credit subsidies are the best choice to shield
the economy from the adverse consequences of financial shocks on credit spreads.
However, according to Correia et al. (2016), standard tax instruments are sufficient
to overcome the zero lower bound constraint on interest rates, which is an encour-
aging argument to support the utilization of an interest rate subsidy as a policy tool
capable of alleviating the effects of the zero lower bound constraint.
The paper by Singh (2014) shows that a tax-subsidy scheme can be used to over-
come the zero lower bound on interest rate, without any inflation manipulation or
inflationary expectations. However, the author uses a simple Old Keynesian model
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instead of a New Keynesian DSGE version, which is a standard closed economy
macroeconomic model whose equilibrium can be synthetized in five equations: an
identity equation that equates savings to investment in equilibrium; an equilibrium
condition equating the supply and the demand of money; the production function
that relates output with employment (in the version without capital); a condition
that states that in equilibrium the real wage is equal to the marginal product of la-
bor; and an equilibrium condition to ensure that the supply of labor depends on real
wage. Although Singh (2014) follows closely Correia et al. (2013) to show that fiscal
policy can be used as a credible alternative to monetary policy in circumventing
the zero lower bound constraint, Singh (2014) argues that the approach developed
by Correia et al. (2013) avoids the ZLB problem by manipulating inflation through
fiscal policy, while Singh (2014) avoids using inflation altogether. Instead the au-
thor uses a tax-subsidy scheme policy implemented by the treasury that attempt to
mimic the tax-subsidy scheme implicit in inflation, which is controlled by the central
bank. This scheme consists on an explicit tax rate on savings counterbalanced by
the presence of an explicit subsidy rate on investment. However, this subsidy rate
on investment assumes a lump-sum form, contrary to the distortionary definition of
the interest rate subsidy studied in this paper.
Recently, a lot of effort have been devoted to incorporating the financial sector
into more traditional DSGE models. Therefore, integrating the analysis of financial
markets explicitly into general equilibrium is a top priority in the literature, both
for firms and households. Financial frictions and financial shocks such as an equity
premium shocks are especially important to capture and evaluate different phenom-
ena generated in financial markets, such as the impact of credit supply conditions,
risk aversion, anticipations about future policy actions or the effect of quantitative
easing (QE) policies targeting the yield curve or risk spreads. Other authors such
as Iacoviello (2005) and Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017) incorporate borrowing and
collateral constraints on housing wealth to drive asymmetries in the link between
housing prices and economic activity, while other models (Christiano et al. (2003,
2007, 2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011)) introduce
an active role for financial institutions (traditional banks, investment banks, hedge
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funds, etc) in the credit supply process or the asset pricing functions. There is also
a new branch of macro-financial models (He and Krishnamurthy (2012), Allen and
Gale (2004), Adrian and Shin (2010a), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Chen
and Song (2009), Mendoza (2010)) that explore in more depth how constraints over
financial intermediaries can affect their role in setting asset prices and influencing
the endogenous risk that investors can support, therefore disrupting the channels of
transmission of shocks between the financial and the real sectors that can help to
explain patterns during financial crises. Another important reference related to the
financial frictions branch of literature is Negro et al. (2017), that incorporate the
credit frictions introduced by Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) in a relatively standard
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model 6 that features the usual
nominal and real frictions in this type of models, such as price and wage rigidities à
la Calvo and aggregate capital adjustment costs. In this setting, monetary policy is
also implemented through manipulations of the nominal interest rate according to a
standard Taylor rule truncated by the zero lower bound. Contrary to the Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) case, the credit disturbances proposed by Kiyotaki and Moore
(2012) can be divided into two different types: financial constraints (that, like col-
lateral constraints, arise when a firm can borrow only up to a fraction of the value of
its current investment) and liquidity constraints (that arise when a firm, when faced
with an investment opportunity, can sell only up to a certain fraction of the more
less liquid assets 7 on its balance sheet in each period. They conclude that both the
financial shock and the liquidity policy can have a quantitatively large effect, and a
binding zero lower bond plays a crucial role to achieve those findings.
6Following closely the framework proposed by Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2007).
7These illiquid assets correspond to equity holdings of other firms, which include privately issued
paper such as commercial paper, bank loans, mortgages, etc.
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3.3 General Overview of the Model
In this paper I follow closely the New Keynesian DSGE model estimated by
Jermann and Quadrini (2012), which was constructed as an extended structural
approach of their real business cycle model destined to study the macroeconomic
effects of financial shocks over the economy, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial
crisis. The main difference between the two approaches (in addition to the usual
standard features that differentiate both models) lies in the fact that the real busi-
ness cycle framework is independent of how many shocks are added to the model,
whereas in the structural estimation the effects of a particular shock depend, in
general, on the shocks that are included in the model. This structural approach
follows closely the model estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007), but extends the
original model by adding financial frictions and financial shocks. This framework
includes the original seven shocks assumed by Smets and Wouters (2007) (produc-
tivity, investment-specific, intertemporal preferences, labor supply, price markup,
government spending and monetary policy) but it also includes an additional finan-
cial shock and financial frictions to expand the scope of the model. Eight empirical
variables were used to estimate the model: GDP, investment, working hours, wage
rate, federal funds rate, government spending, nominal prices and also a proxy for
financial flows.
3.3.1 Households
There is a continuum of homogeneous households indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], supplying















where c is consumption, nj,t is labor of type j, and β is the discount factor. The
variable γt+s evolves stochastically and captures shocks to the intertemporal margin,
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i.e., is a discount factor shock affecting both the marginal utility of consumption
and the marginal disutility of labor. However, since it is an intertemporal shock it
implies that it doesn’t impact how households value utility from consumption today
versus utility from leisure today, but rather how they value utility today versus
utility in the future. For example, if γt+s increases, then households place relatively
more weight on present utility than the future, i.e. they become more impatient.
The parameter ε is the elasticity of labor supply i.e. the Frisch elasticity, and h
determines the degree of ”external” habit in consumption. The period utility is
represented by U(ct−1, ct, nj,t).
The household’s budget constraint is:
wj,tnj,t + dt +Bt + aj,t = Ptqtst+1 +
Bt+1
1 + rt
+Ptct + Tt +
∫
qωj,t+1aj,t+1dωj,t+1,1 (3.2)
where rt is the nominal rate on bonds and wj,tnj,t is the nominal wage set by
household j. The variable Bt is the one-period nominal bond, dt is the equity
payout received from the ownership of firms and Tt denotes nominal lump-sum




Individual households are monopolistic suppliers of specialized labor and set the
wage taking the demand function as given. The demand for labor of type j derives
from the aggregation of the inputs demanded by all firms. The demand for type j

















aggregate nominal wage index. The variable υt is stochastic and captures shocks to
the wage mark-up.
Households post nominal wages and supply the specialized services as determined
by the demand function (3.3). Wage rigidities derive from the assumption that
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households can change their posted wage only with probability 1− ω (Calvo’s price
rigidity).
Consider a household who is allowed to post a new wage in period t. Using the










υt − 1 Lt+s
 , (3.4)
subject to the sequence of budget constraints (3.2).
After choosing wj,t at time t, the wage remains constant until the household is
allowed to post a new wage. Only the periods preceding the resetting of a new wage
are relevant for the choice of the wage today, explaining the probability ω in the
discount factor.
Following the literature, we derive a wage equation by differentiating (3.4) with
respect to wj,t and taking a log-linear approximation around the steady state. After


















where Φ = [ε(υ−1)(1−βω)]/[ε(υ−1)+υ] and the hat sign denotes log-deviations
from steady state.
Since all households that re-optimize choose the same wj,t, the aggregate wage












In addition to the nominal wage and, implicitly, the supply of labor, households
choose nominal bonds. The first order condition for Bt+1 is:










Firms’ optimization is consistent with households’ optimization and the stochas-







There is a continuum of firms in the [0, 1] interval, each producing an intermediate
good xi. The intermediate good is used as an input in the final goods production,










The variable ηt is stochastic, capturing shocks to the nominal price mark-up.




















is the aggregate nominal price index.
The intermediate good is produced with capital and labor according to:
xi,t = zt(ui,tki,t)
θn1−θi,t , (3.10)
where zt is the aggregate productivity, ki,t the input of capital, ui,t the capital








is the aggregation of all labor inputs used
by firm i. The variable υt is stochastic and affects the demand elasticity for the
different types of labor.
From the cost minimization problem we can derive the demand for labor of type
j for each firm. Aggregating over all firms gives the aggregate demand for type j
labor as reported in equation (3.3). Substituting the production into the inverse










ηt ≡ PtD(ki,t, ui,t, ni,t; st) (3.11)
To take into account the dependence on the aggregate production Yt, we have
included the term st, which is the vector of aggregate states.
Using (3.11) the real revenues of the firm can also be expressed as a function of









ηt ≡ PtF (ki,t, ui,t, ni,t; st) (3.12)
Physical capital is accumulated by firms and evolves according to kt+1 = (1 −
δ)kt + Υ(it−1, it; ζt), where ζt is a stochastic variable affecting the transformation
of final goods in new capital goods (investment specific technology shock). The
function Υ(it−1, it; ζt) takes the form:








with g(1) = 0, g′(1) = 0, g′′(.) > 0. This cost function is not standard in
the investment literature but has become popular in New Keynesian models. The
function g(it/it−1) is specified as %(it/it−1 − 1)2.
Capital utilization is also costly. Denoting by ut the fraction of used capital over
the owned capital, the utilization cost is Ψ(ut)kt where we impose that Ψ(1) = 0,
Ψ′(1) > 0 and Ψ′′(1) > 0. The functional form for Ψ(ut) is specified as ϑ(u
1+ψ
t −
1)/(1 + ψ) where ϑ = (1− ξ̄µ̄)/β − (1− δ) so that the steady state utilization is 1.
There are different ways of generating nominal price rigidity. A popular approach
is based on Calvo’s staggered prices which generates heterogeneity in firms’ prices.
The price heterogeneity can be easily handled in the case of complete markets. With
incomplete markets, however, the characterization of the equilibrium is much more
complex because the price heterogeneity generates heterogeneity in the financial
structure of firms. Thus, we would not be able to aggregate and work with a
‘representative firm’.
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This problem does not arise with the Rotemberg’s approach which is based on a
convex cost of adjusting the nominal price. This is the only change we make to the
model estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007), besides adding financial frictions
and financial shocks.
Given the nominal price pi,t−1 set in the previous period, the adjustment cost is:









We should think of the model as already detrended by long-term inflation.
The financial structure and frictions are the same as those described in the sim-
pler model studied earlier. In particular, they are characterized by two parameters: τ
and κ. The first parameter determines the tax advantage of using debt. Given rt the
nominal interest rate, the effective gross rate paid by firms is Rt = 1+rt(1−τ). The
second parameter determines the cost of changing the equity payout. Given the eq-
uity payout dt received by shareholders, the cost for the firm is ϕ(dt) = dt+κ(dt−d̄)2.
As in the simpler model, if we set these two parameters to zero, the model collapses
to a New Keynesian model with complete markets.
The individual state variables for the firm are the nominal price chosen in the
previous period, p−1, the previous period investment, i−1, the stock of capital, k,
and the debt, b. Since in equilibrium all firms make the same choices (assuming
that they start with the same states), from now on we omit the subscript i. The
optimization problem is:
V (s; p−1, i−1, k, b) = max
d,n,u,p,i,k′,b′
{d+ Em′V (s′; p, i, k′, b′)} (3.15)
subject to:
P [F (k, u, n; s)−Ψ(u)k] + b
′
R






P (1 + r)
)
≥ F (k, u, n; s)
p
P
= D(k, u, n; s)
(1− δ)k + Υ(i−1, i; ζ) = k′
The problem is subject to the budget constraint, the enforcement constraint 8,
the demand for the firm’s product and the law of motion for capital. The first
order conditions that solve the optimization problem faced by the firm represented










































8The enforcement constraint in this structural New Keynesian version of the Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) model is derived in the same way than its Real Business Cycle counterpart, and it
is originated from the renegotiation process between the firm and the lender to settle the amount
of collateral in the event of firm’s default on the intertemporal debt. A more detailed description













Where λ, µ, χ, Q represent the Lagrange multipliers associated with the four
constraints.
3.3.3 Public Sector









where Gt is real (unproductive) government purchases, rt is the nominal interest
rate and Rt = 1 + rt(1 − τ) is the effective gross interest rate paid by firms. The
cost of the interest deduction is Bt+1/[1/Rt − 1/(1 + rt)]. Total expenditures are
financed with lump-sum taxes Tt paid by households. Government purchases follow
the stochastic process given by:
Ĝt = ρgĜt−1 + ρgz(ẑt − ẑt−1) + εg,t (3.24)
where εg,t ∼ N(0, σG).













where ρR is a parameter that measures the degree of interest smoothing, ν1 is the
inflation coefficient, ν2 is the output coefficient and ςt ∼ N(0, σR). The monetary
authority targets inflation and output growth deviations from the steady state, and

















After log linearizing this equation in order to simplify it and isolate the nominal
interest rate, we get the following condition:
a1rt−1 + a2(Pt − Pt−1) + a3(Yt − Y ∗t ) + a4(Yt−1 − Y ∗t−1) + ςt − rt = 0 (3.27)
where a1 = ρR, a2 = (1− ρR)ν1, a3 = (1− ρR)ν2 + ν3, a4 = −ν3.
Therefore, the zero lower bound constraint is implemented as a Taylor rule trun-
cated at zero:
rt = max(Zt, 0) (3.28)
where
Zt = a1Zt−1 + a2(Pt − Pt−1) + a3(Yt − Y ∗t ) + a4(Yt−1 − Y ∗t−1) + ςt (3.29)
3.3.4 Stochastic Processes for the Shocks
The stochastic processes regarding the fiscal policy (represented through a shock
over government purchases) and the monetary policy (captured through a shock over
the nominal interest rate) have already been specified in conditions (3.24) and (3.25).
The remaining stochastic variables follow the generic process x̂t+1 = ρxx̂t + εx,t+1,
with εx ∼ N(0, σx) and x ∈ {z, ζ, γ, η, υ, ξ}. The hat sign denotes log deviations
from steady state.
3.3.5 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is a sequence of stochastic processes:
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{ct, nt, ut, µt, χt, xt, Qt, Rt, Pt, Qt, it, wt,Wt, Yt, Vt, Tt, kt+1, bt+1}
such that for any given sequence of states:
{zt, ζt, γt, ηt, υt, Gt, kt, bt, ςt, ξt, pt−1, it−1, ct−1,Wt−1, Rt−1, Yt−1}
the household and firm problems are satisfied, the monetary and fiscal policy
rules are satisfied, and markets clear. Conditions (3.2), (3.5), (3.6) and (3.7) char-
acterize the household problem, while conditions (3.16)-(3.22), combined with con-
ditions (3.12), (3.13), (3.14) and the maximization problem (3.15) characterize the
equilibrium through the firm’s problem. That collection of state variables also sat-
isfies the government budget constraint (3.23) and the monetary policy rule given












The full set of equations that characterize this equilibrium is presented in section
3.5.1.1 of the Appendix.
3.3.6 Estimation
A small number of the model parameters are set using the standard calibration
technique based on steady state targets described in the simpler real business cycle
model proposed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012), which includes only two shocks.
The remaining parameters are estimated using Bayesian methods as described in
An and Schorfheide (2007).
However, the calibration of some of the parameters incorporates the correction
proposed by Pfeifer (2016) in a paper where the author shows that the Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) model suffers from methodological issues which affect the accuracy
and the consistency of the estimates. According to Pfeifer (2016), ”the constructed
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TFP combines GDP of the total economy with inputs pertaining to the business
sector only”, and the author also shows that the structural approach is affected
by issues in three equilibrium conditions. Additionally, Pfeifer (2016) remarks that
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) ”make a timing error by using the end of period rather
than the beginning of period capital stock as an input, which is inconsistent with
their model”. Correcting these issues changes the calibration of several parameters,
leading to crucial alterations in the estimation of the shocks series (e.g. a more
volatile TFP series) and in the main findings of the model. Pfeifer (2016) concludes
that, after recalibrating the model to match the corrected calibration targets, the
technological shock accounts for the 2008 financial crisis, while the contribution of
the financial shock is considerably muted. Although its role during the recent Great
Recession is more pronounced than without the corrections, it still accounts for
approximately a third of the percentage GDP decrease occurred in this period.
3.3.6.1 Calibrated Parameters
This is a quarterly model and the calibration targets for the few calibrated
parameters are the same as those presented in the real business cycle version of
the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model.
More specifically, those parameters are set as: β = 0.9825, τ = 0.35, δ = 0.025
and α is chosen to have an average working time of 0.3. The average value of the
enforcement variable ξ̄ is chosen to have a steady state ratio of debt over quarterly
output of 3.36. Finally, the average value of government purchases Ḡ is chosen to
have a steady state ratio of government purchases over output of 0.18.
3.3.6.2 Estimated Parameters
As in Jermann and Quadrini (2012), the model is estimated using eight empirical
series: growth rate of GDP, growth rate of personal consumption expenditures,
growth rate of private domestic investment, growth rate of implicit price deflator for
GDP, growth rate of working hours in the private sector, growth rate of hourly wages
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in the business sector, federal fund rate and debt repurchases in the nonfinancial
business sector. The first seven variables are similar to the variables used in Smets
and Wouters (2007), but debt repurchases are added because there is an additional
shock in the model, ξ. The sample period is 1984.I-2010.II. We start in 1984 to
avoid the issue of possible structural breaks associated with the so-called ‘great
moderation.’ See the appendix for a more detailed description of the data.
To generate artificial series, the model is solved numerically after log-linearizing
around the steady state. This is possible because the enforcement constraint is
always binding in the neighbourhood of the steady state equilibrium. The whole set
of equations are listed in the appendix.
The choice of the prior distributions are the same as those used in Smets and
Wouters (2007) with the exception, of course, of the parameters that were not present
in that model. In particular, the parameters that govern the stochastic process for
the financial shock, ρξ and σξ, and the flexibility in equity payout, κ. For the
persistence and standard deviation of the financial shocks we use the same priors
as those used for the other shocks. For the parameter κ we use an inverse gamma
distribution with a mean of 0.146 (the calibration value used in the simpler model)
and a standard deviation of 0.05.
Table 3.1 reports the parameters, calibrated according to the Jermann and
Quadrini (2012) methodology and the estimated parameters computed with Bayesian
techniques, following the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) structural approach based
in the Smets and Wouters (2007) model. However, the table displays the posterior
estimation results of Pfeifer (2016) (the mode and the cutoff values for the 5 and 95
percentiles of the posterior distribution), and only the posterior mode is compared
against the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) results 9.
9Pfeifer (2016) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) share the same prior densities.
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Table 3.1: Parameterization
Calibrated Parameters Par Value
Discount factor β 0.9825
Tax advantage τ 0.3500
Utility parameter α 16.7360
Production technology θ 0.3600
Depreciation rate δ 0.0250
Enforcement parameter ξ̄ 0.1990
Average government purchases Ḡ 0.179
Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Estimated Parameters JQ Reestimation
Par. Dist. Mean S.D. Mode Mode 5% 95%
Risk aversion σ Normal 1.500 0.370 1.090 1.540 0.855 1.731
Frisch elasticity (of labor) ε Normal 2.000 0.750 1.761 0.873 0.940 2.998
Habit in consumption h Beta 0.500 0.300 0.608 0.367 0.263 0.500
Calvo wage adjustment ω Beta 0.500 0.300 0.278 0.075 0.037 0.220
Rotemberg price adjustment cost φ InvGamma 0.100 0.300 0.031 6.997 7.300 29.584
Investment adjustment cost % InvGamma 0.100 0.300 0.021 0.149 0.102 1.371
Capital utilization cost ψ Beta 0.500 0.150 0.815 0.775 0.548 0.882
Equity payout cost κ InvGamma 0.200 0.100 0.426 0.287 0.254 0.935
Average price markup η̄ Beta 1.200 0.100 1.137 1.806 1.712 1.871
Average wage markup ῡ Beta 1.200 0.100 1.025 1.140 1.057 1.374
Productivity shock persistence ρz Beta 0.500 0.200 0.902 0.920 0.864 0.949
Investment shock persistence ρζ Beta 0.500 0.200 0.922 0.913 0.623 0.928
Intertemporal shock persistence ργ Beta 0.500 0.200 0.794 0.949 0.920 0.979
Price markup shock persistence ρη Beta 0.500 0.200 0.906 0.866 0.734 0.910
Wage markup shock persistence ρυ Beta 0.500 0.200 0.627 0.981 0.945 0.996
Government shock persistence ρG Beta 0.500 0.200 0.955 0.976 0.957 0.993
Interest policy shock persistence ρς Beta 0.500 0.200 0.203 0.213 0.131 0.338
Financial shock persistence ρξ Beta 0.500 0.200 0.969 0.990 0.978 0.998
Interaction production government ρgz Beta 0.500 0.200 0.509 0.859 0.608 0.969
Taylor rule persistence ρR Beta 0.750 0.100 0.756 0.784 0.767 0.849
Taylor rule feedback ν1 Normal 1.500 0.250 2.410 2.202 1.984 2.505
Taylor rule feedback ν2 Normal 0.120 0.050 0.000 -0.020 -0.032 0.050
Taylor rule feedback ν3 Normal 0.120 0.050 0.121 0.176 0.141 0.232
Technology shock σz InvGamma 0.001 0.050 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005
Investment shock σζ InvGamma 0.001 0.050 0.006 0.009 0.007 0.049
Preference shock σγ InvGamma 0.001 0.050 0.016 0.019 0.013 0.028
Price markup shock ση InvGamma 0.001 0.050 0.019 0.013 0.013 0.031
Wage markup shock συ InvGamma 0.001 0.050 0.085 0.021 0.012 0.022
Government shock σg InvGamma 0.001 0.050 0.028 0.016 0.014 0.018
Monetary shock σς InvGamma 0.001 0.050 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
Financial shock σξ InvGamma 0.001 0.050 0.008 0.016 0.013 0.018
Source: Pfeifer (2016) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
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However, since both calibration schemes were not able to generate shocks large
enough to activate the zero lower bound in the simulated economies, several param-
eters were recalibrated to increase the friction of the shocks: the persistence of the
preference shock, ργ, was reset to 0.95; the Taylor rule persistence parameter, ρR,
increased to 0.9; and the Taylor rule feedback parameter, ν3, increased to 0.6. It is
important to take into account that increase the value of ν3 implies that the Taylor
rule is increasing the weight on the ratio between the current output gap Yt/Y
∗
t rel-
ative to the output gap in the previous period, Yt−1/Y
∗
t−1, which helps to propagate
and amplify the impact of each shock over the economy. When using the Smets
and Wouters (2007) framework to analyze the post-crisis inflation and employment,
Fratto and Uhlig (2014) concluded that, although the zero lower bound resulted in
a tightening monetary policy from 2008 to 2010, the magnitude and duration of
this effect was actually lower than most studies suggest. Fratto and Uhlig (2014)
decomposed the nominal interest rate according to the Taylor rule from the model
(which is identical to conditions (3.26) and (3.29)) and concluded that the term re-
lated to the ”change-in-the-ouput-gap term is key, while the output-gap term itself





is large, its direct effect on
the interest rate dynamics is null because, in this case, the parameter of the Taylor





, is the main responsible for the initial drop of the nominal interest
rate below zero after a shock hits the economy and for its subsequent increase. It
is also the main responsible to bind the lower zero bound when a shock hits the
economy and increase its spell over time. Hence, this finding validates the need to
increase the calibration of the parameter µ3 associated with the output gap growth
component to a higher value (µ3 = 0.6) than the original value proposed by Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) (µ = 0.121) or even Pfeifer (2016) (µ3 = 0.176).
After incorporating these changes, the simulations were conducted under the
original Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and under the Pfeifer (2016) updated cali-
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bration scheme for the remaining parameters.
3.3.7 Simulation
In order to impose the zero lower bound constraint into the Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) model, the model is simulated using Occbin, a library of numerical routines
developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) that solves the model through a piece-
wise linear solution algorithm compatible with Dynare. This model includes only
one occasionally binding constraint, which implies that the nominal interest rate
cannot be lower than zero (the ZLB constraint). In such cases, the Occbin algo-
rithm is designed to assume the existence of two regimes: one where the occasionally
binding constraint is slack and another one where the constraint is binding. The
model is linearized under each regime around the non-stochastic steady state, and
choose the regime 10 that applies at the point of linearization as the ”reference”
regime and the other regime as the ”alternative.” It is important to stress that the
Occbin algorithm demands the fulfilment of two requirements to ensure its correct
implementation: the reference regime must ensure that the conditions for existence
of a rational expectations solution recommended by Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
hold; and that ”if shocks move the model away from the reference regime to the
alternative regime, the model will return to the reference regime in finite time under
the assumption that agents expect that no future shocks will occur”.
When applying the Occbin toolkit developed by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015)
to compare the results of the model with and without a binding zero lower bound
constraint, both scenarios are simulated with a first order linear approximation
around the steady state, instead of using the Bayesian methods used by Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) and Pfeifer (2016), assuming that the enforcement constraint is
always binding around the steady state for τ > 0, similarly to the parsimonious RBC
model with only two shocks initially developed by Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
In this simulation exercise the economy without a binding zero lower bound, i.e.,
10Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) emphasize that it is irrelevant whether the occasionally binding
constraint is binding at the reference regime or the alternative regime.
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the economy where the monetary policy follows a nontruncated Taylor rule so that




Before analysing the impact of different shocks over the path of the main variables
of this structural model, it is important to inspect the variance decomposition for the
eight shocks used in the estimation (reported in Table 3.2), and establish the main
differences between these findings and the results obtained by Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) and Pfeifer (2016). In this case, the shock that contribute the most to the
volatility of the growth rate of output is clearly the price markup shock (46.26%),
followed by the technology shock (11.27%), and the preference shock (8.95%). The
financial shock only accounts for 4.26% of the total volatility of output, contributing
only marginally to the volatility of consumption (2.56%). The price markup shock
is also the major driving force behind the volatility in investment (37.55%), hours
(34.25%), interest rate (35.85%)and debt repurchases (26.07%). Besides nominal
price markups shocks, preference shocks (21.64%) and the marginal efficiency of
investment (MEI) shocks (16.56%) also play a large role in explaining the forecast
error variance of consumption. Surprisingly, the contribution of financial shocks is
rather small for the volatility of all variables, and its highest contribution concerns
movements in debt repurchases, only reaching 7.18%. Generally, the contributions of
intertemporal preference shocks is also small, although reaches a sizable size regard-
ing the volatility in consumption (21.64%), investment (17.33%) and the interest
rate (10.85%). These results differ substantially from the Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) original estimation (see Table 3.6) in the Appendix) and the Pfeifer (2016)
reestimation (see Table 3.7) in the Appendix), although they are more consistent
with the latter. Indeed, in this case movements in output are largely explained
by price markup innovations (as in the Pfeifer (2016) estimation) and much less
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by financial shocks. However, according to Pfeifer (2016) results the contribution
of the MEI shock is also considerable (26.11%) to explain the GDP growth rate
fluctuations. The price markup shock is the major driving force for the volatility
of almost all variables, especially to explain debt repurchases movements (68.71%).
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) rationalize this result through the link between the
price markup shock and the enforcement constraint.
It is important to take these results into account regarding the variance decom-
position of errors before analysing the impulse response functions and simulated
series generated by the model, since the impact of some shocks over the economy
is stronger than others, and that can substantially bind the response of the main
variables of the model to a particular shock.
Table 3.2: Variance Decomposition (Jermann and Quadrini (2012) original calibra-
tion except for ργ = 0.95, ρR = 0.9, ν1 = 2.410, ν2 = 0, ν3 = 0.6)
TFP Investment Preference Price MK Wage MK Government Money Financial
Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock
z ζ γ η υ G ς ξ
GDP 11.27 3.17 8.95 46.26 7.87 5.2 7.13 4.26
Consumption 7.41 16.56 21.64 32 3.92 15.11 2.56 1
Investment 9.23 12.76 17.33 37.55 8.26 3.25 6.07 2.54
Hours 10.98 5.78 8.02 34.25 13.66 9.75 10.3 4.24
Wages 4.9 9.56 3.96 15.54 4.24 6.91 34.82 6.47
Interest Rate 9.23 7.71 10.85 35.85 11.42 3.08 9.85 6.69
Inflation 5.25 8.8 3.94 15.34 1.76 6.09 34.95 6.6
Debt Repurchases 5.65 12.93 7.12 26.07 2.99 4.45 19.29 7.18




3.4.2.1 Effect of a Preference Shock
At time zero, the economy is hit with a 2 standard deviation negative shock over
the intertemporal preference parameter, γt, which lasts for 10 quarters, assuming
that, at time zero, the economy was in its nonstochastic steady state 11. The shock
is large enough so that the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds
in periods five through ten. Figure 3.1 displays the dynamic path of the economy
after the shock hits the economy and the interest rate subsidy is fixed in its steady
state value (τ = 0.35). It establishes a comparison between the impulse response
functions for key variables of an economy constrained by the zero lower bound (i.e.
the monetary policy follows a truncated Taylor rule rt = max(Zt, 0)) and of an
economy where the nominal interest rate is allowed to float freely (i.e. the monetary
policy follows a nontruncated Taylor rule allowing for negative nominal interest
rates).
The shock leads to a substantial decline in consumption, inflation nominal wages
and in the nominal interest rate (which hits the zero lower bound in periods five
through ten). Although output and hours also decrease slightly when the shock
hits, when the ZLB binds in period five both variables start to exhibit an increasing
behavior which lasts until period fifteen, when both variables start to converge once
more to the steady state. Contemporaneously, only investment responds positively
to this shock, since households consume less and increase disposable savings that
can spur an investment boom.
11As Adolfsen (2017) points out, in the literature, modelling a liquidity trap through a large
preference shock is a relatively standard way of studying the policies aimed at solving the ZLB
problem (see for example Correia et al. (2013), Carlin and Soskice (2018), Chari et al. (1991),
Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2009), etc) essentially due to its simplicity and tangibility
when isolating the effects from the ZLB on fiscal multipliers. However, Adolfsen (2017) simulated
a 7 standard deviations negative preference shock because by simulating with a single one standard
deviation preference shock is ”an unrealistic way of modelling a liquidity trap”, and is unable to
generate large ZLB spells.
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In general, the impulse responses for all variables when the zero lower bound is
binding are slightly larger relative to the paths achieved in the economy without
a binding ZLB. To justify this behavior, Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), based on
Nakata (2017) and other authors, emphasize that there are two main forces shaping
these differences between economies with and without a binding zero lower bound:
an uncertainty effect and a price dispersion effect. The uncertainty effect implies that
”negative shocks at the ZLB produce larger contractions than away from it, since
monetary policy is unable to offset them”. On the other hand, if agents anticipate a
negative shock when the economy is already at the ZLB then that shock will further
reduce prices and output, since agents expect that monetary policy will be unable to
overcome the consequences of that type of shock over the economy. Therefore, when
that uncertainty is explicitly taken into account into the model, the ZLB binds
more frequently, monetary and fiscal policies become more accommodative, and
output produces larger impulse responses when hit by an unexpected shock. The
uncertainty effect leads then to larger impulses responses at the zero lower bound
than captured by the more standard economy allowing for negative nominal interest
rates, which ignores that uncertainty. In turn, Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015), based
on Braun et al. (2012) and Braun et al. (2013), argue that the price dispersion effect
implies that the unpredictability of the impulse responses generated by the economy
without a binding ZLB are due to nonlinearities in the equilibrium conditions of the
model that can be ”important especially for large shocks that take output close
to the ZLB”. In this model, this dispersion is captured both through prices, whose
nominal rigidity is generated with the Rotemberg’s approach, based on a convex cost
of adjusting nominal prices (equations (3.12) and (3.14)) and through wages, which
are derived from the assumption that households can decide to change their posted
nominal wage with probability 1 − ω (Calvo’s price rigidity) (equations (3.3) and
(3.6)). Equation (3.6) (the nominal wage index), for example, can be interpreted
as a measure of the evolution of wage dispersion. If the price or wage dispersion is
high, then a fraction of the firms, stuck with lower prices, are inefficiently capturing
a disproportionate fraction of aggregate demand. In Figure 3.1, wage dispersion
leads nominal wages to decrease more in the benchmark case without ZLB, which
192
can be explained by the temporary drop of the inefficiency caused by staggering
wages, and cushions the decrease in wages in the economy with a binding zero lower
bound in relation to the benchmark economy. This so called price dispersion effect
partly offsets the dynamic induced by the uncertainty effect when a shock hits the
economy. This result holds for a preference shock or any other type of shock.
Although all the impulse response functions in both economies (with and without
a binding ZLB) coincide when the shock hits, the dynamic path followed by all
variables in each economy start to diverge slightly after the zero lower bound binds
in period five. However, that divergence is more pronounced for the nominal and real
interest rate, wages and inflation. For output, hours and investment that divergence
lasts for several periods but tends to disappear when these variables start to return
to the steady state. Only consumption exhibits an almost coincident path with or
without a binding ZLB. In general, when the zero lower bound binds, the responses
of output, hours and investment in the constrained economy are steeper than the
responses in the benchmark economy, although that gap is gradually reduced as each
variable return to its steady state. The difference between the IRF of the benchmark
economy and the IRF originated in the economy with a binding ZLB is particularly
prominent in the case of inflation, wages and the real interest rate, and in opposition
with the previous variables, that gap does not disappear as the simulation horizon
increases, but tends to stabilize.
To explain this intertemporal behavior, it is important to highlight that a tem-
porary decrease in γt is equivalent to a temporary increase in the discount factor β,
since households now value current utility relatively less than future utility, i.e. they
become more patient and they want less consumption and leisure today, therefore
justifying the decrease in ct and an increasing path for labor throughout the simula-
tion horizon (although the contemporaneous response of labor is slightly negative).
This dynamic can also be justified from the FOC for labor: the decrease in consump-
tion shifts the labor supply curve out. An outward shift of the labor supply along
a stable labor demand leads to a decrease in wages. Besides, the increasing path of
hours worked, without an immediate adjustment in technology zt or in the stock of
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capital kt implies an upwards response of output along the simulation horizon after
the initial sudden fall. Initially, after the shock hits the economy, output and hours
drop together with consumption because the shock initially increases price markups
compared to their steady state level. This leads to a drop in inflation in producer
prices.
Figure 3.1: IRFs to a Preference Shock - τ = 0.35
Notes: Time, measured in quarters, in represented on the horizontal axis. Output, consumption, investment,
hours and wages are measured in log deviations from steady state (in percentage). The nominal interest rate, the
real interest rate and inflation are measured in percentage points deviations from the steady state, in annualized
levels.
3.4.2.1.1 The impact of the interest rate subsidy (τ) over the dynamic
path of the variables
Figure 3.2 displays the impulse response functions of the nominal interest rate,
output, consumption, hours, investment and wages after a negative preference shock
that lasts ten periods hits the economy for different values of the interest rate subsidy,
τ . The model is simulated for five distinct scenarios: in an economy where the Taylor
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rule is truncated so that rt = max(Zt, 0), i.e. the zero lower bound is binding, the
model is simulated for four different values of the interest rate subsidy: τ = 0.0001,
τ = 0.2, τ = 0.35 (the steady-state value), and τ = 0.5. These scenarios are
compared against the benchmark economy, where the Taylor rule allows for negative
nominal interest rates and therefore the zero lower bound is not binding, with the
interest rate subsidy set at its steady state value: τ = 0.35. The main purpose of
this simulation exercise is to infer if the utilization of the interest rate subsidy as a
fiscal policy instrument allows to dampen or even neutralize completely the frictions
caused by the presence of a binding zero lower bound and replicate the effects of
negative nominal interest rates or, on the contrary, if the presence of this subsidy
enhances the effects of the zero lower bound constraint.
It is important to take into account that, in the Jermann and Quadrini (2012)
framework, the presence or omission of the tax benefit τ affects directly the steady
state values of almost all endogenous variables of the model. In fact, according to
Jermann and Quadrini (2012), if the interest rate subsidy τ and the equity payout
parameter κ are simultaneously set to zero, then the model collapses to a New
Keynesian model with complete markets. This is essentially due to the fact that if
τ > 0 the enforcement constraint binds in a steady state, implying that a changing
value of τ would lead to major alterations in the steady state levels of the variables
of the simulated models.
In Figure 3.2 we can observe that for all cases considered the path followed by
all variables after the preference shock hits the economy is very similar, but the
magnitude of the responses changes considerably along with the value of τ . In the
economy where the monetary policy allows for negative nominal interest rates, with
an interest rate tax benefit of 35% (the benchmark economy), the magnitude of
the impulse responses of all endogenous variables are greater than the responses of
the allocation that arises in the economies where the zero lower bound constraint is
binding, except for the case where the interest rate subsidy is large enough (τ = 0.5).
In the benchmark economy, the preference shock produces wider impulse responses
for output, consumption, investment, nominal interest rate, and, on a smaller scale,
195
for hours and wages. For output, the path is smoother for smaller values of τ
throughout all the simulation horizon: in the first five quarters, after the shock hits
the economy, the negative impact is stronger for higher values of τ in the economies
where the ZLB binds and in the benchmark case. After that initial period, when
the path inverts, the increase in output is much smoother for lower values of τ ,
particularly when τ = 0.0001. The paths converge to the same steady state for
almost all cases, except for τ = 0.5, that seems to decline at a much higher rate
than its counterparts, and keeps that gap throughout the whole simulation horizon.
Investment and hours worked follow a very similar path to the impulse response
followed by output, although in the investment case there is an immediate positive
response to the preference shock. This result, although counter intuitive with the
standard decline in investment that economic theory predicts in the presence of a
negative preference shock, comes from the fact that with a negative preference shock
households are more patient and desire to consume less goods and services and less
leisure (therefore increasing hours worked), and that drop in consumption increases
disposable savings that can lead to an investment boost, although the real interest
rate increases both in presence of a binding ZLB or otherwise.
In general, the higher the interest rate tax benefit τ is, the wider is the impulse
response of each variable. Therefore, a higher tax benefit τ associated with the
presence of a binding zero lower bound constraint contributes to amplify the impact
of the preference shock over the economy and enhances the impulse responses of
the majority of the endogenous variables. This result also holds in the case of an
economy without a binding ZLB. In order to smooth the effects of the preference
shock, the fiscal policy authorities can reduce the interest rate tax benefit, and if it is
small enough and very close to zero (τ = 0.0001) 12, the zero lower bound constraint
does no longer binds, but the magnitude of the impulse response functions are much
smaller than in the benchmark case, implying that using the interest rate subsidy
12When τ = 0, the economy does not necessarily collapses to a New Keynesian benchmark model
with complete markets, only when τ = 0 and κ = 0, but the absence of the interest rate subsidy is
crucial to the simulations of the model since it changes the steady state values and consequently,
the dynamics of the model.
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as the only fiscal instrument to circumvent the zero lower bond effects is not enough
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Figure 3.2: IRFs to a Preference Shock
Notes: Time, measured in quarters, in represented on the horizontal axis. Output, consumption, investment,
hours and wages are measured in log deviations from steady state (in percentage). The nominal interest rate, the
real interest rate and inflation are measured in percentage points deviations from the steady state, in annualized
levels.
198
3.4.2.2 Effect of a Financial Shock
Although according to Table 3.2 the contribution of financial shocks to the
volatility of output is quite small (4.26%), that corroborates the findings of Pfeifer
(2016) (6.53%) and contradicts the large contribute of 46.4% reported in Jermann
and Quadrini (2012). Still, the impact of financial shocks over the business cycle
movements of the economy cannot be understated 13, neither in size nor in the
dynamics of the variables. Lindé et al. (2016) concluded that adding financial ex-
tensions or financial shocks to a structural model such as Smets and Wouters (2007)
does not add much propagation of other macroeconomic shocks, and therefore those
frictions are not sufficient to properly analyze or explain the effects of non-standard
monetary policy (e.g. quantitative easing measures) and macroprudential policies.
However, they argue that those extensions are able to account for features of the
2008 financial crisis and subsequent recession if the models appropriately can ”inte-
grate the non-linear accelerator dynamics from financial frictions”. Other studies,
such as Negro et al. (2017), which also incorporate financial disturbances into a stan-
dard DSGE New Keynesian model, concluded that a liquidity shock 14, calibrated
to match the increase in the premium associated with very liquid assets during the
2008 financial crisis accounts for more than half of the drop in output observed in
the data and all of the drop in inflation. These findings show that accounting for
shocks originated in the financial sector is especially relevant in the post-crisis pe-
riod, since those studies have proved that the effects of those shocks over the real
economy can be quite large.
However, it must be stressed that the financial shock and the financial frictions
incorporated in the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) setup, although designed to affect
directly the financial sector of the economy, have a different nature and do not ex-
plicitly address the financial intermediation sector as in Lindé et al. (2016) (where,
13Pfeifer (2016) estimated that despite the small contribution of financial shocks to explain
output volatility, these shocks are responsible to 2-3 percentage points of the observed GDP fall
during the Great Recession.
14Defined as a constraint imposed on firms to sell only up to a certain fraction of the illiquid
assets on its balance sheet in each period.
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based on the basic approach of Bernanke et al. (1999), the intermediate goods pro-
ducers rent capital services from entrepreneurs rather than directly from households)
or as in the approach followed by Negro et al. (2017), in which the financial and the
liquidity shocks have its origins in the money market and in the secondary market.
3.4.2.2.1 The impact of the interest rate subsidy (τ) over the dynamic
path of the variables
Figure 3.3 plots the impulse response functions of output, consumption, hours,
investment, the nominal interest rate and wages after a 4 standard deviations nega-
tive financial shock, simulated for the economy without a truncated Taylor rule (no
zero lower bound) for τ = 0.35, and for the economies with the binding ZLB for
four 15 different values of the interest rate tax subsidy (τ = 0.0001, τ = 0.2, and
τ = 0.35).
For all the cases considered, output, hours, investment, and wages fall immedi-
ately after the financial shock hits, although those drops are smaller for lower values
of the tax benefit, τ , which are in line with the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and the
Pfeifer (2016) responses. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) argue that the large drop in
hours worked is the result of the strict link between the tightness of the enforcement
constraint and the condition (3.38) that defines labor demand 16. In equation (3.38),
µ is the multiplier for the enforcement constraint and the term µϕd(d) defines the
labor wedge, i.e. a wedge between the wage and the marginal product of labor in
the demand for labor. When a financial shock hits the economy the enforcement
15For this particular shock, the simulation for the economy with a binding ZLB and τ = 0.5 will
be omitted in this section because of this high instability and strong volatility of the responses of
all variables in that case. Since the magnitude of those responses is very large comparatively to the
size of the responses obtained for the other simulations, and the inclusion of the simulation with
a binding ZLB and τ = 0.5 hinders the comparison between the other simulations, that specific
simulation is omitted from Figure 3.3, but can be consulted in Figure 3.19 in the appendix.
16Although Jermann and Quadrini (2012) explained this mechanism in the context of the Real
Business Cycle (RBC) setting of their model, the argument it is also valid in the context of the
structural approach of their model.
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constraint becomes tighter (higher multiplier µ), which increases the labor wedge
and will function much like an increase in a time-varying tax on labor income. This
implies that, in order to keep the same scale and maintain the same level of hours of
work, firms have to reduce the equity payout distributed to shareholders, and since
this is costly, firms partially choose to reduce the equity payout and partially the
input of labor.
The nominal interest rate drops to negative values in the benchmark economy,
and in the remaining simulations the duration of the ZLB increases with the tax
subsidy, τ . In relation to the economies with an active ZLB, the negative responses
of almost all variables in the benchmark economy are much deeper, especially for
investment and wages. This is consistent with the fact that a higher interest rate
subsidy implies a tighter enforcement constraint (a higher multiplier µ), which in
turn increases the labor wedge and the distortionary effect similar to a tax on labor
income. In other words, a higher tax benefit, combined with the presence of price
and wage rigidities and investment adjustment costs, seems to have the effect of
increasing propagation and persistence of the financial shock.
The only exception to this almost unanimous fall after the shock is consumption,
whose impulse responses in almost all simulations are more positive the higher is
the tax benefit, τ . The economy with a binding ZLB and an almost absent interest
rate subsidy (τ = 0.0001) corresponds to the only case where consumption decreases
after the financial shock hits. This behavior of consumption is related to the result
that, in the structural setup of the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model, when the
parameters τ (which defines the interest rate subsidy) and κ (which defines the
equity payout cost) are both set to zero, then the model collapses to a standard
New Keynesian model with complete markets. Rupert and Sustek (2019) argue
that in a model with endogenous capital and sticky prices and wages, when output
temporarily drops as a response to a contractionary shock, smooth consumption can
be achieved by reducing investment and adjusting the capital stock. These authors
also argue that in economies that exhibit a high persistence of the Taylor rule (set
to ρR = 0.9 in this case), consumption initially rises higher the larger ρR is, before
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declining below the steady state after the shock fades away, as can be observed in
Figure 3.3. In this also important to note, by inspecting Figure 3.4, that inflation
increases sightly after the financial shock hits, especially in the economy with a
binding ZLB. This leads to a small drop in the real interest rate in both cases, more
pronounced in the economy where the ZLB binds, which in turn makes the positive
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Figure 3.3: IRFs to a Financial Shock
Notes: Time, measured in quarters, in represented on the horizontal axis. Output, consumption, investment,
hours and wages are measured in log deviations from steady state (in percentage). The nominal interest rate, the
real interest rate and inflation are measured in percentage points deviations from the steady state, in annualized
levels.
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Figure 3.4: IRFs to a Financial Shock - τ = 0.35
3.4.2.3 Effect of a Technological Shock
Considered one of the major driving forces behind economic fluctuations in most
early standard New Keynesian DSGE models, the technological or productivity
shock is usually used as the default shock to simulate when new frictions are incor-
porated into the model and need to be tested. However, several studies (including
Smets and Wouters (2007), Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Lindé et al. (2016), just
to name a few) that introduced new types of shocks into more traditional frame-
works concluded that, although the productivity shock plays an important role in
generating business cycles, it is not a dominant role since other shocks account for
a higher contribution of the forecast error variance of output and other endogenous
variables. In this case, we observe from Table 3.2 that the weight of the productivity
shock to ouptut volatility is small (11.27%), although is the second largest respon-
sible for movements in output. This contribution was even smaller for Smets and
Wouters (2007) (4.1%) and Pfeifer (2016) (5.99%). However, due to its importance
to the dynamics of the model, especially in the interaction with the price and wage
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rigidities and also with the enforcement constraint, it is imperative to analyse the
dynamic path of the economy when a technological shock strikes.
3.4.2.3.1 The impact of the interest rate subsidy (τ) over the dynamic
path of the variables
Figure 3.5 presents the impulse response of the nominal interest rate, output,
consumption, hours, investment, and wages to a positive technological shock, simu-
lated for the benchmark economy with no ZLB (τ = 0.35) and for the economy with
a binding ZLB and the 4 different values for the interest rate tax benefit (τ = 0.0001,
τ = 0.2, τ = 0.35 and τ = 0.5).
Output rises for all the simulated cases, although in the moment of impact
initially decreases slightly, bust immediately recovers and increases steadily even
after the shock fades away. Investment also rises, although for lower values of the
interest rate benefit (τ = 0.2 and τ = 0.0001) the initial impact is also slightly
negative, but like output, it also recovers quickly to an ascending trajectory. The
higher the interest rate tax benefit (τ) is, the greater is the incentive for firms to
finance working capital through debt rather than equity (regardless of the presence
of the presence of equity payout costs), and also the greater is the incentive for firms
to increase its investment levels today to accumulate more capital in the future,
which in turns allows firms to borrow more in the future to finance working capital
and consequently, relax the tightness of the enforcement constraint in the future.
Hours, nominal wages and the nominal interest rate decline, while the real in-
terest rate and inflation (as can be observed in Figure 3.6) also increase. Although
a fall in hours might seem counter intuitive with a positive technological shock, it
is consistent with the findings of Jermann and Quadrini (2012), since they show
that their model with only productivity shocks does not generate enough volatility
of hours, even with an alternative specification of preferences based on indivisi-
ble labor. This result is related to the fact that, in their model, working capital
financing determines that the intra-period loan is defined by the production func-
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t , which in turn affects directly the enforcement
constraint ξt(kt+1 − bt+1/(1 + rt)) ≥ lt. Since lt = ztkθtn1−θt , it follows that a posi-
tive productivity shock makes the enforcement constraint tighter, requiring firms to
increase its equity payout dt and reducing the new intertemporal debt bt+1. How-
ever, if firms are unable to exchange flexibly equity for debt due to rigidities (the
equity payout cost), then firms must cut employment, and nt decreases. Further-
more, according to Smets and Wouters (2007) ”there has been a lively debate about
the effects of productivity shocks on hours worked and about the implications of
this finding for the role of those shocks in US business cycles.” Smets and Wouters
(2007) argue that several authors, including Gaĺı (1999), Gaĺı and Rabanal (2005)
and Francis and Ramey (2005), have concluded that a positive productivity shock
leads to an immediate fall in hours worked, due to several causes that include the
presence of nominal price rigidities (prices and wages), habit formation, adjustment
costs in investment, capital utilization costs, among many others.
For higher values of the interest rate subsidy (τ = 0.35 and τ = 0.5), the impulse
responses are wider for almost all variables, specially for the nominal interest rate
and investment. However, the duration of the ZLB is longer for lower values of τ :
the ZLB remains binding for 11 quarters in the economy with τ = 0.0001, while for
τ = 0.5, the spell of the ZLB is only 5 quarters. In this case, having a binding ZLB
or not does not produce substantial differences in the responses of all variables, for
τ = 0.35.
The dynamic path of consumption, once again, fluctuates considerably depending
on the value of the tax benefit chosen to perform the simulation: for higher values of
τ (τ = 0.35 and τ = 0.5), consumption follows a decreasing trajectory immediately
after the technological shock hits the economy, and for lower values of the interest
rate subsidy (τ = 0.0001, τ = 0.2), that response is positive and wider. This finding
holds whether the zero lower bound is binding or not. Once again, just as in the
financial shock case, this behavior can be justified by the high persistence of the
Taylor rule shock, the presence of price and wage rigidities and the fact that when
τ → 0, the economy gets similar to a standard New Keynesian model with complete
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Figure 3.5: IRFs to a Technological Shock
Notes: Time, measured in quarters, in represented on the horizontal axis. Output, consumption, investment,
hours and wages are measured in log deviations from steady state (in percentage). The nominal interest rate, the
real interest rate and inflation are measured in percentage points deviations from the steady state, in annualized
levels.
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Figure 3.6: IRFs to a Technological Shock - τ = 0.35
3.4.2.4 Effect of an Investment Shock
The investment shock, or a shock to the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI),
is especially important to justify fluctuations in consumption and investment, as we
can observe in Table 3.2. A positive investment shock makes the economy more
productive at transforming investment into new physical capital. It can be consid-
ered, in a way, analogous to the technology shock, zt, in the sense that makes the
economy more productive at transforming capital and labor into output. In this
case, an increase in ζt implies that firms can transform more capital goods into new
capital goods Kt+1 for a given amount of investment It, i.e. this shock increases the
efficiency of investment. Some authors such as Justiniano et al. (2011) have argued
that this shock is a reduced form proxy for modelling the health of the financial
system, in the sense that the financial system indirectly converts investment into
capital, and hence the higher (or lower) ζt, the better (or worse) the financial system
is.
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3.4.2.4.1 The impact of the interest rate subsidy (τ) over the dynamic
path of the variables
The impulse responses for a 6 standard deviations negative investment shock,
simulated for the benchmark economy (with τ = 0.35, and the economy with the
binding ZLB for four different values of the interest rate tax subsidy (τ = 0.0001,
τ = 0.2, τ = 0.35 and τ = 0.5) are presented below in Figure 3.7. We observe
that, for most simulations, a negative investment shock leads to a sizeable decrease
in output, hours, investment and the real interest rate, and drops consumption,
the nominal interest rate and inflation. The intuition behind this behavior is the
following: when ζt decreases, transforming investment into capital units becomes less
efficient, so agents decide to save less through capital, increasing consumption. In
the job market, assuming that the labor demand curve is stable when the shock hits
the economy, this leads to an inward shift of the labor supply curve, which initially
lowers the number of hours worked and increases nominal wages. The negative
response of labor consequently results in a reduction of output, which combined
with the increase of consumption implies that investment also decreases. However,
the reduction in investment is immediate since it is directly affected by the shock,
ζt. As the initial impact of the shock fades away, the economy starts to accumulate
less capital and the levels of consumption start to drop gradually, which shifts labor
supply back out, increasing hours worked and dropping wages once more.
The exception for this trajectory of the impulse responses is the economy where
a binding ZLB and with the highest tax benefit (τ = 0.5): for this type and size of
shock, this value of the interest rate subsidy is high enough to trigger anomalous
behaviors in the dynamic path of the main endogenous variables of this model.
In this case, although the nominal interest rate hits the zero lower bound after five
quarters, there is a sudden sharp positive peak at period nine, followed by a steep fall
at period ten, and after by a new upturn inversion, converging to the dynamic paths
followed by the nominal interest rate in the other simulations. This anomalous peak
is reflected in the responses of output, hours, investment, and in a smaller scale, in
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nominal wages. Although the dynamic path of consumption when τ = 0.5 does not
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Figure 3.7: IRFs to an Investment (MEI) Shock
Notes: Time, measured in quarters, in represented on the horizontal axis. Output, consumption, investment,
hours and wages are measured in log deviations from steady state (in percentage). The nominal interest rate, the
real interest rate and inflation are measured in percentage points deviations from the steady state, in annualized
levels.
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Figure 3.8: IRFs to a Investment (MEI) Shock - τ = 0.35
3.4.2.5 Effect of a Price Markup Shock
The analysis of the price markup shock is particularly important, since according
to the variance decomposition findings presented in Table 3.2, this shock is the major
driving force for the volatility of output (46.26%) and the other major variables of
the model, except for wages (15.54%) and inflation (15.34%).
3.4.2.5.1 The impact of the interest rate subsidy (τ) over the dynamic
path of the variables
Figure 3.9 displays the impulse response functions to a positive 2 standard devia-
tion price markup shock in the benchmark economy with no ZLB (τ = 0.35) and for
the economy with a binding ZLB and the 4 different values for the interest rate tax
benefit (τ = 0.0001, τ = 0.2, τ = 0.35 and τ = 0.5). The price markup shock causes
output, hours and investment to decline together, providing positive co-movement
to their dynamic paths. However, the responses of consumption are much more
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mixed, showing that the response of consumption during the initial impact of the
shock increases with the value of τ , for the economy with a binding ZLB. As τ → 0,
the response of consumption becomes negative, which is theoretically the expected
standard reaction to this type of shock. However, this atypical behavior is not due
to the presence of the zero lower bound since in the economy where the ZLB is not
binding and τ = 0.35 consumption immediately increases after the shock hits the
economy. A possible explanation to this puzzling trajectory of consumption can be
explained by the interaction between the price markup shock and the enforcement
constraint. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) argue that a positive price markup shock
gives additional market power for firms, that will provide an incentive to reduce
production levels to maximize profits. In turn, a lower production decreases the




P (1 + rt)
)
≥ F (zt, kt, nt),
therefore reducing the tightness of this constraint. This allows firms to raise debt
and pay more dividends, therefore increasing the incentive to consume more.
Furthermore, according to Fratto and Uhlig (2014), price markup shocks played
an important role to avoid a even larger fall in inflation during the 2008 financial
crisis and in the slow recovery of employment during the post-crisis period. Fratto
and Uhlig (2014) also used the well-known pre-crisis Smets and Wouters (2007)
model as the benchmark framework upon they added financial frictions and reesti-
mated with post-crisis data, although their analysis focused essentially in explaining
the puzzling combination of low employment and stable and positive inflation that
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Figure 3.9: IRFs to a Price Markup Shock
Notes: Time, measured in quarters, in represented on the horizontal axis. Output, consumption, investment,
hours and wages are measured in log deviations from steady state (in percentage). The nominal interest rate, the
real interest rate and inflation are measured in percentage points deviations from the steady state, in annualized
levels.
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Figure 3.10: IRFs to a Price Markup Shock - τ = 0.35
3.4.2.6 Effect of a Wage Markup Shock
Table 3.2 indicates that the contribution of the wage markup shock to the volatil-
ity of output is small (7.87%) 17, and it is also modest for the other variables of the
model, although reaches a weight of 13.66% to the volatility of hours worked and
11.42% to movements of the nominal interest rate.
3.4.2.6.1 The impact of the interest rate subsidy (τ) over the dynamic
path of the variables
Figure 3.11 displays the impulse responses to a 2 standard deviation positive
wage markup shock, in the benchmark economy with no binding ZLB (τ = 0.35)
and for the economy with a binding ZLB, considering 4 different values for the
interest rate tax benefit (τ = 0.0001, τ = 0.2, τ = 0.35 and τ = 0.5). Just like
17This contribution was also found to be small for Jermann and Quadrini (2012) (12.9%) and
for Pfeifer (2016) (11.63%).
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the price markup shock, this shock also induce extremely volatile responses for all
variables, specially in the simulated economies with high levels of the interest rate
benefit (τ = 0.35 and τ = 0.5). Overall, output falls after the shock hits, as well
as hours, investment and the nominal interest rate. This is consistent with the
findings of Smets and Wouters (2007), that also obtained a falling output (around
0.8 percent) and hours worked (around 0.6 percent), and also got initial positive but
falling paths for both the nominal interest rate and inflation.
Wages increase, and consumption also increase, but only for higher levels of the
interest rate subsidy, τ . It is important to emphasize, however, that for those higher
values of τ , the responses of almost all variables exhibit very atypical behaviors,
since those responses hit a positive peak before the shock fades away in period 10.
In fact, due to that peak, the ZLB only binds in period 8 when τ = 0.5, in period
10 when τ = 0.35, and in period 13 for τ = 0.2. In the economy with τ = 0.0001,
the ZLB does not even binds at any point of the simulation horizon. The duration
of the ZLB also increase with the size of τ : it lasts for 12 quarters when τ = 0.5
and when τ = 0.35, but lasts only for 5 quarters when τ = 0.2.
The smoothest responses correspond to the economy without a binding ZLB and
to the economy with a binding ZLB but with an almost absent interest rate subsidy
(τ = 0.0001). For this two cases, the dynamic path of the nominal interest rate
is very similar, characterized by a hump shape (there is a positive initial response
to the shock, followed by a decreasing trajectory, until it turns upwards again from
period 15 onwards). However, only the benchmark economy reaches negative values,
since it is unconstrained by the ZLB. For output and hours worked, the responses of
these two economies are almost coincident, and to a lesser extent, also the responses
of nominal wages and investment. Once again, the exception is consumption, and
in this case in the simulation without a binding ZLB there is a positive dynamic
path for consumption, while for the constrained economy with almost no tax benefit
(τ = 0.0001) the response is negative. Once again this is related to the fact that
with τ → 0 the economy is closer to a benchmark New Keynesian economy with
complete markets, and also to the fact that a high persistent Taylor rule causes this
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type of distortions in the model.
From Figure 3.12 it is also possible to observe that the increase in wage markup
puts upward pressure on inflation, but since that increase exceeds the initial increase
in the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate drops after the shock hits, which
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Figure 3.11: IRFs to a Wage Markup Shock with a binding ZLB
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Notes: Time, measured in quarters, in represented on the horizontal axis. Output, consumption, investment,
hours and wages are measured in log deviations from steady state (in percentage). The nominal interest rate, the
real interest rate and inflation are measured in percentage points deviations from the steady state, in annualized
levels.
Figure 3.12: IRFs to a Wage Markup Shock - τ = 0.35
3.4.2.7 Effect of a Government Expenditure Shock
According to Table 3.2, the government shock only accounts for about 5.2% of
the total volatility of output, which is consistent with the estimated contribution
of 5.96% computed by Pfeifer (2016), and still is bigger than the value of 0.8% re-
ported by Jermann and Quadrini (2012). However, many authors such as Adolfsen
(2017) concluded that, when the ZLB binds in a liquidity trap, government spend-
ing becomes more effective in stimulating output, and consequently the size of the
government multiplier increases at the ZLB. In the next section we will explore how
that relationship between a government expenditure shock and the ZLB is affected
by the presence of the interest rate subsidy, τ .
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3.4.2.7.1 The impact of the interest rate subsidy (τ) over the dynamic
path of the variables
Figure 3.13 plots the impulse response functions to a positive government expen-
diture shock in the benchmark economy with no binding ZLB and τ = 0.35 and for
the economy with a binding ZLB, considering 4 different values for the interest rate
tax benefit (τ = 0.0001, τ = 0.2, τ = 0.35 and τ = 0.5). Overall, output grows after
along the simulation horizon, although immediately after the initial impact there is
a negative response in the constrained economies, specially when τ = 0.35 (in that
case the negative response persists until period 10, when the shock is over). It is also
for this simulation that the duration of the ZLB is longer (11 periods), followed by
the constrained economy where τ = 0.5 and 8 periods (2 years) when τ = 0.2. In the
constrained economy with the lowest simulated tax benefit (τ = 0.0001), the ZLB
spell is only of 2 quarters, and this is the case for which consumption starts to in-
crease almost immediately after the shock hits. In the unconstrained economy with
τ = 0.35, there is also small initial negative response of consumption, but followed
by a quick recover in period 6. With a positive government spending shock, house-
holds anticipate an increase in taxes in the future, and therefore lower consumption,
as can be observed for all the simulated cases, and raise labor supply, which justifies
the positive response of hours worked for all the economies considered. In addition,
the initial negative response of output is perceived as lower income for households,
which leads them to lower investment, as can be observed in the dynamic path of
investment for all the simulated economies. In turn, the positive response of hours
worked puts downward pressure on nominal wages and inflation, as can be observed
in Figure 3.14. Since the negative response of inflation is bigger than the negative
response of the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate increases, crowding out
consumption and investment.
In this case, the ZLB contributes negatively to the effectiveness of the government
expenditure shock, since output increases more in the benchmark case then in the
economy with a binding ZLB (see Figure 3.14). The presence of the interest rate
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subsidy increases that effectiveness of government spending since the magnitude of
the impulse response of output increases with a higher value of τ . In fact, when
τ = 0.5, the positive path of output even surpasses the benchmark unconstrained
economy. In this simulation, the impulse responses of all variables are larger than
the benchmark economy and the other constrained simulations, for lower values of
τ . All the responses are smaller when the tax benefit is almost absent (τ = 0.0001),
nearly resembling the standard findings that we would get in a New Keynesian DSGE
model. This result implies that the presence of the financial frictions introduced by
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) (the enforcement constraint and the equity payout
cost) is an important source of distortions in this model, that, in interaction with the
ZLB, is able to generate wider and more unconventional responses from the main
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Figure 3.13: IRFs to a Government Expenditure Shock with a binding ZLB
Notes: Time, measured in quarters, in represented on the horizontal axis. Output, consumption, investment,
hours and wages are measured in log deviations from steady state (in percentage). The nominal interest rate, the
real interest rate and inflation are measured in percentage points deviations from the steady state, in annualized
levels.
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Figure 3.14: IRFs to a Government Spending Shock - τ = 0.35
3.4.2.8 Effect of a Monetary Policy Shock
According to Table 3.2, the monetary policy shock only account for a small
fraction of output, consumption, hours and investment developments, although it is
particularly relevant to wages, inflation and debt repurchases volatility. Figure 3.15
shows the impulse response functions to a contractionary two standard deviation
monetary policy shock that lasts for 10 quarters, for the five cases mentioned in the
previous sections (the benchmark economy with no binding ZLB (τ = 0.35) and
the economy with a binding ZLB and the 4 different values for the interest rate tax
benefit (τ = 0.0001, τ = 0.2, τ = 0.35 and τ = 0.5). Output, hours, investment
and nominal wages all decline, while consumption, once again, exhibits different
responses to this shock depending upon the value of the interest rate subsidy, τ .
From Figure 3.16, which displays the impulse response functions to this shock but
only for the benchmark economy and the economy with a binding ZLB when τ =
0.35, we can also observe that in response to a monetary policy shock both the
nominal and the real interest rates rise and inflation and wages decrease.
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After the initial sudden increase, the nominal interest rate starts to gradually de-
cline and, from Figure 3.15 it is clear that in the economy where the nominal interest
rate is allowed to be negative, the paths for output, hours, wages and investment
reach the lowest values among the different scenarios, except for consumption. In
the constrained economy, the duration of the ZLB increases with the value of the
tax benefit τ : for τ = 0.5, the ZLB binds between quarters 5 to 12 while for τ = 0.2
the ZLB only lasts for one period of the shock (10). When the interest rate subsidy
is sufficiently close to zero (τ = 0.0001), the ZLB does not bind, and the dynamic
path of consumption is the only one that decreases after the monetary policy shock
hits the economy, in accordance with the standard New Keynesian literature. That
is also related with the fact that when τ = 0, this model gets closer 18 to a standard
New Keynesian model with complete markets. Rupert and Sustek (2019) argue that
in a model with endogenous capital like this one, when output (income) temporar-
ily drops as a response to a contractionary monetary policy shock in the presence
of sticky prices, households can smooth consumption by reducing investment and
adjusting the capital stock. Furthermore, Rupert and Sustek (2019) argue that in
the cases of high persistence of the Taylor rule (which in this case is ρR = 0.9),
consumption initially somewhat increases the higher ρR is, before declining below
the steady state, as can be observed in Figure 3.15. Figure 3.15 also shows us that
in the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) model, this initial temporary positive response
of consumption increases with the value of the interest rate tax benefit, τ . With a
higher tax subsidy τ , the duration of the ZLB increases, and that implies that the
adjustment in investment to secure smooth consumption with a minimal effect on
the real interest rate has to be stronger, therefore ensuring a smaller drop in output.
If output/income falls less, that implies that consumption exhibits a larger positive
response to a monetary policy shock when τ is higher.
These impulse responses to a monetary tightening in the form of a Taylor rule
that increases the short term nominal interest rate are expected in the context of
the standard New Keynesian monetary transmission mechanism related to this type
18In order to fully collapse to a standard New Keynesian model with complete markets, the
equity payout cost must also be absent, i.e. κ = 0
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of shock, based on the traditional interest rate channel that was vastly explored in
the literature (e.g. Christiano et al. (1999), Christiano et al. (2005), Bernanke and
Gertler (1995), Ireland (2016)). Since nominal prices (and consequently, inflation)
are sluggish due to the Calvo rigidity that is imposed through a costly or staggered
pricing scheme, it is expected that the increase in the nominal interest rates trans-
lates into an increase in the real interest rate, that in turn dampens consumption
and investment. Through the Phillips curve, the decline in output puts downward
pressure on inflation, which adjusts only gradually after the shock. However, due to
the presence of both price and wage rigidities and also to the presence of the ZLB,
this transmission mechanism in this framework does not operate so smoothly as the
theoretical New Keynesian benchmark model would predict. Although both price
and wage rigidity tend to amplify the responses of real variables to a monetary policy
shock, both reactions are usually quite similar with either type of rigidity, since both
the price and wage markups move in the same direction. As a consequence, when
the contractionary monetary policy shock exert downward pressure on prices, some
firms end up with prices that are too high relative to what they would optimally
like, and therefore the price markup rises, and the same reasoning is valid for the
wage markup.
However, in this particular model with the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) calibra-
tion, the values of the parameters associated with the Calvo wage adjustment and
the Rotemberg price adjustment cost, respectively, are set low enough (ω = 0.278
and φ = 0.031) to not be considered sufficiently big to trigger more extreme re-
sponses from real variables. Therefore, in this case, the presence of the zero lower
bound constraint is one of the most important sources of disparity of the impulse
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Figure 3.15: IRFs to a Monetary Policy Shock
Notes: Time, measured in quarters, in represented on the horizontal axis. Output, consumption, investment,
hours and wages are measured in log deviations from steady state (in percentage). The nominal interest rate, the
real interest rate and inflation are measured in percentage points deviations from the steady state, in annualized
levels.
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Figure 3.16: IRFs to a Monetary Policy Shock - τ = 0.35
3.4.2.9 Statistical properties of the innovations and their relation to the
endogenous variables
Table 3.3 presents an overview of the statistical properties of the most important
endogenous variables of the model, which include GDP, consumption, investment,
hours worked, the nominal interest rate, inflation rate, debt repurchases and equity
payout to shareholders. Those statistical properties are measured by the mean,
standard deviation, variance, skewness and kurtosis of those variables, all computed
in a simulated economy with an interest rate subsidy of τ = 0.35.
Surprisingly, the most volatile variables are wages, inflation and specially debt
repurchases, when usually it is expected to get a much more unstable behavior
for investment, for example. In general, all the variables seems to be low skewed,
although some are more left-skewed (consumption, wages, inflation, debt repurchases
and equity payout) and others are slightly right-skewed (GDP, investment, hours
and the nominal interest rate. All the variables present very low values of kurtosis,
suggesting that they are almost mesokurtic, although some exhibit a slight tendency
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to be more leptokurtic (hours, nominal interest rate and equity payout) and others to
be more platykurtic and possess fatter tails (GDP, consumption, investment, wages
and inflation).
Table 3.3: Moments of Simulated Variables
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Variance Skewness Kurtosis
GDP 0.995 0.037 0.001 0.145 -0.484
Consumption 0.608 0.026 0.001 -0.150 -0.021
Investment 0.211 0.045 0.002 0.175 -0.322
Hours 0.299 0.012 0.0001 0.237 0.013
Wages 1.858 0.397 0.158 -0.395 -0.909
Interest Rate 0.018 0.013 0.0002 0.191 0.165
Inflation 0.027 0.217 0.047 -0.327 -1.065
Debt Repurchases 3.618 1.115 1.244 -0.416 -0.579
Equity Payout 0.204 0.037 0.001 -0.112 0.150
Source: Author’s own calculations in Dynare.
As observed in Figure 3.4, the statistical properties of the 8 structural shocks in-
cluded in the model somehow confirm the previous conclusions regarding the relative
importance of each one as crucial drivers of recession episodes. The shocks with the
highest absolute volatility are the wage markup shock and the price markup shock,
followed by the preference shock. However, if we take into account to coefficient of
variation to take into account the volatility of each innovation relative to its mean,
the investment shock is the most volatile innovation, followed by the financial shock,
the price markup shock and the preference shock. This is relatively consistent with
the previous analysis, if we take into account that the shocks that needed to be
simulated with a lower number of standard deviations were volatile enough to bind
the ZLB and provide a wider duration of this constraint. Less responsive shocks, like
the technological shock and the government expditure shock were simulated with a
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much higher nember of standard deviations in order to bind the ZLB and generate
a sufficiently large duration of that constraint. Indeed, the wage markup shock,
the price markup shock and the preference shock were simulated with 2 standard
deviations, the financial shock with 4 standard deviations and the investment shock
with 6 standard deviations. This is also consistent with the variance decomposition
presented in Table 3.2, that suggest that the shocks that are more capable to gen-
erate more extreme movements in economic activity are the price markup shock,
wage markeup shock and also the preference shock. The only exception in this case
is the productivity shock, that, although exhibits a low volatility levels, contributes
with approximately 11.27% to the volatility of output, the second largest driver of
output movements according to these simulations.
Table 3.4: Statistical Distribution of Innovations
Innovations Mean Std.Dev. Variance Coef. of Variation Skewness Kurtosis
Preferences 0.9980 0.0446 0.0020 22.3844 -0.1159 -0.4474
Financial 0.1998 0.0055 0.00003 36.5201 0.1481 0.8313
Technology 0.0019 0.0121 0.0001 0.1587 -0.1375 -0.5469
Investment 1.0018 0.0142 0.0002 70.5372 0.1557 -0.3685
Price Markup 1.1398 0.0506 0.0026 22.5114 0.0171 -0.1454
Wage Markup 1.0216 0.1079 0.0116 9.4679 -0.1134 -0.0907
Gov. Spending 0.1776 0.0169 0.0003 10.5346 -0.0019 -0.3486
Monetary Policy 0.00003 0.0020 0.00004 0.0015 0.0202 -0.1891
Source: Author’s own calculations in Dynare.
Another way to look at the strong linkages between some of the included struc-
tural shocks and endogenous variables, the correlations between the estimated in-
novations and the main variables of the model are presented in Table 3.5. The
strongest correlation in this table (which exceeds 0. in absolute terms) is observed
between equity payout and the price markup shock (0.6131), followed by the cor-
relation observed between output and the price markup shock (−0.5008), which is
227
consistent with the contribution of approximately 46.26% of this shock to output
volatility. Investment is also highly correlated with the price markup shock (0.4795)
and with the investment shock (0.4228), as well as hours worked (correlation of
0.3969 with the price markup shock and 0.2446 with the investment shock). The
correlations between the preference shock and consumption (0.2425), investment
(−0.3188), the nominal interest rate (0.1833) and debt repurchases (−0.2089) are
also considerably strong, confirming the importance of the preference shock in driv-
ing dynamics into the economic activity. The correlations between the financial
shock and wages (0.3298), inflation (0.3176) and debt repurchases (0.3842) are also
considerably strong, confirming the link between the enforcement constraint and
the marginal cost of labor, although the correlation between this shock and hours
(0.0643) and between this shock and output (0.0703) is not high enough to reflect
that relationship.
Table 3.5: Correlation between Simulated Variables and Innovations
Variables
Innovations y c i n w r π b d
Preferences -0.1546 0.2425 -0.3188 -0.0243 -0.057 0.1833 -0.0534 -0.2089 0.1569
Financial 0.0703 0.0408 0.0294 0.0643 0.3298 0.16 0.3176 0.3842 0.0603
Technology 0.1913 0.1526 0.1375 -0.31 -0.2628 -0.0333 -0.3072 -0.0914 0.008
Investment 0.2652 -0.2789 0.4228 0.2446 -0.0721 0.3127 -0.0513 0.129 0.0171
Price Markup -0.5008 0.2137 -0.4795 -0.3969 0.3363 -0.1659 0.4002 0.1739 0.6131
Wage Markup 0.0396 0.0574 -0.0464 -0.0695 0.1135 0.1892 0.0467 0.0779 0.196
Gov. Spending 0.2195 -0.2366 -0.0223 0.1457 -0.3769 0.0249 -0.3856 -0.1699 -0.0392
Monetary Policy -0.1084 -0.0223 -0.0657 -0.114 -0.0391 -0.1267 -0.0516 -0.0477 -0.1179
Source: Author’s own calculations in Dynare.
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3.5 Conclusion
In general, I conclude that, in an economy constrained by the binding presence
of a zero lower bound imposed in a truncated Taylor rule by the monetary authority,
the presence of an interest rate subsidy and other frictions (such as the equity payout
cost, price and wages rigidities and investment adjustment costs) helps to amplify
and propagate the effects of shocks of very different sources that can affect the
economy.
While performing simulations of the model based on Jermann and Quadrini
(2012), the unconstrained economy where the nominal interest rate is allowed to
float freely (even to negative values) and with an interest rate tax benefit set to 35%
(τ = 0.35) was considered as the benchmark economy or the first best allocation,
and compared against five different economies with a binding zero lower bound
but different values of the tax benefit defined for each case: τ = 0.0001, τ = 0.2,
τ = 0.35 and τ = 0.5. After conducting simulations for the eight different types of
shocks included in the Jermann and Quadrini (2012) setting (preference, financial,
productivity, investment, price markup, wage markup, government spending and
monetary policy shocks), one of the first conclusions that stand out is the fact
that the presence of a binding zero lower bound constraint is sufficient to trigger
adverse shocks and increase the amplification and propagation of those shocks. My
findings also suggest that using the interest rate subsidy as a fiscal instrument to
circumvent completely the effects of a liquidity trap and replicate the first best
allocation achieved in the benchmark economy is not possible, although it can help
to neutralize partially the effects caused by that constraint.
For almost all simulated shocks, the magnitude of the impulse responses, which
implies higher amplification and propagation of those shocks, increase with a higher
interest rate subsidy, and for some values of the tax benefit (for τ > 0.35) those
responses usually surpass the dynamic path of the benchmark case. Furthermore,
increasing the tax benefit as a fiscal tool to neutralize the effects of the ZLB further
increases the duration of the ZLB, which contributes to perpetuate and reinforce
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the impact of the shocks over the economy and further cementing those shocks as
important sources of economic fluctuations that are able to generate deep recessions
like the 2008 financial crisis.
However, using lower values of the interest rate benefit or even completely elim-
inating this subsidy can approximate the economy to a standard New Keynesian
economy with complete markets, which for some simulations implies that the zero
lower bound can be completely circumvented (for example, for τ = 0.0001 in the
preference shock, the investment shock, the wage markup shock and the monetary
policy shock simulations). However, the benchmark allocation can no longer be
achieved, which implies that the positive impact over output will be lower and the
capacity of the model to generate realistic business cycles will be limited.
These findings suggest that the tightening of the enforcement constraint imposed
to firms during the 2008 financial crisis, limiting their ability to contract new debt
to finance investment and labor, allied to the subsequent period of very low nominal
interest rates contributed to extend and amplify the negative effects that different
types of shocks exerted over the economy when they were triggered by the subprime
crisis. Furthermore, the high persistence of the Taylor rule and the high values set
to calibrate the output gap growth coefficient of the Taylor rule also help to justify
the high persistence in the shocks processes that lead to a higher duration of the
zero lower bound constraint and to explain the anomalous behavior of consumption
in some of the simulations.
Appendix
3.5.1 Corrections in the First Order Conditions for the Firm’s
Problem
This section of the appendix describes the full set of equations that characterize
the equilibrium of the structural model studied in this paper, presented by Jermann
and Quadrini (2012) as an extension of the framework originally developed by Smets
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and Wouters (2007), by adding financial frictions and financial shocks. The full list
of log-linearized equations is provided, as well as the the first order conditions of the
firm, already incorporating the corrections proposed by Pfeifer (2016).
3.5.1.1 Dynamic System of Equilibrium Equations
This section presents the complete list of dynamic equations that define the
equilibrium of the structural model. In the first order conditions for the firm the
Lagrange multiplier λ is eliminated by imposing the condition λt = 1/Ptϕd(d).




− 1 = 0 (3.31)
2. Capital utilization:
(1− µtϕd,t)Fu,t −Ψu,tkt − χtDu,tϕd,t = 0 (3.32)










4. Price of capital:




5. Law of motion for capital:
(1− δ)kt + Υt − kt+1 = 0 (3.35)
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− χtϕd,t = 0 (3.40)
11. Firm’s value:

















− bt −Wtnt − PtGt − Ptϕt − Ptit = 0 (3.43)
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14. Household’s budget:
Wtnt + Ptdt −
bt+1
1 + rt









− Tt = 0 (3.45)
16. Monetary policy (linearized):
a1rt−1 + a2(Pt − Pt−1) + a3(Yt − Y ∗t ) + a4(Yt−1 − Y ∗t−1) + ςt − rt = 0 (3.46)
where a1 = ρR, a2 = (1− ρR)ν1, a3 = (1− ρR)ν2 + ν3, a4 = −ν3.
17. Output:
Ft − Yt = 0 (3.47)
18. Debt repurchase:
bt/(1 + rt−1)− bt+1/(1 + rt)
YtPt
− xt = 0 (3.48)
Taking into account that 1 + r = (R − τ)/(1 − τ), we can use the linearized
version of these equations to solve for 18 variables:
Rt, Pt, ct, nt, ut, dt, µt, χt, xt, Qt, it, wt,Wt, Yt, Vt, Tt, kt+1, bt+1
as a function of 16 states:
zt, ζt, γt, ηt, υt, Gt, ςt, ξt, pt−1, it−1, ct−1,Wt−1, Rt−1, Yt−1, kt, bt.
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3.5.2 Variance Decomposition (in percent)
Table 3.6: Variance Decomposition (Original Jermann and Quadrini (2012) findings,
in percent)
TFP Investment Preference Price MK Wage MK Government Money Financial
Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock
z ζ γ η υ G ς ξ
GDP 4.1 4.1 1.1 24.9 12.9 0.8 5.9 46.4
Consumption 2.1 27.8 56.6 2.9 2.7 7.1 0.2 0.6
Investment 2.5 16.5 13.3 13.8 9.6 15.2 4.4 24.7
Hours 19.4 5.1 0.8 16 17.7 1.1 6.5 33.5
Wages 0.5 2.9 3.1 5.4 83.3 0.7 3.1 1
Interest Rate 3.6 61.9 4.1 3.4 8.1 9.7 4.5 4.7
Inflation 2.2 24 2 3.7 5.2 2.8 50.6 9.5
Debt Repurchases 6.9 5.8 0.5 51.3 15.3 5.8 0.9 13.5
Note: Average over 10000 draws from the posterior distribution of the reestimated model through
Bayesian methods.
Table 3.7: Variance Decomposition (Original Pfeifer (2016) findings, in percent)
TFP Investment Preference Price MK Wage MK Government Money Financial
Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock
z ζ γ η υ G ς ξ
GDP 5.99 26.11 8.06 25.36 11.63 5.96 10.36 6.53
Consumption 4.33 23.27 20.81 8.85 24.66 5.96 7.56 4.57
Investment 1.98 74.45 5.97 11.08 2.68 0.10 2.39 1.35
Hours 22.42 26.15 3.69 14.52 17.36 6.74 5.95 3.17
Wages 2.13 4.98 15.45 21.51 36.78 1.52 8.15 9.48
Interest Rate 1.24 53.3 31.64 4.16 5.68 1.53 1.09 1.36
Inflation 3.98 18.09 18.6 17.88 8.37 0.7 12.69 19.69
Debt Repurchases 4.05 38.51 5.3 16.8 7.77 0.83 2.44 24.32
Note: Average over 10000 draws from the posterior distribution of the reestimated model through
Bayesian methods.
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Table 3.8: Variance Decomposition (Updated calibration according to Pfeifer (2016),
in percent)
TFP Investment Preference Price MK Wage MK Government Money Financial
Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock Shock
z ζ γ η υ G ς ξ
GDP 1.96 0.79 0.12 3.74 90.66 3.24 0.34 0.15
Consumption 1.46 1.82 0.04 1.55 93.43 3.02 0.07 0.04
Investment 1.4 10.96 0.25 5.02 71.51 3.49 0.45 0.2
Hours 0.26 1.39 0.11 2 95.28 3.09 0.25 0.09
Wages 2.36 19.89 29.73 5.2 38.98 61.87 6.17 0.1
Interest Rate 0.92 20.86 7.56 3.41 54.87 8.32 0.15 0.12
Inflation 0.87 25.15 41.53 0.3 25.44 82.19 7.64 0.02
Debt Repurchases 0.85 19.49 15.74 1.63 76.21 41.23 3.01 4.46
3.5.3 Impulse Response Functions
Figure 3.17: IRFs to a Preference Shock - τ = 0.2
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